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Summary  findings
IDavis  offers an overview of issues relating to the  consequences for econormic  efficiency. Though  countries
development of funded pension schemes in industrial  differ widely in their regulation of pension futnds,  some
countries. The analysis applies the economic theory of  suggestions for good practice canl  still he made.
pension regulation to experience with the structure,  *  Whether pension funds are a cost effective way of
regulation, and performance of funds in nine countries  providing pensions depends on the real asset returns that
- Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan,  Netherlands,  can be attained, in relation to the growth of real wages.
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the  Ideally, there should be a gap of 2 to 3 percent  between
United States - seeking to shed light on the finance of  theni. Portfolio distributions and fund management are
old age security in developing countries and the reform  the key determinants of returns to pension funds, subject
of pension funds in industrial countries.  to the returns available in the market. Prudent
The main peints of the analysis are as follows:  diversification in domestic and foreign markets and
* Pension funds are either defined benefit or defined  indexation of much of pension funds' portfolios both
contribution.  The individual bears more risk with  appear to be imnortant.
defined contribution plans because the pension benefit  *  Pension funds affect capital markets in many ways.
depends on asset returns. Conceptually, defined benefit  They influence market structuee and demand for
funds offer better "employee retirement  insurance."  securities; stimulate innovation, allocative efficiency, an
Private defined benefit pensions are generally available  market development; and have a positive effect on
only through companies and typically include sctne  overall saving. They may also have some deleterious
restriction of labor mobility.  effects, such as irncreases  in volatility, "short termism,"
* Because of some shortcomings of fully or I irgely  and weakening of the control  exerted  by investors and
funded plans, especially for income redistributiotn,  creditors over firms.
governments have chosen to maintain at least basic le.'els  *  Prospects for pension funds in industrial countries
of pay-as-you-go social security. rhe  scope of such  vary with the maturity of existing funds and the
unfunded social security schemes is the key determinant  generosity of social security benefits. In countries such a
of the scale of private retirement  saving.  France, Germany, and  Italy, growth  in coming decades
7 The extent to which pension funds are used as a  could be sizable.
vehiclz for retirement saving depends on the regulatory  * The key recommendations  for countries that are just
regime. Tax advantages are the most important  starting pension funds are for a mix of social security an
incentive, but a wide range of other regulatory choices  private funds; for separate funding rather than "book
also make pension funds more or less attractive to firms  reserves;" for defined benefit plans, subject to
and employees. And some regulations, such as those  appropriate regulation; and for company-based pension
affecting the portability of pensions, may have important  funds.
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This paper provides an overview of the principal  Among the key issues are tax treatment, rules on
policy issues relating to pension funds, illustrated  funding, portfolio regulations, benefit insurance,
by  data  and  details  of  current  practice for  a  protection against insolvency and fraud, vesting,
selection of advanced countries, namely the US,  ownership of  surpluses and  the  mechanics of
the  UK,  Germany,  Japan,  Canada,  tU,e  supervision,
Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Given its largely pay-as-you-go  system, France Is  The  fourth  section  assesses  aspects  of  the
given limited coverage.  The definition  of pension  performance of  funds.  To  the  extent that the
funds  employed is  of  flnancial  intermediaries,  available data  permit,  the  level  and  nature of
usually  sponsored by  non-financial companies,  benefits  paid,  contributions and  administrative
which collect and Invest funds on a pooled basis  costs  of  pension  funds  to  the  company  are
for eventual  repayment  to members in pensions.  compared.  The  kev  influence on  returns  and
hence  costs  of  providing  benefits,  namely
The work is structured as  follows;  in the flrst  portfolio distributions, are compared and related
section we provide key deflnitions and an outline  to  asset  returns,  capital  market  structure,  the
of the general economic issues relating to pension  nature of  liabilities and regulation. Estimates of
funds,  many  of  which  are  developed  and  pension  fund  returns  are  presented'  and  the
illustrated in the rest of the paper.  In the second  nature  of  the  fund  management  process
section we  give  an  overview of  the  different  considered.  Some qualitative effects on  capital
structures for  old age security, and the role of  markets are  also  discussed, notably effects on
pension funds in the countries studied, which is  innovation, market structure, supply of funds and
both of direct re:evance to the  issues addressed  the development of  securities markets.  A final
and key background for the rest of the analysis.  section  offers  a  summary,  takes  a  view  of
The third section addresses the  main issues in  prospects  in  advanced cA  ies,  and  assesses
pension  fund  regulation  (including  fiscal  issues and makes recommenua.tions  for  countries
treatment), and seeks to  assess whether there is  seeking  to set up pension funds de npo.y
any consensus  on "good regulatory practice".2
l.  GENERAL  ISSUES AND DEFINIONS
Pension funds, which car be defined as financial  The  main  fatures  of  pension  funds  can  be
intermediaries,  usually sponsored  by non-financial  analyzed partly by  contrasting them with  other
companies, which collect and  invest funds on a  types  of  provision  for  old  age  and  financial
pooled basis for eventual  payment to members in  institution.  Hence unlike pay-as-you-go pension
the  form  of  pensions,  are  among  the  most  funds,  where  workers'  contributions are  paid
important institutions in certain national financial  direct to pensioners, large quantities of funds are
markets.  For  example,  in  1988 in  the  US,  accumulated  by or on behalf of workers to  pay
pension  funds  held  17%  of  equitihs,  in  the  their  own  pensions,  and  there  is  no
Netherlands  funds accounted  for 40% of personal  intergenerational  transfer  (The relation between
sector assets, and in Switzerland  their assets were  pension funds and social security is discussed in
equivalent to 68% of GDP.  In contrast, in other  Section 2.)  Unlike banks, pension funds benefit
advanced  industrial countries  such  as  France,  from regular inflows of funds on  a  contractual
Germany,  and  Italy,  funds  are  of  minor  basis and from long term liabilities (i.e.,  with no
importance (reasons for this are assessed below).  premature withdrawal of funds',  which together
Reflecting these patterns, most economic  analysis  imply little liquidity risk.  The main risks are
has been performed in countries such as the US,  rather those of inaccurate estimates of mortality
the  Netherlands, and the  UK  (see for  example  and  lower  than  expected  returns  on  assets.
Bodie (1990a), Turner and Daily (1990), Van Loo  Defined benefit pension schemes may also suffer
(1988), Blake (1992) and Davis (1988), and their  from the  influence on  liabilities of  unexpected
bibliographical  references).  changes in salaries, transfer payments out of the
scheme and legal changes (e.g.,  equal retirement
Pension funds  are of  two  main types,  namely  ages).
defined benefit and defined  contribution, which
differ  in  the  distribution of  risk  between the  Given the nature ot liabilities, pension funds may
member and the sponsor (typically  a non-financial  concentrate  portfolios on long term assets yielding
company). In the former, the sponsor undertakes  the  highest  returns,  co npensating  for  the
to  pay  members a  pension  related  to  career  increased risk  by  pooling across  assets whose
earnings, such as a predetermined percentage of  returns  are  imperfectly correlated.  Pooling is
final  or  average  salary,  subject  to  years  of  facilitated by  the size  of  pension funds which
service.  Hence  members  trade  wages  for  lowers management, information  and transactions
pernsions  at the  long-term rate of  return in the  costs and facilitates investment  in large indivisible
capital marke.  jvhile employers undertake to top  assets, such as  commercial property.  Portfolio
up the fund to keep it in actuarial balance.  This  distributions and resulting risks and returns are
risk  sharing  feature  is  absent  from  defined  discussed in Sections  4 (b) and (c).  Pension funds
contribution schemes,  where  contributions are  may in  turn aid development of capital markets
fixed and benefits vary with market returns;  all  (Section 5)  although this  may be  hindered by
the risk is borne by the employee. (In the case of  portfolio regulations  (Section  3(c)) or the structure
a stock market crash just prior to retirement, such  and  behavior of  the  fund  management sector
risks for defined contribution  plans may be severe  (Section  4(d)).
- pensioners in the UK who retired in 1974 often
had  pensions less than half the value of  those  Meanwhile, unlike  other  types  of  institutional
retiring  in  1973.)  In  addition, with  defined  investors (life  insurance, mutual funds) pension
benefit schemes there may be  a transfer of risk  funds in most countries benefit from tax deferral.
between young workers who can bear investment  Contributions are  tax  free,  as  are  accumulated
risk,  and  older  workers and  pensioners.  This  interest and capital gains;  tax is only paid on
enables  such  funds  to  have  a  high  share  of  receipt  of  a  pension  after  retirement.  (Tax
equity - trading return for risk.  Note that both  treatment is discussed in  Section 3(a).)  Hence,
types may also have life insurance aspects e.g.,  for  both  the  sponsoring  company  and  the
widows' benefits.  employee - or  for the individual, in the case of3
poksonal  pensions  - pension  funds are superior  to  schemes  Is  because  they  provide  superior
alternatives  (for the company,  unfunded  schlemes,  insurance  to deflned  contributione  - although  the
for the employee,  other forms of sav,ng).  In  implication  is also that company-based  defined
addition,  pension  funds are generally  contractual  contribution  schemes are superior to  individual
annuities,  meaning  that lump  sum  withdrawals  are  contracts. The balance  in the countries  studied
precluded  even  during  the period  when  claims  are  between  defined  contribution  and defined  benefit,
payable after retizement.  In  contrast, for life  and its daterminants,  are discussed  in Sections  2
insurance,  early withdrawal  is possible  (at some  and 4(a).
cost) and policy loans also entail a  degree of
liquidity  for holders. Members  of pension  funds  Note  that  the  Informdtion and  Insurance
are willing  to accept  low liquidity  given  potential  arguments  for employer  provision  suggest why
for higher  returns  (at greater  risk)  that contractual  the  market  (insurance  companies,  options
annuities  permit, supported by  benefits of  tax  markets, etc) does not  (and  perhaps cano)
deferral and implicit  insurance  of pension  levels  provide defined benefit schemes.'  But  the
(in defined  benefit  schemes). Pension  funds  tend  approach  also highlights  the fact that, particularly
also  to  have  much  more  liberal  portfolio  in the  absence of  separate funding, and legal
regulation  than life insurers,  partly dv' to lower  separation,  pension  benefits  may  be vulnerable  to
risks  to  solvency resulting from  contractual  risk of  default of  the  firm in  questici.  In
annuities,  which  again  enables  them  to offer high  contrast,  social security pensions  are sublect  to
returns.  political  risk that future governments  will not
honor  benefit  promises.
As  regards economic analysis, pension funds
generally  clearly  have a role to play in the Ijf  Insurance  is not the only way to  view pension
jy&k pattern of  saving, with the  function of  funds;  there is also the tax  shelter  perspective
ensuring that sufficient assets are  available  to  (which  suggests  tax advantages  to companies  are
provide income after  retirement.  Biu  more  the main reason for growth o  funds).  From a
specifically,  at a micro level Bodie (1990a)  has  labor  economics perspective, defined benefit
suggested  that pension  funds (particularly  defined  funds assist the employer  by reducing  costs of
benefit)  should be seen as a form of empioy  labor  turnover  (if vesting  is imperfect,  i.e., early
retirement insurance. 3 Given  risk  sharing,  leavers do  not gain a  proportionate  share of
insurance is  provided against an  inadequate  benefits in  relation  to  contrbutions) and hence
replacement  rate, social security cuts, longevity,  funds  can  be  a  source  of  labor  market
investment  risk and (to some extent) inflation.  inflexibility.  Even with perfect vesting and
Pension  funds are seen as insurance  subsidiaries  indexing,  workers  tend to lose out by changing
of  the  sponsoring firm.  He  suggests this  defined-benefit funds  compared with  those
approach  expiains  a number  of features  of pension  remaining  in  one fund, because part of  their
funds, notably  provision  by the employer  and the  pensions  are based on the low salaries  that they
dominance  of defined  benefit  schemes. Employer  earnt early in their careers. Defined  contribution
provision  may occur because  they have superior  schemes  avoid these problems.  (Portability  is
information  over  earnings, which are  of  key  discussed  in Section  3(f).)
relevance  to the employee's  long term financial
needs;  benefit from economies of  scale in  The corporate rinanc  perspective  sees defined
processing information, employing competent  benefit persion fund liabilities  as corporate  debt
fund managers, etc compared with individuals  and fund investments  as corporate  assets which
arranging  their own pensions;  can implement  collateralise  the pension  obligation. (Section  3(d)
enforced  saving  by deferring  wages  and salaries;  offers a discussion  of funding  rules.)  Given  tax
ca- overcome  many  of the agency  problems  faced  deductability,  corporations  manage  pension
by  individuals  in  dealing direct with financial  funding  and investment  to  maximize  benefit to
institutions;'  and can avoid some of the adverse  sharehulders.  This perspective  also rises  the
selection  problems  of private  annuity  insurance. 5 issue of the status  of members  as stakeholders  in
Meanwhile,  the  dominance  of  defined benefit  the firm, given ownership  of the surpluses  - as4
well  as liability  for deflcits  - rests  with the owners  of policy  regarding  surpluses,  see  Section  3(e).)
of the company. Although  the independent  status
of a fund  cOers  some  protection  from  predators  in  lhe paper now go% on to assess the status of
a takeover,  stripping  of surpluses  and reduction  of  funded pension schemes in  the  structure of
expected  beneflts  has been a controversial  issue  retirement  Income  provision  in the nine countries
(Schleifer  and Sur-mers  (1988)). (For  discussion  studied.S
2.  STRUCTURE
(a)  The Plllars of Retirement  Provision  rates of return and increase in costs per capita.)
Funding may  adversely influence the  exchange
Pension funds are convintionally seen as merely  rate and the current account if ex ante domestic
one part of  a  system of piovision for old age.  investmnent  is  less than the  ncrease in  saving.
The other so-called "pillars" include compulsory  The increase in saving may depress the domestic
flat-rate  social-security  pensionsg  (which  is  rate  of  return.  A  trust  fund  run  by  the
u.ually  pay-as-you-go,  i.e,  workers  pay  government  could  be  diverted  into  public
pensioners  directly);  & rnings-related  social  consumption,  or at least be vulnerable to political
security, often for those without private pensions  influence (private funds avoid this problem).  A
(again  pay-as-you-go);  individual  saving,  transition from pay-as-you-go  to  funding can be
including  that via life insurance savings plans and  difficult, as one generation has to  "pay twice",
purchase of residential property;  support by the  once for  existing pensioners via  pay-as-you-go,
family; and work after retirement.  and once for their own pensions via funding.
Key macroeconomic and welfare issues arise in  Also the problem of competition over domestic
this  context,  particularly  from  the  choice  o  resources is  not  entirely removed by  funding;
(public  or  private)  pension  systems  between  instead it is switched from pensioners seeking a
fimding and  pay-as-you-go.  The  issue arises  share of  labor income (v.a  taxation) to  claims
partly  from  agi g  of  the  population, which as  over  the returns on  the  capital stock.  (Vittas
discussed below will put increasing  strain on pay-  (1992)  shows  their  equivalence  in  a  closed
as-you-go systemns,  as  workers  and  employers  economy.)  But at least ownership of the capital
become increasingly burdened by social security  stock may be a more secure basis for retirm.ent
contributions, (i.e.,  there will be  an  increasing  than the willingness of  existing workers to  pay
problem ef competition over domestic resources).  pensions  as  in  pay-as-you-go schemes.  In
Such difficulties will impact on competitiveness,  addition, the potential for  conflict over  use  of
depending on the situation in other countries.  If  domestic resources in the case of funded schemes
contributions are seen as  taxes they will distort  can  be  reduced by  international investment in
the labor supply decision;  this does not occur  (developing)  countries  that  do  not  face
with funding.  Pay-as-you-go  may also discourage  demographic problems.  Such  diversification
saving and hence capital formation, while funding  would alh.  reduce any  adverse effects  on  the
increases it, thus raising future output for workers  domestic rate of return and the exchange  rate.
and pensioners.
However, given the conflicting risks arising from
There  are  nevertheless some arguments against  funde(&  and pay-as-you-go  schemes, analysts such
funding.  From a welfare point of view (Pestieau  as Vittas (1992) suggest countries are best advised
(1991)),  funding  may  be  objectionable for  to have a mixture  of both.
intergenerational  equity 9 (because no transfers are
possible  between  generations,' 0 to  compensate  (b)  The Size of Funded Sectors
for a changing economic environment)  as well as
within generations (well paid workers who stay  The data in Table 1 show a contrast between the
with one firmn  benefit most from the fiscal benefits  role  of  pension funds  in  the  Anglo-American
offered).  Pay-as-you-go  schemnes can  offer  countries (the United Kingdom, the United States,
Jmmediate  pensions, without waiting for assets to  and Canada), the"  Netherlands and Switzerland,"
build  up.  They  remove  inflation  risk  to  where they account for a sizable part of personal
pensioners by  linking future benefits to  wages.  sector  saving and  wealth,  and  those  in  other
They can provide a higher rate of return to each  continental European countries such as Germany
generation if  the sum of wage and *'mployment  and  France.  Japan  occupies an  intermediate
growth exceed the interest rate.  (But if they do  position, with  sizable total  assets but  srnL'l in
not,  then there  mnay  be  a  corresponding fall in  relation  to personal  wealth, saving or GNP.Table 1  Pension  fund  assets("),  1988
Stoct?  of  % of  I  of  Total net  I  o  I  of
assets  (end-  personal  GNP  investment  personal  ON"
1988)  $bn  sector  Obn  sector
assets  saving
UK  475.9  27.2%  57.0%  21 .9(c)  71.30)  3.5%
Us  1646.7  13.20  33.8%  72 6(c)  49.9%  1.5%
Canada  130.9  14.1%  26.7%  11.4Wd!  38.8%  2.4%
Japan(b)  134.1  2.1%  4.6%  17 o(d)  19.5%  0.6%
oermany(b)  41.1  :4  3-5%  44 (d)  3.9%  0.3%
Netherlar1esf)  177.4  39.6%  77.9%  :1 6(dl  37.9%  5.1%
Swedon(q)  51.2  - 28.4%  3 d'd'  ())  2.1%
Denmark(h)  13.1  12.9%  1 2(d)  - 1.1%
Iwitserland  121.  1  - 68.0%  ll j(d)  95.0%  6.2%
HemoJ France  27.7  3.1%  3.0%  1 o(C)  1.5%  0.1%
Sources National  Flow-of-Funds  Data
Notes  (a)  The table  covers  only independent  funded  schemes,  which  are the  main subject
of the  paper,  and hence  excludes  pension  funds  managed  by life  insurers,  which
in 1988  had asoets  of $100  billion  in  the United  Kingdom,  $628  billion  in  the
United  States,  $80  billion  in Japan  and $6  billion  in  Germany.
(b)  The data  exclude  unfunded  Japunese  and  German  pensio4  reserves  held  directly
on the balance  sheet  of  the sponsoring  firm (booking). In 1988  these  amounted
to $87  billion  in  Japan  and $100  billion  in  Germany.
(a)  Flow.
(d)  Difference  of stock  (ie  may include  some  revaluations)
(e)  The large  t  lancing  item  in  the United  Kingdom  national  accounts  means  this
ratio  may be inaccurately  measured.
(f)  Includes  both public  (ASP)  and  private  funds. Private  funds  alone  were
$104  billion.
(g)  Data for  Sweden  relate  to  the  ATP scheme,  which is  a  hybrid  between  social
security  and funded  private  schemes  (it  is  nationally  coordinated  but relies
on  employers  contributlons  and  employers  are  represented  on the investment
boards). There  are also  private  schemes  in  Sweden (ITP/STP)  but  they  are
usually  booked  or unfunded.
(h)  1987.
(i)  Not meaningful  (saving  negative).
5a6
Similar contrasts are apparent  over time.  The  othor  types  of  financial asset.  (Although
proportion  of peisonal sector financial  wealth' 2 legislation in  the  United Kingdom outlawing
accounted  for by poasion  fijid  assets, and the  compulsory membership, as  well  as  the
ratio to GDP (see Table 2', has increased  in all  development  of personal  pensions  in a number  of
the  countries illustrated, although by  different  countries,  may make the situation  more fluid.)
amounts. Absolute  growth  hr- also beeni  rapid.  On the other hand, the nature of the benefits
Real growth in  Japan over  1980-8  was at  an  offered  may provide  an incentEve  to work for a
avorago  of 17% (UK 13.3%, US 8.8%, Cianada  particular  firm, making  it attractive  for that firm
6.4%, Netherlands  7.5%).  to  of'er  a  particular type of  scheme.  For
employees,  pensions  have  often  been  a subject  for
Savings  basad  life insurance  policies,  and pension  collective  bargaining  (particularly  in the United
funds managed  by  life insurers, are of  eourse  States, Denmark,  and the Netherlands). And as
alternative  ways to  pension funds of fir ncing  noted,  private  annuity markets suffer  from
retdiument.  The combined  size of life insurance  imperfections,  encouraging  employees  collectively
and pension  fund sectors has also grown, albeit  to press  for vension  funds  to be set up.  The more
often nmore  slowly than pension funds alone  generous  the beneflit offered, and the wider the
(Table  3).  The principal  change  In the ordering  Is  ;overaU,  the  more assets pension funds will
in Japan, where the size of the life insurance  require.  Finally,  taxation  and  regulatory
sector is almost  eight times  that of pension  funds  proyisions,  as discussed  in  Section 3,  make it
(run by trust banks). In most other countries  the  more or less attractive  for the firm to  offer a
size of the jife sector is commensurate  with the  pension  fund.  For employees,  too, high marginal
size  of its pension  funds.  tax  ra.es  may increase the  attraction of  tax
deferral  via pension  funds.
This section  now  goes  on to outline  the causes  of
these  differences by  refeisnce  to  structural  But the most crucial  point is that private  funded
features  of  the funds themselves  and the main  schemes  cannot  usefully  be viewed in isolation;
alternative  pillar, namely social security.  Note  the principal  altematiy to a private  pension  fund
that a complete  assessment  of the causes  of the  is the state social security  pension  scheme. Not
differences  in  size of funded sectors must also  surprisingly,  the growth of private schemes  can
incorporate  the arguments  presented  in sections  3  be related  to the scale of social security  piension
and 4, which  respectively  address  regulation  and  provision,  which  impose  limits on private  sector
performance;  these  underly the  structural  schemes. Note  that social  security  is invariably  a
differences between funded schemes that  are  compulsory,  indexed,  defined  benefit,  and usually
outlined  here, as well as the scale of their use as  unfunded  pension  scheme.
compared  with other types  of private  saving  (the
'third pillar").  On the other hand, as noted, the age structure  of
the population  will determine  likely  future strains
(c) Causes  of Differences  cii a social security  system. As shown  in Table
4,  rapid aging of the population,  with a rising
What  accounts for  the  differences in  the  proportion of,  retirees,  is  projected for  all
importance  of funded  ors in the provision  of  advanced countries, but  especially those  in
pensions? Since  pension  funds  comprise  financial  Continental  Europe  and  Japan  (see also  Hagemann
assets, it  is  natural to  begin with  portfolio  and Nicoletti  (1989)). This results largely  from
considerations  such as risk and return. However,  declining  birth rates, but also greater longevity
the  majority of  pension fund  members are  and a  decline in  the  amplitude  of  migration.
affiliated  as a consequence  of their employment,  Where  social security  is relatively  generous  (see
and such fund membership  is often compulsory,  Table 5), maintenance  of promises  may lead to
although  setting  up of a fund is not compulsory  vastly  increased  contributions  from the workforce,
for the firm, except in Switzerland  and France.  resulting in  a  loss of  competitiveness  due to
Therefore  rates  of return  on pension  funds  do not  higher wages and/or a  marked reduction in
attract investors  in the same direct way as do  personal income.  For  example, Mitra (1991)Table  21  Pension  fund assets  (as a p.raentage  of  ODP)
1970  1971  1980  1985  1990
Ut.  17  15  23  47  55
Us  17  20  24  29  35
Germany  2  2  2  3  3
Japan  0  1  2  4  5
Canada  1  13  17  23  28
Netherlands  29  36  46  68  77
Sweden  22  2.  30  29  28
Iwitierland  38  01  51  59  69
Denmark  5  5  7  12  15
lourc:t  Nat!e,nal  llow-of-Fun4s  data.
Table  3i  Life  insurance  and pension  fund  assets (as a  percentage  of GDP)
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990
UK  43  37  46  83  97
uS  37  37  42  49  59
Ge'  ny  10  11  14  19  22
Japan  8  10  13  20  41
Canada  31  28  31  39  46(3)
Netherlands  45  51  63  86  107
Sweden  42  48  51  55  63
Switzerland  51  1is  70  82  n/a
Denmark  14  14  19  31  n/a
Memo  Items5
France  6  7  7  9  13(1)




6aTable  4:  Percentage  of Population  Over  65
1990  2020  Percent  2050  Percent
L%ange  Change
As  a  percentage  of  population  15-65
UK  23.1  25.6  10.8%  30.4  18.8%
Germany  22.5  33.2  47.6%  42.3  27.4%
Netherlands  18.5  28.9  56.2%  38.1  31.8%
Sweden  27.4  33.0  20.4%  35.8  8.5%
Denmark  22.7  30.5  35.6%  39.8  30.5%
Swltzerland  25.0  48.1  92.4%  46.0  -5.6%
France  21.0  30.5  45.2%  37.8  23.9%
US  18.7  25.0  33.7%  31.8  27.2%
Japan  16.6  33.7  103.0%  37.6  11.6%
Canada  16.8  29.0  72.6%  36.4  25.5%
Source: Hagemann  and  Nicoletti  (1989)
Table  5:  Indicators  of the  scope  of social  s*curlty  pensions
Payments/GDP  (1985)(1)  Social  securLty  replacee  nt
rate  for  single  worker  (1980)(2)
US  8.2%  44%
UK  7.5%  31%
Germany  13.5%  49%
Japan  5.2%  54%
Canada  6.4%  34%
Netherlands  11.8%  44%
Sweden  13.0%  68%
Denmark  9.8%  29%
Switzerland  8.5%  37%
Memo:  France  14.4%  66%
(1)  Source:  Mitra (1991)
(2)  Source:  Aldrich (1982)
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suggests  that contribution  rates for social  security  This section  discusses  the balance  between  social
pens.ons  in Germany  might rise from a current  security  and funded  pensions,  together  with key
14% of labor costs  to 23% in 2010 and 30% in  structural  features  of the systems  which  determine
2050.  French  government  calculations  suggest  a  the balance  between them.  These features are
rise from a current 19%  to 31-42%  in 2040.  In'  summarized  in Table  6.
Japan  the contribution  rate would  be 30% in 2020
under  unchanged  policies.  In theJlK (Blake  (1992)),  70%  of workers  have  a
funded  pension,  of whom  50% are in company
Political  problems  would  be likely  to follow  such  schemes. Schemes  are quite  long-etablished;  the
increases,  as well as the workforce  and industry  current level of coverage  of  company  schemes
"voting  with its feet' to shift to other countries  was reached in  1967.  Defined benefit plans,
with lower contributions. Elements  of this are  often with provisions  for a degree  of indexation,
already apparent  in  Germany,  where firms are  cover  all public  sector  and the majority  of private
tending  to locate new factories  in countries  with  sector beneficiaries.  Defined  contribution  plans
lower  social  costs. Note  that taking  the strain  via  declined  in popularity  during the mid-1970s,  an
increased  public deficits instead  of taxation  will  era of high inflation  and low real rates of return
only postpone  the problem  until  the bonds  need  to  to  investment.  Defined beneflt  plans  are
be repaid with taxpayers' money.  A rational  obviously  vulnerable  to deficits  during  periods  rf
private  sector  in the sense  of Barro  (1974),  which  securities  market weakness,  such as the 1970s,
anticipates  perfectly  the future taxes to pay off  and  firms had  to  make large  "topping-up"
bonds and  immediately  adjusts its expenditure  payments  in the late 1970s. More  recently  (since
accordingly,  would  not even  differentiate  the two  1981),  asset growth  has reflected  the strength  of
cases.  capital  markets,  and with in addition  widespread
reductions in  membership  due  to  redundancy
Governments  are seeking  to limit social security  (which reduces projected pension obligations),
commitments,  and stimulate  private saving for  many schemes became overfunded,  with firms
retirement,  in the light of these  potential  burdens.  taking  contribution  holidays. And the advent  of
They may also  seek partially to  fund social  personal  pensions  has accompanied  a resurgence
security.  (Related  policies are to  increase  the  of defined  contribution  plans.  The development
labor force  participation  rate, notably  of older or  of social security  has been favorable  to private
even "retired' people, to encourage  immigration,  schemes; employees  with company  pensions  may
to  raise the  retirement  age," 3 and to  seek to  "contract  out" of  all but the most basic state
promote  fertility.) In the light of these polic-es,  scheme, and the  government,  concerned  over
and associated  expectations  of further action, in  future  state  pension obligations, is  offering
many  countries,  individuals now  anticipate  incentives to  individuals without a  company
promises  will be scaled  down in the light of the  scheme to  take a personal defined contribution
burden of such schemes  on future wage earners  pension instead of  an  earnings-related  state
md/or government  borrowing. This in turn is  pension.  It  is  also  reducing the  maximum
,timulating  precautionary  saving via institutions  benefits  from  the latter.
indeed,  private  pensions  can be seen as a form of
private  sector insurance  against  the political  risks  In the United  States  (Turner  and Beller (1989)),
of a government  run system). Section  3 probes  coverage  is lower, at 40%.  Most  primary  private
more  deeply  the further  question  of why  increased  funded pension coverage is  again in  defined
precautionary  saving should occur via pension  benefit  schemes  (which  account  for two thirds of
funds, rather than private voluntary  saving of  pension assets).  However,  a  large number of
other  types.  workers  also  have  supplementary defined
contribution  plans.  From 1975 to  1985 US
Structures  of  Pension Provision In  Nine  workers covered by  defined benefit plans  rose
ountries  from 27.2 to  29.0 million but fell from 39% to
30% of  the workforce,  while participants  in
'hat are the structures  of the pension  systems?  defined contribution  plans rose from  11.2 toTable  Gas  Features  of  funded  penuion  systess
UK  US  Germany
Nature  of benefiu for  Largely defined benefit  Primary cover largely  Largely defined benefit
average  member  based on final  alary.  defined benefit based  with flat rmteLbenefit
on fnl  salary.  bued  on yea  of
Supplementary defined  service.
contribution  plans
widespread.
Taution  of  mnded  Contnbutions and  asset  Contributions  and uset  Employers'
schem.  returns tax free  returns tax fre.  contributions  taxed as
Benefri  tuxed, exept  Benefit  taxed.  wages; employee
tax free lump sum.  contributions  and aset
returns tax free.
Benefits  taxed at low
rate.
Social securiy  Low replawomnt ratio.  I w replacement  tio.  High replacement ratio.
Scheme members can
ontract  out of earnings
related sochl scurity.
Regulation of porolios  Prudent man oDncept;  Prudent man concept;  Guidelines; maximum
S*  self investrnet  10% Umit on self  20% equity, 5%
Umit;  concentration  investment for defined  property, 4% foreign;
limit for defined  benefit plans.  10% self investment
contribution  plam.  limit.
Regulation of funding  Maximum 5% overfund  Maximum 50%  Funding obligatory for
(seo  Section 3(d)  of IBO or PBO.  overfund of ABO.  pension funds
Funding only obligatory  Higher insurance  (Pensionskassen), albeit
for contracted out part  premia if underfunded.  only up to PBO.
of social  security.  Option of booking (tax
exempt- pensions taxed
at normal rate).
Maturity of funds  Matur.  Mature.  Immature.




Insurauce of bonefits  No (although stato  Yr  (special guarantee  Yes (via insuranco
guarantee payment of  corportion).  supervisors).  Booked
minimum  pension if  benefits insured by
fund  default).  Pension Guarantee
Association.
PortAbility  features  Vesting in 2 years.  Vesting in 5 ye".  No  Vesting in 10 years.
Indexation of acrued  indexation of accrued  Indexation of accrued
benefits. Trnsfer  benefits.  Lump sum  benefits.
must be made  to other  disribution permitted
pension fuds.  on truufer.
Indexation  Discretionary  (to date)  Full inuexation  rare  Mandatory.
but total or parial  (5% of schemes).
indexation  common in  Discretion  cost-of-
pratice  (75%).  IivLg increases
oommon.
7aTable  *bt  Features  of  funded  pension  systems
Jaran  wanada  Netherlands
Nature  of benefits for  Largely defined benefit  Largely defined benefit  Almost  exclusively
aveoge  member  based  on years of  baed either on final  defined benefit baned
service  and career  salary  or flat rate  on fil  ulary.
earning or final basic  benefit.
salary. Often taken as
a lump  sum.
Taxation  of funded  Contributions  tax free.  Contributions and  aset  Contributions and aset
schemes.  Tax on asset retums.  returns tax free.  returns tax free.
Benefit taxed, exoept  Benefits  taxed.  Benefits taxed.
tax free lump :.m.
Social seurity  High replacement  ratio.  Low replacement ratio.  Lo-  -ent  rdo.
Scheme members can
contract out of earnings
related social  security.
Regulation  of portfolios  Guidelines; maxirnum  Prudent man (since  Prudc it .-  -; 5% se(f
30% equity, 20%  1987); tax on foreign  investm  ...  lizri  except
property,  30% foreign,  assets above 10%; 7%  for ABP (sc. su&).
10'% one company.  limit on real etate.
Minimum  50% bonds.
Regulation of funding  Funding optional.  Tax  Funding obligatory.  Funding obligatory for.
(see  Section 3(d)  exempt up to ABO  Maximum 5% overfund  IBO or PBO.
only. (Book reserves  of PBO.
tax exempt up to 40%
of liabilities).
Maturity of funds  Immature.  Mature.  Mature.
Coverage  of workforce  37% (funded plans  41%  83%
(approx)  only)
Insurance of benefits  Yes (under wage  No (but social security  Contnbutions insured
payment law).  Mutual  provides backup).  for one  year.
guarantee scheme for
EPFs introduced 1988.
Portability features  Vesting graded between  Vesting after 2 years.  Vesting in one year.
5 and 30 years for  Little indexation  of  Accrued benefits
voluntary leavers.  Low  accrued benefits.  indexed.
transfer values for  Tranferability within
voluntary early leavers.  extensive penion
circuits  with same
conditions.
Indexation  Rare except for part  Provisions rae  (6% of  Indexation almost
replacing social  private schemes); some  universal) albeit not
security.  discretionary increaes.  mandatory).
7bTable Get  Features  of funded  pension  systeas
Denmdrk  Sweden (ATP)  Switzerland
Nature of benefits for  Largely defined  Defined benefit based  Majority of schemes
averago member  contribution.  on best income years.  (60%) defined
contribution but with




Taxation  of funded  Contributions tax  Contributions tax free.  Contributions and asset
schemes.  deductable.  Fund may  Tax on asset  returns  returns tax free,
be taxed.  Benefits  (1991)  benefits taxod at  benetts  taxod.
taxed, including 40%  low rate.
of lump sum.
Social security  High replacement ratio.  Low replacement ratio;  Low replacement rtio;




Regulation of portfolios  Real estate, investment  Majority to be in  listed  30% limit on domestic
trusts,  shares linited to  bonds, debentures and  shares. 50% domestiu
40%. 60% in domestic  retroverse loans to  real estate.  20%
debt.  No self  contributors.  foreign currency assets
investment.  Only  10% foreign shares.
srr.aU  proportion' can
be invested
internationally.
Regulation  of funding  Irrelevant as defined  Contribution rate  Funding compulsary for
(see Section 3 (d))  contribution.  adjusted S-yearly to  PBO or IBO.
ensure. IBO is funded.
Maturity of funds  Mature.  Mature (pre-BVG
immature  (post-BVG).
Coverage of workforce  30% (company  funds)  90% (compulsory)  90% (compulsory to
(approx)  20% (persona!  workers and
pensions)  employers).
Insurance of benefits  State backup as national  Yes; Government
schf ie.  Safety Fund. Small
funds backed by
insurance companies.
Portability features  !mmediate  access to  Vesting immediate - Immediate access to
own contributions, 5  national scheme and  minimum contributions;
years total vesting.  transferability perfect.  imperfect vesting for
Tr-..1sfer  values can be  employers' excas
negotiated.  contributions, with
graded vesting between
5-30 years of service.
Indexation  No.  Yes.  Indexing not
compubory but almost
universal in prumice.
7c33.2 million  (14%  to  33%).  Advantages of  qualified pension plans  (TQPPs),  authorized
defined  contribution  plans  for  the  employer  1962,  are  similar  to  Anglo-American funded
include lower regulatory and administrative  costs  pension plans, and are available to firms with,
(including  avoidance  of PBGC insurance premia),  or more employees.  In 1989 they covered 28
as  they  need  not  meet  the  actuarial  funding  of the private sector workforce and held assets of
standards required of defined benefit funds;  shift  $76 billion.  90% of benefits are taken as a '---
of  risk  to  employees, as  noted  in  Section 1,  sum.  Employee pension funds (EPFs) (19
although  this  should  be  offset  by  higher  unlike TQPPs, enable the private plan to replace
compensation;  and  self  investment  being  the earnings related component of social securi
permitted for over 10% of assets.  (and hence the firm can contract out of earning
related social security contributions),  and are o
But in fact Kruse (1991), using US micro data,  available  to  large  Ftrms  with  500  or  more
suggests that  rather  than  a  positive  shift  by  employees.  Benefits are  in  the  form  of  an
employers, with termnination  of a defined benefit  annuity equal to  the social security pension plus
plan,  the  relative shift  io  defined contribution  the  excess (which has to  be  at  least a  further
relates largely to slower employment  growth for  30%) - often taken as a lump sum.  These cover
firms  offering defined  benefit  plans  (although  26%  of  the  workforce  and  had  assets  of
there was some supplementing  of defined benefit  $143 billion  in  1989.  Both schemes'  "defined
by defined contribution). Effects of relative costs  benefits" usually relate  to  final  "basic"  salary,
on shifts towards defined contribution were also  which may not keep pace with total remuneration,
not large.  Finally, greater economic  instability in  given the importance  of bonuses and allowances.
an  industry leads firms introducing new pension  These  plans  coexist  with  traditional  unfunded
plans to choose defined contribution, perhaps due  retirement bonuses, which benefit from a 40% tax
to lower risk.  deduction for  accruing liabilities, payable when
they are earmarked through an accounting entry
Social security is the US is again supportive of  in the books of the firm.
private schemes;  the  replacement rate  is  low
(though finds  can  take  full  account of  social  In  contrast to  the  US  and  UK,  social welfare
security in  paying pen-ions, so  as  to  ensure a  promises  in  Japan  were  historically relativel
fixed replacement  ratio for all levels of income).  generous, with a prospective "replacement  ratio
A  recent  reform  will  make  social  security  (average  pension  as  a  proportion of  averag
pensions  a  smaller  proportion  of  earnings,  earnings) of over 50 per cent (Table 5), although
beginning in the year 2000, and will increase the  a  reform of  1985 will gradually reduce publi
age at which full benefits are payable.  It  also  pensions as a proportion of average earnings.  A
introduced a  degree  of  prefunding for  social  in  the US,  some assets, amounting to  50% of
security;  funds are accumulated in a trust fund  GDP at present, are accumulated  by the state in
and invested in government bonds.  This should  advance of benefit commitments;  this can help
in  principle  reduce  any  tendency  for  social  allay demographic  concerns.  Such social security
security  provisions  to  reduce  national  saving  benefit commitments are likely to  constrain the
(while increasing the risk that it will be diverted  growth  of  pension  funds.  However,  social
by  the  government  to  unproductive  uses).  security in Japan is not payable until 60, while
However, as  pointed out  by  Bodie and Merton  retirement is often at 55, so a private pension can
(1992),  it  is  not  clear  that  government's  bridge  this  gap."'  In  addition,  as  noted
willingness to  repay bonds (or at  least, not  to  companies can opt out of part of social security
devalue them by  a  bout of  inflation) should be  contributions  by paying an equivalent  pension.
any  more  relia*le- than  the  promise  to  pay
pensions, unless the funds are used for productive  The  German private pension system  comprises
capital investment, with revenues hypothecated  to  four main types of scheme (Deutsche  Bundesbank
pay pensions.  (1984)).  The  largest  are  unfunded schemes,
"direct  commitments"  (Direktzusagen) on  the
In Jaa  (Murakani  (1990), Clark (1991)), tax  balance sheets of large firms, which are usually9
mutually  insured  to  cover  the  risk  of  as an  initial response to  demographic concerns.
bankruptcy."S  In  1990  these  were  60%  of  (See Schmahl (1992a).)
pension  liabilities,  valued  at  DM 181 billion.
Another common form  of  company scheme is  In  the  Netherlands,  'supplementary"  pension
'direct  insurance"  (Direktversicherung) (10%),  funds have developed over a long period, often as
whereby an enterprise concludes  a contract with a  a result of collective  bargaining, to cover virtually
life  insurer  on  behalf  of  its  employees.  the entire labor force (83%) - despite not being
Employees then have a  direct claim on the life  compulsory for employers" 7 - and were codified
insurer.  Risk  and  administrative expenses are  in the Pension and Savings Fund Act of 1953 (see
shifted to the life insurer, but the funds are of no  LutJens (1990), Zweekhorst (1990)).  90%  of
direct use to  the firm.  An enterprise may also  pension plans are defined benefit (usually paying
commission a legally independent  "pension fund'  70% of final salary, in combination  with the basic
(Pensionskasse)  (1990;  20%;  DM 61 billion) or  social security pension), and 90% of pensioners
"provident fund""'  (Untersttitzungskasse)  (1990;  receive  inflation  protection.  Private  pena.-n
10%;  DM 29 billion)  to  handle  its  pension  provision  in  the  Netherlands falls  into  three
scheme,  operating  as  a  mutual  insurance  categories;  industry  funds  covering  multiple
association. Pension funds are closest to practice  employers  (40%  .f  the  workforce);  and
elsewhere.  Provident funds face  no  limit  on  individual  company  funds  (19%);  insurance
investment;  all  can  be  loaned  back  to  the  contracts (3%).  There is also the pension fund
sponsoring  company, and there is no legal right to  for public servants (ABP) (28%).  Industry funds
benefits.  However,  since  1974 only  part  of  may be made compulsory  by collective  agreement
transfers  to  provident  funds  h3ve  been  tax-  for  all  employers and  employee organizations.
deductible for firms as an operating expense (all  Corresponding to  the  development of  private
may  be  deducted  for  pension  funds)  and  pensions, social security only  offers a  minimal
employees'  legal  rights  to  benefits have  been  basic benefit related to the minimum  wage.
strengthened,  so provident funds have declined.
In Canad  funds are again largely defined benefit.
A recent development is "special security funds'  Private 'trusteed" schemes, which cover 40% of
(Kapitalanlagegesellschaften),  a  form  of  the  labor force,  co-exist with  a  flat  rate  non-
investment company whereby highly-liquid  firms  contributory  state  pension  scheme  (OAS),  a
having direct commitments  can invest  part of their  negative income tax (GIS) for those over 65 on
pension provisions in the  capital markets.  This  low incomes and a  contributory earnings-related
overcomes the concentration of  risk  inherent in  public pension (CPP/QPP).  The last  is partly
booking the liability on the firm's balance  sheet.  funded.
Given the  attraction of  exemption from  capital
gains  tax  and  turnover tax  these  have grown  In Sweden, the_main  funded pension scheme is a
rapidly;  inflows were DM 19 billion and a;sets  compulsory,  publicly  directed  "National
DM 116 billion in  1990, although only a part of  Supplementary  Pension Scheme" (ATP Scheme),
these were counterparts  to pension liabilities.  set up in  1960, which complements a basic, flat
rate, social security scheme.  It covers 90% of the
The  development of  German private  pensions  workforce.  The aim is to accumulate  significant
needs to be put in perspective,  as it accounts for a  quantities  of funds to provide future benefits, thus
relatively small proportion of personal saving and  offering an occupational pension that is  indexed
wealth, even if  unfunded schemes are included  and equal to a  sizeable proportion (60%) of the
(Table 1).  This is largely because Germany  has a  best years of earnings.  The fund is administered
relatively  generous, mandatory  and wholly pay-as-  independent  of the government in a series of sub
you-go state  social security scheme (Table 5).  funds, which invest monies from different sectors
Private schemes are supplementary,  and need far  of the economy (public sector, large firms, small
fewer  assets  to  cover  their  more  limited  firms/self employed) in a  variety of both public
commitments than  elsewhere.  However,  the  and private financial assets (Section  4).  There are
retirement age has recently (1989) been increased  also certain smaller private schemes in Sweden,10
one for white collar workers (the ITP system) and  private pension schemes, which already cover
one for blue collar (the STP system).  The ITP  85% of the workforce.  Afterl'institution  of BV
system is funded either through book reserves,  this rose  to  90%  (it excludes the  unemployec
through insurance contracts or  through contracts  some part  time  and  temporary employees, an,
with a  special pension company, while the STP  those under 18).  Unlike the public ATP scheme
scheme is unfunded.  However, we focus in the  in Sweden, fund management is not centralized,
paper on the ATP scheme, as the major funded  but arranged by the individual  employer.
scheme invested directly in  the capital markets,
while bearing in mind - and using for comparative  In France and  Ialy,  the generosity of the sta
purposes - its public sector basis.  scheme  (supplemented in  France  by  "hybrih
private/public  industry-wide  pay-as-you-g4
The  jDjsh  funded pension schemes are private,  schemes) has been such as to  almost completel'
largely defined contribution plans run by private  crowd  out  funded  private  pension  plans  (s
companies  for  their  staff,  although  some  Metais (1991)).  For this reason, these countries
multinationals offer  defined  benefit  schemes.  are not covered in detail in the current analysis.
There  are  also  natianw; .-  sectoral  and  Recent  proposals  in  France  to  increase  the
professional pension funds, which are classed as  importance  of  private  pension  schemes  (for
mutual insurance companies.  Retirement assets  background,  see  Commissariat  Generale  du
are accumulated  in banks and life insurers as well  Plan (1991)) face difficulties given the short-run
as pension funds;  the latter account for only 28%  fiscal  implications  of  tax-free  pension
of the total.  The attraction of private pensions to  contributions.  However, in Italy a  1991 reform
blue collar workers is reduced by the generosity  did seek to raise the retirement pension age from
of  the  public pension system,  which currently  60  to  65,  impose higher  contributions and
offers a  replacement rate for married couples of  longer  contribution  period (20 to 35 years).
66%  (OECD (1988)).  (Note that the  data  in
Table  5  are  for  1980 and  single employees.)  To summarize, the influence on the development
High  composite marginal income tax  rates  on  of private schemes  of the scale of social security.
supplementary  pensions are also a disincentive  to  offset  in  some cases by demographic concerns,
pension saving.  can be discerned in  each country;  for example
the  Swedish public and  Swiss private national
The SAiss pension system (Hepp (1990)) consists  funded systems are designed to provide the bulk
of the state social security scheme (AHV/IV), the  of  retirement benefits beyond a  basic flat  rate
compulsory  occupational  pension  schemes  pension, and are accordingly  both compulsory  and
(BVG/LPP)  and individual  saving.  The formation  comprehensive.  In a more free-market context
of the BVG/ILPP  schemes stems, as  in Sweden,  the forces encouraging  funding are also at work in
from  recognition that  the  state  pay-as-you-go  the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United
scheme would impose a rising burden on future  States  and  to  a  lesser  extent  Canada  and
generations, as  well  as  desire  to  increase the  Denmark;  state pensions are not comprehensive,
proportion of  final salary provided in  pensions  and  thus  development of  funded  schemes  is
(i.e., to  fill the gap between state pensions and  encouraged.  Meanwhile, in Germany and Japan
the  retirement  income  considered  socially  relatively generous social security promises, as
desirable).  However, the funds are more clearly  well as tax incentives  to "booking" have - at least
private-sector than  the  Swedish system.  The  until  recently  - accompanied smaller  funded
BVG requires companies basically to  set  up  a  schemes, while in  France and  Italy  they have
deflneu contribution plan,  which,  together with  crowded them out completely.  An illustration of
social security,  offers  a  defined benefit target  these  relative  patterns  is  the  ratio  of  social
(90% of retirement income for the low paid, 60%  security pensions to  national income, which in
at average earnings, 25% for top earners).  Many  1985 was 12.5% in Continental  Europe, 7.5%  in
individual  funds offer defined benefits, which may  the UK, 8.2% in the US and 5.2% in Japan (see
target a higher replacement  ratio.  When instituted  Table 5).  The relatively high UK and US levels,
in  1985, the  scheme was grafted onto  existing  which contrast with the low replacement ratios,11
relate to the current age structure (Table 4) with a  whether  they have a long-run ratio of contributing
relatively high proportion  of pensioners.  to benefiting  members.  Immaturity helps explain
the  growth of  schemes in  the  Anglo-American
(e)  Other  Determinants of the  Importance of  countries,  the  Netherlands,  Sweden,  and
Funding  Switzerland  over the last twenty-five years.  Now,
some of  these schemes are  maturing, and  the
Personal pensions, which ar  invariabl3 defined-  growth of their assets will slow (to around the
contribution,  have grown in importance  in recert  growth rate  of  real  wages), although changing
years,  the  main aims being to  provide the tax  regulations, such  as  those  for  indexation and
incentives of  pension schemes to  those  not  in  retirement  ages,  as  well  as  broadening  of
company  schemes, to enable company schemes to  coverage following moves to  compulsion, may
be  supplemented,  and/or  to  offer  greater  add to this.  (Commentators suggest that recent
portability  than  is  available  from  company  changes in UK regulations could boost liabilities
schemes.  In  some countries, boosting national  by £40-50 billion.)  As discussed in Section 4(b),
saving was also a motive, although evidence  as to  maturity  may  have  an  important  effect  on
its success is mixed.  (See Venti and Wise (1987)  investment,  as  income  from  assets  becomes
and Gravelle (1991) for  opposing views on  the  relatively more  important than  capital growth.
US.)  Individual retirement accounts (IRAs) were  Maturity for an individual  scheme will depend on
introduced  in  the  United  States  in  1974 for  its  history  and  development, and  demographic
workers without company pensions;  they offer  factoms. Thus, 'aging of the population' in many
the same tax benefits as pension funds and grew  countries  is leading to growth in pension funds.
more rapidly after  1982 when all  workers and
their  spouses became eligible (15 million plans  As an exarnple  of maturity, outflows in the United
were  open  in  1985).  Similar  provisions,  States exceeded inflows by  $lbn  in  1989 and
introduced in  the  early  1970s, cover  3 million  $6bn in  1990 (growth of assets also depeids on
workers  in  Canada  (1987).  More  recently  asset returns, of  course).  Also the  number of
4.5 million have taken "personal pensions" in the  beneficiaries rose 41  % between 1980 and  1986.
United Kingdom, generally opting out  of  the  United Kingdom net inflows were 19% of assets
social  security  earnings  related  scheme.  in 1980 and 4% in 1990. By contrast, schemes in
Regulations state that UK personal pensions must  Germany and  Japan are less  mature, so  future
be indexed up to 3%, and 25% of the value can  growth will continue to be strong.  For example,
be extracted as a tax free lump sum.  France and  in Japan in 1988 on y 9% of the population over
Switzerland have introduced similar provisions.  65 received  a pension from a funded scheme.
On  balance,  personal pensions seem  to  have
complemented rather than  substituted for  other  Coverage is obviously also  important (i.e.,  the
types  of  private  provision.  Andrews  (1990)  proportion of  employees  covered  by  pension
suggests  that countries such as Japan find personal  plans, which as shown in Table 6, varies between
pensions unnecessary, due to low labor mobility  90% in Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netheriands
and a high savings  rate.  to around 40% in the US, Germany, Japan, and
Canada).  However, this  is  a  consequence of
A further factor influencing the size of pension  factors discussed above and in Section 3, rather
funds is the maturity  of the schemes, i.e.,  than a separate cause  of growth in itself.12
3.  REGULATION
This section assesses the main issues in pension  assets in long-term institutions in countries such
fund  regulation, comparing and  contrasting the  as the United Kingdom and the United States  as a
adopted solutions in the nine countries  studied.  It  proportion  of personal  portfolios has a counterpart
is suggested  that whereas social security is the key  in a continual reduction in direct personal equity
determinant  of  total  precautionary saving  for  holdings as a proportion of financial assets.  This
retirement,  it  is  the  fiscal  and  regulatory  clearly partly results  from  the  fact  that direct
environment that  influences the  use  made  of  equity  holdings  generally  suffer  from  double
pension funds as a vehicle for such saving.  An  taxation (purchases of  securities are made from
attempt is  made to  come to  a  view  regarding  taxed  income,  and  both  dividends and  capital
"good regulatory  practice".  gains are also taxed)."'  However, in the longer
term,  this  reduction may also  result  from  an
(a)  Taxation  equalization  of  the  income  and  wealth
distribution,  where  only  the  wealthy  could
One  of  the  main determinants of  the scale of  economically maintain  equity  portfolios  with
benefits and  advantages of  pension funds as  a  adequate  risk  diversification,  although  mutual
means of  saving is  exemption of  contributions  funds overcome this problem.  As  a  means of
from taxatioq.  As discussed in Johnson (1992),  retirement provision,  equity holdings also have
pensions may  be  taxed  at  three  points,  when  the  disadvantage of  greater  capital and  income
money is contributed, when investment  income is  uncertainty  than  institutional  iavestment  and
earned and when retirement benefits are paid to  (particularly)  defined benefit pension funds.
scheme  members.  In  general,  taxing
contributions  only and benefits only are equivalent  In  other  countries  such  as  Denmark,
(except to the extent that progressive taxation may  supplementation  of the  state retirement schemes
be  lower on  lower post-retirement income, and  occurs via insurance  schemes and bank investment
deferment itself means pretax rather than post tax  products as well as through pension funds (given
income  is  available  for  investment  and  a more even tax treatment).
accumulation).  These  are  expenditure  tax
regimes, where the post tax rate of return equals  Reasons for  taxing pensionr¢  relatively leniently
the  pre  tax  rate,  and  the  consumption/saving  include, first,  the need to  assist people to  save
choice is not distorted;  consumption  is taxed at  enough  to  maintain  post  retirement  living
the same rate now and in the future.  standards; second, a desire to encourage people to
save and thus cut the cost to the state of means-
In contrast, regimes where investment income is  tested social security benefits; and third, to raise
taxed  as  well as  contributions or  benefits are  the general level of saving.
comprehensive income  tax  regimes  (they  tax
income  equally  regardless  of  source).  This  The first  is  the most important, and is  largely
reduces the incentive to save by driving post-tax  paternalistic. It suggests  that people are generally
rates of return below-the pre-tax rate.  Note that  myopic, and/or that there  is  a  form  of  moral
if the distinction  between-  nominal and real returns  hazard, in that they assume  they will be cared for
is not made by the fiscal authorities  (i;e., nominal  by the state even if they do not save.  That people
returris are  taxed) a  comprehensive income tax  do  not  save  sufficiently is  confirmed by  US
also  induces a  growing distortion dependent on  studies  such  as  Diamond  (1977),  and  recent
the rate of  inflation.  In general, pension funds  evidence in  New Zealand shows removal of tax
are given expenditure tax treatment, while other  exemption  can cut retirement saving sharply.  Of
forms  of  saving  are  not.  There  is  thus  a  course,  compulsion  (as  in  Sweden  and
distortion between types of  saving, encouraging  Switzerland')  is  an alternative way of  ensuring
accumulation'  via pension funds.  adequate saving, but tax exemption mitigates the
associated  element  of coercion.  However, despite
Corresponding to  this distortion, the growth of  this argument, Munnell (1992) argues for taxation13
of  pension fund  income in  the  US  on  equity  In  Germany,  employer  contributions  to
grounds, as with coverage of less than 50%, the  independent pension  and  provident funds  (and
bulk of benefits to tax deferral, which amount to  direct insurance) ire treated as current income of
over  $50  billion  per  year,20 go  to  richer  employees and are subject to  wage tax - hence
people. 21 This  is  particularly  the  case  for  deferred taxation is absent - although  pensions are
Individual  Retirement  Accounts (Munnell  (1984)).  taxed lightly compared with earned income, partly
to  compensate.  This  provision makes  "direct
The argument of encouraging  saving and reducing  commitments"  (i.e., pension liabilities held on the
social  security  is  only  applicable  when  state  books of  the sponsoring firm),  which are  fully
schemes are  means tested  and/or opting out  is  tax-deductible,  more  attractive.  They  are
possible, as in the UK and Japan.  consequently  the  dominant  form  of  private
pension obligation,  accounting  for 60% of pension
The evidence for the third effect, i.e., raising the  liabilities,  compared  with  30%  for  funded
level of saving, is positive but minor (see Section  independent pension funds (Pensionskassen)  and
4).  Johnson  (1991)  concluded  that  these  provident funds.
arguments for special treatment of pension funds
are less well founded than those for the general  In  Denmark,  there  is  a  special  variable  tax
expenditure-tax  treatment of saving, all of which  (currently)  44% on pension asset returns, which is
could contribute to  retirement income (a counter  imposed when real returns exceed 3.5  %.  This
argument is presumably  that other forms of saving  thus  avoids  the  comprehensive income  tax's
may be  decumulated at  will,  whereas pension  difficulties with inflation (as outlined above), but
funds are unique in being contractual annuities, as  does impose some deviation of pre and post tax
defined in Section 1).  returns.  Equities are exempt.  The reason for the
tax was concern that high real returnis  could lead
The  United  Kingdom  is  an  example  of  pension  payments  to  exceed  earnings.
expenditure tax  treatment  of  pensions,  where  Meanwhile, taxes on  receipts of  supplementary
employees' and employers' contributions and all  pensions are reportedly so high as to constitute a
returns  on  investments are  free  of  tax  and  disincentive  to pension saving.  Sweden imposed
employers' pension contributions, unlike wages,  a major reform in  1991 (Munnell (1992)), to tax
are not subject to national insurance contributions.  all  annual earnings on  pension funds, to  offset
(A pay-as-you-go  scheme, in contrast, would not  losses in revenue due to tax deferral and improve
gain tax privileges nor be eligible to contract out  equity with other forms of saving.  The rate is
of earnings related social security.)  However, an  15%,  half  the  rate  of  tax  on  other  forms of
anomaly, which is  contrary to  expenditure tax  saving.  Taxation of benefits is relatively low;
treatment (as wel' as the idea of pension funds as  contributions  are tax exempt.
"contractua! annuities" (Section 1)) is that up to
one and a half times an employee's salary (up to  In the case of company  pensions, the attraction of
£150,000) may be taken out  at retirement as a  schemes  to  employers  is  important,  since
tax-free lump sum.  Recently nominal limits have  provision is only compulsory  to firms in Sweden
been imposed on tax-free contributions,  and other  and  Switzerland.  "Direct  commitments"  in
forms of saving such as equities and deposits have  Germany,  in  effect,  offer  tax-deductible "free
been accorded (limited)  expenditure  tax treatment.  capital" to  the  firm,'  tinough in  principle the
The tax  treatment of  pension funds is  broadly  liabilities arising from pension claims should be
similar in the United States, Canada, Japan, and  reflected in the share price.  In Japan a taxation
the  Netherlands.  However,  in  Japan  (Clark  change in 1980 encouraged companies to  replace
(1991)) other  forms  of  saving also  enjoy tax  unfunded by  funded  pensions or  bonuses,  by
privileges, pension funds' asset returns are subject  reducing from 50% to  40%  the amount of  tax
to  a  special  1%  corporate tax,  and  unfunded  free  book reserves that  could be  san against
liabilities are partly tax deductible, (which could  pension  obligations.  Many  schemes  remain
help explain the slow growth of funded schemes  unfunded  however.  In  the  Anglo-American
in Japan).  countries and the Netherlands the tax exemption14
of funded  schemes  makes  them the cheapest  way  also often limits on self investment,  to prote
for  firms  to  provide retirement benefits to  against the  associated concentration of  rih
employees. Unfunded  private pensions  - which  regarding  insolvency  of the sponsor. Apart  from
acccunt for  virtually all  private pensions in  the self investment  control, the degree  to which
France, and which are themselves  compulsory  - such regulations  actually  contribute  to security
may appear advantageous  to  companies  when  open to  doubt,  since  pension funds,  unlike
population  and the economy  are growing,  interest  insurance  companies,  face the risk of increasing
rates are low and employment  is high, but in  liabilities  as well  as the risk of holding  assets,  and
more adverse circumstances  may prove more  hence need  to  trade  volatility with  return.
risky to the firm, workers and pensioners. In  Moreover, appropriate  diversification  of  assets
effect, they may face similar demographic  and  can eliminate  any idiosyncratic  risk from holdin,
flnancial  problems  to state social security  without  an individual  security (such as an equity), thu
the ability to raise taxes.  These problems  also  minimizing  the increasc  in risk - and if nationa
arise for German  or Japanese  'book reserves"  if  cycles and markets are  imperfectly  correlated
actual investment  does not follow  the booking  of  international investment wi;l  actually reduce
provisions,  and/or  the investment  is unprofitable.  systematic  risk (see Sections 4  (b) and (c)).
Clearly,  such  regulations may  affect  th(
(b) Integration  with Social  Security  attractiveness  to companies  of funding  pensions  -
and the generosity  of provision  - if it constrains
Certain regulatory issues  are  raised  by  the  managers  in their choice  of risk and return (i.e.,
treatment  of the relation  between private  penSions  forcing them to  hold low yielding assets and
nd  social  securitv. As noted, in Switzerland,  the  increasing  their  risks by limiting  their possibilities
schemes  aim  to dovetail  so as to offer a declining  of diversification).24
replacement  ratio, the higher  up the income  scale
the retiree  is, thus ensuring  maintenance  of living  This is not, however,  the case in all countries. 1'
standards. In the US, by contrast,  pension  funds  For example, United States pension funds are
are allowed  to aim for a fixed replacement  ratio  subject  to a  "prudent  man rule" which requires
(including  social security)  across the board, and  the  managers to  carry out  sensible portfolio
hence low income earners may not receive a  diversification;  there are no limits on portfolio
pension  at all, despite  the firm  having  contributed  distributions  other than a  10% limit on  self
on their behalf. This system  is strongly  criticized  investment  for defined benefit funds.  United
by Munnell  (1984)  as an abuse of tax privilege  Kingdom  pension  fiinds  are subject  to trust law
and social injustice. In the UK a compromise  is  and again follow the  "prudent man" concept;
reached, whereby  pension funds may substitute  they are not constrained  by regulation  in their
for earnings  related  social security,  but may not  portfolio  distribution  except for limits on  self-
take flat rate social security  into account,  which  investment (5%)  and  concentration.  Dutch
ensures a  falling replacement  ratio  over  the  private funds face no restrictions,' except  for a
earnings  scale,  other  things  being  equal.  5% limit  on self investment,  see Van  Loo (1988).
(an contrast,  the public  service  fund (ABP)  faces
(c) Regulation  of Portfolio  Distributions  strict limits,  being  able to invest  only 5% abroad,
and  15% in  shares or  real estate).  Similar
Quantitative  regulation  of portfolio  distributions  is  prudent man rules are implicit in  current EC
imposed in  a  number of  countries, with the  proposals  for a Pension  Fund Directive,  stressing
ostensible aim  of  protecting pension  fund  security  (consistent asset/liability matching,
beneficiaries, or  benefit  insurers,  although  diversification and  limited  self  investment),
motives  such as ensuring  a steady demand for  liquidity  and  profitability.
government bonds  may  also  play  a  part.2 1
Limits are often imposed  on holdings  of assets  Other  countries impose portfolio limitations,
with relatively  volatile returns, such as equities  though  the degree  to which  they  bind varies. For
and property, as well as foreign  assets, even if  example,  Japanese  funds  face  ceilings  on holdings
their mean return is relatively  high.  There are  of certain  assets (such as 30% for foreign  assets15
and for equities),  which  Tamura  (1992)  suggests  (d) Funding Rules
"(Inappropriately)  imitate regulations  devised  for
trust banking  and life insurers". German  pension  Regulation  of the funding  of benefits is a  key
funds,  besides a  10% self  investment limit,  aspect of the regulatory  framework  for defined
remain  subject  to the same  panoply  of regulation  benefit  pension  funds.  Note that by definition,  a
as  life  insurers (4%  limit on  foreign asset  defined contribution plan  is  always funded,
holdirigs,  20% limit  on equities,  5% on property).  whereas  with defined benefit plans there is a
It  Is  arguable that  these  are  particularly  distinction  between  the pension  plan (setting  out
inappropriate  for pension  funds  given  the indexed  contractual  rights  to the parties) and the fund (a
nature  of their liabilities  (Section  (d)), though  they  pool  of  assets to  provide collateral for  the
could be justified by the  need to  protect the  promised  benefits). When  the fund is worth  less
insurance funds (Section (h)).  They may be  than the present  value of promised  benefits  there
contrary  to the EC Capital  Movements  Directive,  is underfunding,  when the opposite,  overfunding.
depending whether they  are  judged  to  be  Calculation  of  funding requires a  number of
"reasonable  prudential  restrictions". Resolution  actuarial  assumptions,  In particular  the assumed
of this question is being sought in the Pension  return on assets, projected  future wage growth
Funds  Directive,  as  discussed  in  the  (for flnal salary schemes)  and future inflation  (if
conclusion.:n  Note  that  by  offering  tax  there  is indexing  of pensions).
privileges to  "booking", Germany and  Japan
effectively  impose  no limits  on self investment  of  Minimum  funding  lim!ts seek to protect-ecurity
book reserves  (although  the Germans  do insist  on  of benefits  against  default risk bv the company,
insurance  of such  reserves).  given unfunded benefits are  liabilities  on  the
books  of  the  firm,  and  therefore risk  is
Swiss  limits  are similar,  if slightly  less restrictive  concentrated  and pensioners  (or pension  insurers  -
than the Germans'; a 30% linit on shares, 50%  see below)  may have no better claim in case of
for  real  estate and  20%  on  foreign assets.  bankruptcy  than any other creditor.  Funding
Scandinavian  limits are  in  some ways  even  offers  a  diversified and  hence  less  risky
tighter, in that minima  are also specified. The  alternative  backup  for the benefit  promise,  as well
Swedish  funds have historically  been obliged  to  as offering  the possibility  of unplanned  benefit
holl the majority  of their assets  in domestic  listed  increases if  the  plan  is  in  surplus.  Extra
bonds,  debentures and  retroverse  loans  to  protection  against  creditors  of a bankrupt  firm is
contributors  (although  recent deregulations  have  afforded  when  the pension  fund is an independent
permitted  limited  investment  in property,  equities  trust (as in the Anglo-American  countries),  or a
and foreign assets, which some private schemes  mutual  insurance  company  (as  in  some
have  reportedly  taken  advantage  of); Danish  funds  Continental  European  countries)  and, as in most
have to hold 60% in domestic  debt instruments,  countries, when self  investmen.  is  banned or
although  since 1990 they have been allowed to  severely restricted (see  above).  However,
hold 20% in foreign  assets. Some  countries  have  funding does not  increase perseral saving or
switched  to prudent man rules; Canadian  funds  wealth  in an economic  sense - it only affects  the
were  strictly  regulated  till 1987  (when  the prudent  distribution  of the cost of insuring  those  benefits.
man  concept was  introduced) and  have  till  There are usually  also upper  limits  on funding,  to
recently faced limits on  the share of  external  prevent abuse of  tax privileges (overfunding).
assets  as  tax  regulations  limited  foreign  Bodie (1990b) suggests that  the  three  main
nvestment  to 10%  of the portfolio. A tax of 1%  reasons why firms fund, besides  regulations  per
of excess  foreign  holdings  was imposed  for every  se, are the tax incentives,  provision  of financial
month  the limit was exceeded. In 1990, it was  slack  (when  there is a surplus)  that can be used in
announced  that the limit would  be raised  to 20%  case of difficulty,  and because pension benefit
over 1990  95.  There is also a 7% limit on real  insurance may  not  cover  the  highest-paid
estate.  employees.
In the United States  an important  influence  wasi6
the  Employee Retirement Income Security Act  important  for risk.
(ERISA) of  1974, which provided for minimum
standards  of  vesting  and  increased  funding  This  "wind-up"  definition  of  liabilities,  the
requirements,  both of which increased the burden  "solvency"  level at which the firm can meet all its
to firms of  running a pension scheme.  It  also  current obligations, is known as the accumulated
introduced  the  Pension  Benefit  Guarantee  benefit  obligation  (ABO).  Indexation  up  to
Corporation (PBGC) to guarantee (up to a limit)  retirement, as is normal in a final salary scheme,
benefits  of  funds  in  default,  funded  by  gives  the  projected  benerit  obligation  (PBO)
contributions  from all defined benefit plans;  the  which  is  not  guaranteed except in  the  United
funding requirement can  be  seen  partly  as  a  Kingdom  although  it  is  common  in  the
protection for  PBGC.  (This has not prevented  Netherlands (80%  of  members are  covered).
heavy financial claims on  the PBGC, following  Taking account of  future obligations instead of
several cases of default of underfunded  schemes,  purely focussing on current liabilities is likely to
as discuissed  further below.)  Following ERISA,  permit  smoother levels of  contributions as  the
the growth in pension funds slowed.  Some firms  fund  matures,  which  may  be  better  for  the
terminated their schemes, and the number of new  financial stability of the sponsor.  The indexed
defined benefit plans  initiated dropped.  Some  benefit obligation (IBO) assumes indexation a.'er
firms swit(;.;  to defined contribution  plans;  and  retirement, which is not generally guaranteed in
overall coverage  cx  ,ced to grow.  Japan, the US or Canada but is in  Switzerland,
the  Netherlands, Germany,  and  Sweden, and
More recent chank.  - wo .I.n'ted  States regulations  will be soon in the UK.  (See Bodie (1991) for a
have clarified funding,  ruies by defining pensior  further discussion  of these concepts.)
fund liabilities as  the present value of  pension
benefit  owed  to  emplo).ces under  the  benefit  In  the  US,  the  accounting standard FASB  87
formula  absent  any  riroiections  of  salary,  focuses on the PBO, in contrast to the minimum
discounted  at  a  nominal  rate  of  interest.  funding  regulations  as  described  above.  In
Implicitly, these are the obligations  of the fund if  addition,  overfunding in  the  US  is  limited to
it were wound up immediately. Current estimates  150% of the ABO or the PBO, whichever is the
suggest that 76% of pension funds are overfunded  lower.  These limits may have different effects.
on this basis, with an average overfund of 74%.  The 150% of ABO limit implies a rise in interent
If  pension  assets  fall  below  this  level,  the  rates could prevent further funding, leaving the
unfunded liability must be reported in the firm's  scheme underfunded  when interest rates fall.  This
balance  sheet, and since they are senior debt, they  is  not  the  case  for  a  PBO  definition taking
act as a  major problem for  the firm in  raising  projected rises in benefits into account, as long as
funds.  However, a surplus cannot be included  on  interest rates rise with expected inflation.
the balance sheet (although it can be implicitly
recouped via  a  reduction in  contributions, see  In Japan, as  noted in  Section 2,  the  traditional
Section (e)).  In this definition, indexing up to  means of provision of retirement benefits was via
retirement is not compulsory  but only an implicit  pay-as-you-go, with a special reserve account on
promise, despite the fact most US schemes are  the balance sheet as benefits accrue.  The  TQPFs
actually final  salary.  This  has  an  important  and EPFs,  as described above, must be  funded
influence on  portfolio distributions, discussed at  only up to the ABO, and there is reportedly very
greater length in Section 4, since underfunding  on  little  overfunding, partly  because contributions
this  basis  can  be  avoided by  holding bonds;  above the ABO are taxed.
equities are only suitable for overfunded  schemes.
As  discussed below,  regulations now  seek  to  In Germany, various laws or court decisions akin
reduce  the  moral  hazard  of  deliberate  to  ERISA have enforced minimum standards of
underfunding  by charging higher PBGC insurance  funding for pension funds (while leaving open, as
premia to underfunded  schemes;  but they do not  in Japan, the choice of an unfunded book reserve
take  account  of  the  asset  composition  of  system) and what amounts to inflation indexing  of
underfunded  schemes,  which  may  be  more  pensions. However, although this implies funding17
the IBO, it appears that provisions for indexation  If it is too high, funding may be inadequate;  if
are taxed - only the  PBO is tax  &Tee. These  too  low,  there  may  be  overfunding  and
provisions  were  felt  to  be  particularly  corresponding abuse of  tax  privileges.  In  the
burdensome, despite the relatively low level of  Netherlands, where funding is  compulsory, the
German inflation, and, along with the decline in  government sets  a  maximum real  interest rate
profitability of firms, helped blunt the growth rate  assumption of 4%,  and an assumption for wage
of private pension schemes  in the 1970s  and early  growth.  Since in practice Dutch funds have been
1980s. (See Deutsche  Bundesbank  (1984).)  able to earn over this level, surpluses estimated  at
30% were present by  1990.  A special levy of
In the United Kingdom, the reform of the state  40% is to be enacted on such surpluses in excess
scheme In  1978 had an  important influence on  of  15% of  liabilities, to  offset the  implied tax
private  schemes  (by  setting  a  "guaranteed  evasion.  In  the US,  the  accounting standards
minimum  pension" (GMP)) and enforced a degree  FASB  87  and  88  have  imposed  common
of  funding  sufficient  to  cover  the  GMP.  standards.  In  Japan  contributions  are  set
However, funding above this level is not legally  assuming a 5.5% nominal rate of return on fund
required - although trustees are bound by  their  assets.  In the UK and Canada the govenranent
duty of care to ensure funding is in place - nor is  accepts the (varying)  judgement of the actuaries,
any  standard  method  of  calculating  funding  and  generally also  allow for  an  assumption of
imposed, or  a requirement to  include deficits in  wage growth.
company  balance sheets.  There is also no svstem
to  guarantee non-GMP pension benefits in  the  Finally, since many Danish funds (as well as a
United  Kingdom  - partly  for  this  reason  proportion of funds in Switzerland  and the Anglo-
regulations can be less strict than elsewhere, and  American countries) are defined contribution, the
managers can offer  a  high  return by  taking a  issue of funding does not arise.  However, the
higher level of risk.  issue of limiting tax privilege does arise, and is
dealt with via contribution limits or  taxation of
A plethora of more recent changes have limited  returns.
overfunding to  5% of  projected obligations, (in
practice, either the PBO or the  IBO), including  (e)  Ownership of Surpluses
discretionary  provisions  giving  five  years  to
remove surpluse-s;  enforced a degree of indexation  Ownership  of surpluses in defined benefit pension
(up to 5%) of pensions up to retirement for early  funds is a  key issue in a  number of ccuntries,
leavers (in contrast to  the United States, Japanm  particularly because predator firms may seek to
and Canada); may make a degree of  indexation  strip  surpluses after  taking over  another firm,
&  retirement  compulsory;'  have  outlawed  although also, as noted above, because the firm
compulsory  membership;  limited  tax-free  may seek to recoup the funds for its own use.  On
contributions  and benefits; enforced transferability  the one hand, this may be seen both as an abuse
of assets between schemes and may enforce equal  of tax privileges and (more contestably)  as seizing
pension ages.  (For a discussion  of related issues  assets held for the benefit of members.  On the
in  the United Kingdom, see  Blake (1992).)  A  other, it can be argued that if the fund is only a
decline of  the company pension fund sector is  backup for the firms' promise of pensions, and if
predicted, but there is  little evidence of this to  the firm is equally responsible for making good
date.  Few  employees  have  left  company  any deficit, then the surplus should belong to the
schemes, although there has been a sharp rise in  firm.  It  is  important to  note that the funding
personal pensions.  And  few  companies have  rules outlined above define the surplus.  Note in
closed their  schemes, even though  some have  addition that such issues only  arise for  defined
switched to  defined contribution or  made them  benefit funds;  in defined contribution  funds there
less generous for new entrants.  is no surplus  to strip.
As noted, the interest rate assumed to be earnt on  In the US,  a  1987 law states that the employer
assets is a key aspect of the funding arithmetic.  owns  all  surplus  assets  so  long  as  certain18
standards are complied with.  This, following  the  In Japan the surplus may neither be stripped nor
second  line  of  argument  above,  is  seen  as  used to  increase benefits, but  used  to  operate
economically  reasonable since funds are purely a  "welfare facilities".  This  puts the  fund  under
means  to  collateralize  a  (separate)  benefit  pressure to  smooth its  income to  ensure  such
promise.  In other words, the employee  has rights  payments continue - which may entail inefficient
to  a pension, bnt not to  the means of financing  investment.
those rights.  However, there are limits to  such
ownership, as  under ERISA, firms  cannot use  (f)  Portability
pension assets  as  collateral for  loans.  In  the
1980s,  many  funds  with  surpluses  were  yesting, treatment of transfers between schemes
terminated and the surplus taken by the sponsor  and  of  prior  service  credits,  particularly  for
(asset reversion).  It  can be  argued that  such  defined benefit plans, have a key role to play in
behavior  implied  breach  of  implicit contracts  labor mobility, which in turn may be  important
between  employer  and  employee.  Later,  for  economic efficiency.  Indeed,  Lazear  and
substantial  tax  penalties  were  introduced  to  Moore (1988) estimate that labor turnover in the
discourage this, although there is nothing to stop  US would be  twice as high  in  the  absence of
firms  absorbing surpluses  more  gradually,  by  pension funds.  This is because of the losses in
taking contribution  holidays.  pension benefits that may be  incurred by  early
leavers compared with those staying in  one job
In the UK, the surplus is again held to belong to  (US  calculations suggest that  these may  be  as
the company, which can be recovered by direct  much as 50%, see Munnell (1984)).  There are
withdrawal  (subject to  a  40%  tax)  or  by  a  obviously  also  problems  of  equity  in  such
contribution holiday.  However, court judgments  patterns.  Women may be particulariy vulnerable
have severely restricted ability of  predators to  to  such  losses,  as  they  change  jobs  more
extract surpluses from takeover target's funds via  frequently  and spend fewer years in one job.
winding-up or  spin-off termination of  schemes.
The 1990 Social Security Act states that when a  Solutions include shorter vesting periods, which
plan is terminated, it shall be assumed to provide  ensure  that  benefits  are  nonforfeitable  on
for indexation up to 5% inflation, thus reducing  retirement;  transfers  permitted  with  full
the potential surplus to be extracted.  Moreover,  allowance  for benefits accrued; or service credits
there is increasing support for arguments on the  (in  the  case  of  final-salary  based  schemes)
employee's side,  namely that pension rights are  indexed till retirement.  Note that these problems
not gratuities but part of a remuneration  package  do not arise with defined contribution, nor does
earned by service.  This point of view has been  the  last arise  for  career-average based  defined
supported by recent rulings of the European  Court  benefit plans;  hence portability  is an argument in
that for the purposes of equal treatment pensions  their favor;  in contrast even with full indexation
are  to  be  considered as  deferred  pay  (Goode  to prices of accrued benefits in final-salary  plans,
(1992)).  The  logical conclusion would be  to  the early leaver loses out, because his real wage
outlaw  even  contribution holidays  and  make  would probably  have been higher at retirement.
employers  much more restrained in funding.
The  arguments for  portability, though  strong,
In the Netherlands, where the pension fund is an  should not be overstated.  Whereas the suggested
executive body  independent of  the  sponsoring  reforms would make pension plans more attractive
firm,  usually in  the  legal  form  of  a  financial  to  employees, they  may  reduce the  ability of
institution, or  in  Switzerland, where  it  is  a  employers to  use pension plans to  manage their
foundation with joint representation of employer  workforces, and hence reduce their attractiveness
and  employee  representatives on  the  board,  to them.  Frovision, when voluntary for the firm,
ownership lies with that body itself.  This means  may thus decline.  Low labor  mobility is  not
the  company cannot  lay  claim  to  the  assets,  always  inefficient; higher  labor  turnover  may
although surpluses can be  returned by  reduced  have adverse effects on the incentives  for firms to
contributions.  train their labor forces, given the "market failure"19
that  employees may  leave  once  trained,  thus  benefits  are,  indexed  (up  to  5%)  prior  to
wasting the  employer's  investment.  Countries  retirement," employees have a  right to  a  cash
with "lifetime employment' such as Germany and  transfer to another pension scheme 31 in line wAth
Japan  have  of  course  been  conspicuously  accrued benefits and  restricted transfer  circuits
successful  economically  - although  pinsion  exist  (e.g.,  in  the  public  sector).  However,
arrangements  which  discourage  turnover  are  difficulties may arise outside such circuits from
probably best seen as a  consequence  or  support  the non standardization  of the valuation methods
for the system, rather than a cause.  Nevertheless,  for liabilities. In the US, Japan, and Canada past
could be  suggested that  a  small aniount of  benefits are  not  indexed; however,  there  is  a
esistance to labor mobility arising from pension  transfer  circuit  in  Japan  enabling  workers  in
provision, so long as  it does not lead to  unfair  Employee Pension Funds to shift their contracted
deprivation of  pensions,  may  not  be  entirely  out social security benefits (which are indexed)
ndesirable.  only  between emrployers.  In  the  US,  service
transfers  are  available as  a  lump sum,  which
Vesting standards in  the US under ERISA give  poses the risk that tax advantaged  pension assets
three alternatives; however, the most common Is  will be  used for other purposes.  In  Denmark,
to  demand that  companies offer  100% vesting  differing  medical  examination  requirements
after 10 years of service (the alternatives  are 25%  between schemes are  reported to  give  rise  to
vesting after 5  years,  rising to  100% after  15  transfer difficulties.
years or 50% vesting when age and service add to
45, increasing to 100% five years later).  Recent  Transnational  moves  of  employment  pose
legislation will reduce vesting to 5 years.  There  particular problems for pension funds, given the
are  no  common vesting standards in  the  EC.  differing tax treatment that  may make transfer
They vary from 10 years in Germany and 5 years  impossible. The EC have found this insoluble  so
Denmark to 2 years in the UK and one year in  far,  despite the  premium  put  on  international
e Netherlands. In Sweden  the ATP scheme is a  labor mobility.
uational  one, so the issue of vesting  does not arise
'though it does  for  the  ITP/STP).  The  most  (g) Internal Transters
restrictive countries are  Switzerland and Japan,
both  of  which  appear  to  assume  'lifetime  Difficulties  of  early  leavers,  who  implicitly
employment".  In the former, vesting is graded  subsidize those remaining till retirement, are not
.ween S and 30 years of service (for payments  the only case of  potentially inequitable internal
excess of the legal minimum, which is vested  transfer within defined benefit funds.  As noted
mediately), while in the latier, vesting  takes 15-  by Riley (1992), in  countries such as the  UK,
years,  with early leavers typically penalized  final salary schemes  give incentives for managers
Jhough vesting is  quite short  for  involuntary  to award themselves  large salary increases in 'heir
irement,  and  for  lump-sum distributions as  last  year  of  employment,  thus  benefiting
opposed to  annuities).  Particularly in  Japan,  particularly at the expense  of workers forced into
restrictive  conditions  are  seen  as  socially  early retirement (given the expense  to the pension
desirable, to support "lifetime  employment".  fund), early leavers and those workers (such as
manual  A'orkers) whose earnings peak  in  mid
regards  service  transfers,  this  is  a  career.  More generally, if contribution rates are
straightforward matter in  countries such as  the  based on expected average increases in  salaries,
Netherlands, where benefits are generally indexed  contribution  rates may fall short of costs for those
to  and beyond retirement and tran'sfers  occur  whose salaries rise  faster than the average, and
hrough portability clearinghouses called transfer  vice versa for slow climbers.  Finally, given that
circuits.  A requirement to join the clearinghouse  the rate at v hich benefits are accrued rises as the
s that the fund be ind,xed and pensions based on  worker  nears  retirement,  there  are  strong
inal  salary.  In  Sweden, there  are  again no  incentives  for firms to retire workers early, which
3roblems for  the  ATP  in  this  context, as  the  may not be economically  efficient. Understanding
em is a national one.  In the UK, too,  past  of these issues may be hindered by the complex20
rules of a defined benefit plan.  they fall below a certain minimum funding level.
It is hence essential that the insurer have access
A  related equity problem, and implicit form of  the assets, the assets have a defined market value,
transfer,  was that  US  funds were  traditionally  and  that  there  are  agreed  standards  for
only  for  managers, despite the  use of  income  determining  minimum funding levels.  Analogous
from the firm as a  whole to  contribute to  their  to bank capital, it is also desirable that there be
pensions (i.e.,  not  merely reflecting their  own  cushion of over funding to protect the guaran^
productivity), and benefit of tax privileges (i.e.,  and  frequent  auditing.  A  system  relying  on
basically schemes were a means of tax-avoidance  monitoring might not  be  efficient with  illiqu
for  managers).  This was clamped down on by  fund assets, as their wide bid-ask spread imposes
ERISA, which insisted that all full time workers  costs  either  on  the  sponsor  or  the  guarrntee
over  21  should  be  eligible  to  allow  tax  agency.  A  second approach is  restrict1in_A
deductibility.  But  as  noted  in  Section  (b),  asset choic  of pension funds to ensure an upper
inequity may still arise from differing treatment of  bound  on  the  risk  of  the  assets  servsng as
social security pensions.  collateral for the promised benefits, for example,
by  insisting on  immunization  of  assets equal to
(h)  Insurance  the guaranteed  benefits, see Section 5(a).  A third
is setting the premium  rate for the guarantee in
As  noted, insuranc  of defined benefit pensions  linewith  thrisk,  which depends in turn on the
against default risk for the sponsoring firm is a  variance  of the value of the collateral  and the tim
feature of most of the countries studied.  Note  between audits (which allow the fund to  chang
that insurance of benefits of defined contribution  its risk exposure adversely.2
plans is unnecessary,  as there is no fixed pension
right to guarantee (although investment  rules may  The  US  example  (Bodie  (1992),  Bodie  and
still  be  useful  to  protect  members from  risk  Merton  (1992)),  where  the  Pension  Benefit
concentration, and insurance may be  needed to  Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) was set up as a
protect  members  against  fraud,  etc).  Also  compulsory insurance scheme to  guarantee basic
funding of defined benefit obligations - or at least  retirement benefits,  shows the  difficulties that
assurance of  seniority of  claims  against other  arise when such controls are not properly applied
creditors in the case of bankruptcy - are the first  PBGC premia  have traditionally been  non-risk
line of protection of members  against default risk.  related, thus encouraging risk taking;  minimum
Insurance  provides a second line of defence.  funding rules have proved ineffective, and indeed
till  recently plan sponsors could freely transfer
But any system of  guarantees, including deposit  some of their unfunded peision  liabilities to the
insurance as well as pension insurance, faces the  PBGC by voluntarily  terminating an underfunded
difficulty that it may create incentive structures  plan  (subject to  a  provision allowing PBGC to
leading honest recipients to undertake excessively  take 30% of the employers' net worth to make up
risky investments, which in turn give the risk of  for  underfundinge); given lack of  control over
large shortfall losses to  the  insurer.  In  other  pension  fund  management, firms  in  financial
words, losses may not arise merely from fraud or  distress have faced particularly strong incentives
incompetwnce  but  the  incentive structure itself,  to  take risks and reduce funding;  courts have
What is needed are means to control risk, which  ruled that the PBGC has no better claim on assets
could  (Bodie and  Merton  (1992))  include  an  of  bankrupt firm  with an  underfunded pension
appropriate  mixture  of  monitoring,  asset  plan than other creditors;  and fragmentation  of
restrictions and risk-based guarantee premia.  We  regulatory  authority  and  conflicts  of  interest
consider this a useful and flexible framework for  among government departments (as discussed in
analysis  of the regulation  of guarantees.  Section (k) below) weaken monitoring.  Finally
the PBGC was set up to  serve goals other than
In the case of pension funds, controls could, first,  purely  protecting  pension  benefits,  namely
include monitoring of the market value of pension  revitalization  of depressed industries by assuming
assets, with the right to seize and liquidate  them if  part  of  the  burden  of  pension  benefits,  and21
preservation of defined benefit plans against the  defined benefit company plans,  while imposing
trend  to  defined contribution.'3  These further  greater risk on the beneficiaries in cases such as
dilute the effectiveness  of its control mechanisms.  Maxwell, as  discussed below.  However, the
absence of insurance in the UK need not exclude
As  a  result of  these difficulties, plans that are  discretionary assistance by the government on a
terminated are often vastly underfunded  (typically  case by case basis, which may create less moral
60%),  having been only 20% underfunded five  hazard than a guarantee scheme (there are strong
years before.  Sponsoring firms eitzer minimize  paral!els with the issue of  deposit insurance vs
pension contributions directly or  encourage early  lender of last resort for banks, see Davis (1992)).
retirement of  workers whose pensions are  not  In addition, defined contribution schemes run by
funded.  Accordingly, the  PBGC has  a  deficit  insurance companies are  covered by  (mutual)
astimated in late-1991 to  be over $2.5 billion,"  insurance compensation arrangements, covering
and is paying an average of $2352 per year to  90% of the investment.
325,000  retirees  in  1,700  failed  plans.
Meanwhile  Smalhout  (1992)  suggests  that  (;)  Fraud
companies  such  as  Chrysler  have  unfunded
iabilities  of $4.4 billion, a quarter of schemes are  Protection against fraud  has  come to  particular
underfunded (to  a  total of $40 billion) and the  prominence  in the UK, given the Robert Maxwell
worst 50 companies account for $21.5 billion in  case.  Large quantities of his companies' pension
unfunded  liabilities.  These  data  suggest  a  fund assets were lent to private companies owned
)otential liability on a  'Savings and Loan'  scale  by  Maxwell  against  poor  security,  or  were
see  Davis  (1992) and  his  references  for  an  invested directly in  them.  When the  private
utline of the S and L crisis and its relationship  to  companies  became insolvent, the assets were lost.
eposit insurance).  The fraud was partly concealed  from fund trustees
by the fund manager or  stock custodian - both
Other countries having guarantee schemes, such  again controlled by  Maxwell - but  was partly
as  Germany, have tended to  impose extremely  legitimate self  investment carried  out  with the
severe asset restrictions on funds to  protect the  knowledge of  the  (pliant) trustees.  In  other
insurance fund against loss, while simultaneously  words, it partly revealed the inadequacy  of legal
imposing higher  costs  on  plan  sponsors  than  provisions, as  well  as  vulnerability of  pension
would be necessary in the absence of guarantees.  funds to fraud.  The case has cast doubt on the
The Netherlands offers partial insurance.  If the  use of  trust  law as  applied in  the  UK,  as the
employer is unable to pay  contributions, due  to  means of redress - civil action against trustees by
bankruptcy or  any  other reason,  the  Industrial  members once things go  wrong - were seen as
Insurance  Board will pay contributions  for up to a  inadequate.  This is especially as members lack
year.  There is also a form of insurance for the  prudential standards against which to monitor the
employee which  is  absent  in  Anglo-American  fund and trustees - and have no regulatory body
untries, whereby if a worker over 40 becomes  to do so on their behalf - and may find it difficult
employed,  the  Pension  Insurance  Advance  to  interpret  performance  measurement  data.
nancing Fund will pay supplementary pension  Also, except in cases of theft and fraud, there is
tributions as  long  as  the  employee has  the  usually  an indemnity  cluse  in case of court action
t  to  wage  related  benefits  under  the  against trustees for  breach  of  fiduciary  rules.
employment  Act.  In Japan, participation  in the  This-leaves the employer to resolve the problem -
)ension  guaranty  programme  for  EPFs  is  and it may be insolvent.  In contrast, in the US
voluntary, with lower guarantees resulting from  fiduciaries  in such cases may face heavy personal
non  payment.  But  all  firms  reportedly  do  liabilities.
contribute, perhaps as  a  consequence of  social
consensus.  Independent custodians, 36  less  leverage by  the
employer over  the  trustees,  better  independent
the UK, the need for portfolio regulations is  actuarial information for trustees, more employee
iated by absence of  a  guarantee scheme for  trustees, as well as limits on self investment  and.22
more  frequent checks on  a  higher standard of  and investment  standards as well as dealing with
minimum funding,  are  among other  proposed  cases of fraud, while the Internal Revenue  Service
remedies.  Independence  of custodians, both from  sets maximum funding rules to prevent abuse of
trustees and from fund managers, is already the  tax  advantages.  Then  the  Pension  Benefit
rule in the US.  Some in the UK hive argued for  Guarantee Corporation collects insurance premia
an insurance scheme similar to PBGC in the US.  and  pays  benefits  but  has  few  enforcement
The discussion above suggests moral hazard is a  powers.  So,  for  example, the  tax  authoritie
strong counterargument against general insurance  would prefer minimal funding to prevent loss o
of benefits, but this need not rule out insurance  tax  revenue,  while  the  insurers  would  seei
aga!nst  fraud.  maximum funding  to  prevent  large  insurance
claims.  Moreover, the tax authorities can grant
(J) Disclosure to Members  contribution  waivers to firms in financial distress,
which  leads to  underfunding of  pension plans,
Standards of information for members has come  against the irterests  of the  PBGC.  Meanwhil
to  prominence recently  in  the  UK,  and  the  fund trustees are responsible  for ensuring funding
Maxwell case (above) is likely to bring it further  is  in  place  for  beneficiaries  and  have  to!
to the fore. 37 Under ERISA in the US, pension  demonstrate  in an audited annual report of incom
funds must provide each plan participant with a  and  assets  filed  with  the  IRS  that  they  h-
summary  of the Annual Report outlining the plan  managed the  fund  prudently.  Also  a  master
and its administration,  information  on the right to  custodian  has  to  be  appointed  to  oversee
receive  pension  benefit,  and  the  status  of  fulfillment  of  ERISA  requirements,  kee
individual  pension benefits.  In the UK under the  appropriate records, and provide security agains
1986 Pension Schemes Regulation, trustees are  prohibited  transfers.
required to  disclose trust  deeds  and  rules  on
request;  annual reports must be provided free of  In  the  UK statutory pension fund regulation is
charge, covering information  such as the names  of  again administered by  different bodies,  namely
trustees, Lztuaries  and fund managers, number of  the Occupational  Pensions Board on behalf of the
beneficiaries,  contributions, increase in benefits to  Department of  Social Security and the Pension
current  pensioners,- distribution  of  assets,  an  Schemes  Office for the Inland Revenue. 3'  As in
actuarial certificate saying  to  what  extent  the  the US, the tax authorities  are concerned to avoid
scheme is financially viable, presenting results of  overfunding, but the Pension Board only checks
performancemeasurenient of fund managers and  on  a  three  yearly  basis  whether  assets  are
how they are  remunerated (see Section 4  (d)).  sufficient to  pay  the  minimal state-guaranteed
Every three years a more detailed valuation  report  pension  (GMP). 3 Otherwise, as  noted,  there
must be  included, giving a  view  of  long term  are  no  minimum funding rules.  The  duty to
viability.  It  is particularly crucial that members  check funding is in place belongs to trustees, as in
receive such information in defined contribution  the US, (they are supposed, under common law,
plans.  In Switzerland, similar to the UK, audited  to  "act  in  the  best  interests  of  the
annual  accounts  and  an  individual  benefit  beneficiaries"') but the wider bounds offered by
statement must be made available to members.  In  the funding rules give more responsibility  to them
Japan Tamura  (1992) reports  that disclosure is  to stand up to employers in insisting  a scheme be
vestigial;  members  only  receive  occasional  funded.  There may be difficulties where trustees
circulars.  are not independent  of the employer, which may
be the case through a variety of  channels, siace
(k)  Structure and Mechanics of Supervision  employers as  well as  employees and pensioners
are beneficiaries of  the trust."  (Noble (1992)).
Effectiveness  of  pension  fund  regulation  is  This  was the weakness that partly  enabled the
influenced  by regulatory structures  and procedures  Maxwell fraud to occur (he was able to persuade
which  in  several  countries  are  somewhat  the trustees to  agree to  imprudent but legal self-
unwieldy.  For  example,  in  the  US  the  investment), and also can lead trustees to  accept
Department of Labor oversees minimum funding  too  readily the  case for  removing surpluses via23
contribution holidays, etc.  Also there may be  (I)  Is  There  a  Consensus  on  Regulatory
conflicts of interest between scheme members and  Pract:ce?
employer,  or  pensioners  and  working
members," 2 that trustees may find it difficult to  It  will  be  apparent  that  there  is  no  overall
resolve.  international  consensus  on  good  regulatory
practice.  (See the summary in Table 6.)  On the
In Canada, apart from federal taxation provisions,  one  hand,  there  appears  to  be  reasonable
regulaticn is carried out at the provincial rather  agreement on  tax provisions and  ownership of
than the national level, and hence pension law can  surpluses.  For example, most countries accept
differ  between provinces (in  practice,  Ontario  the arguments for the expenditure  tax treatment of
tends to be the leader).  This can ereate particular  pensions, although there are moves in some cases
problems for employees moving between jobs in  to  level  the  playing field  by  granting  si,nilar
different provinces - which in  turn foreshadows  treatment to  other forms of saving, or  even to
possible  future  difficulties  in  the  EC.  In  impose  comprehensive  income taxation  on pension
Switzerland, too,  regulation is  generally carried  funds. Again, it is generally accepted  that surplus
out  at  cantonal  level,  except  for  "large'  assets belong to companies, although their access
companies, but the federal authorities  are tending  to them is generally restricted, given the potential
to oversee and harmonize  cantonal  supervision.  tax abuse.  On the other hand, there are strong
divisions on portfolio regulations (prudent man vs
In  most Continental European countries such as  portfolio restrictions);  on funding (unfunded vs
the  Netherlands, regulation is carried out  by a  ABO vs PBO vs IBO, as well as regulatory rules
single  statutory  authority,  the  Insurance  vs trustee responsibility); on insurance;  and on
Supervisory Board.  Pension funds are  legally  vesting and service t.ansfers  (between countries
obliged  to  provide  the  Board  with  detailed  insisting on  rapid  vesting and  those  assuming
information  annually on the benefit payments and  lifetime  employment).  Issues  of  fraud  and
investments of  the  fund.  It  ensures  that the  information  disclosure  have come to the fore only
commitmnents  of the pension funds are sufficiently  in some countries.  Another important aspect on
covered by their assets.  It also involves itself in  which there is no consensus (covered in Section
more general structural issues.  If the Board finds  4(a)) is regulation  of the indexation  of benefits.
procedures or  regulations unsatisfactory, it  can
apply  social  pressure  by  making  a  public  There are no obvious right answers to  many of
complaint.  In practice, this is rarely necessary.  these issues.  Historical development  clearly plays
In  some  countries  such  as  Germany,  the  a  major  role.  When  reform is  feasible, the
supervisors also  check that portfolio regulations  "correct"  approach  depends  crucially  on  the
are complied  with and require a five-year business  tradeoff desired between costs to the company  and
plan.  In  Denmark,  there  are  three  yearly  associated effects on competitiveness  on the one
actuarial reports.  hand;  and  the  interests of  the  recipients, the
perceived importance of  labor mobility and the
It  will be  noted from  this  description that  the  need  to  avoid  insurance losses on  the  other.
mechanics  of supervision generally entail reliance  However, some a priori suggestions can be made
on  annual  reports  and  accounts prepared  by  (amplifying  comments  made above).
auditors  and  full  actuarial  reports  at  longer
intervals.  However, the Netherlands  is unusual in  For example, it is notable that most countries with
that the authorities  conduct on-the-spot  inspections  strong portfolio regulations offer  lower  returns
of  all  funds every  10 years.  In  the US,  the  than those with prudent man (Section 4(c)) albeit
Department of  Labor  runs computer checks to  also with lower volatility.  Only in the case of
identify plans  needing further  investigation (or  self  investment would modern portfolio theory
investigations  may be triggered by complaints by  agree  with  the  need  for  quantitative portfolio
members). 250 investigators  are employed.  regulation (although its avoidance  may be implicit
in a prudent man rule).  Funding rules tailored to
the nature of the benefits (as in the Netherlands),24
such as the FBO or IBO in the case of final salary  less  important if  there  are defined contribution
schemes wouid seem to  offer greater security to  and not defined benefit funds.  These need to be
members  than the alternatives  of no funding rules,  weighed against the superior employee retirement
only  covering state pensions, only  the accrued  insurance and various benefits to employers (such
obligation  or relying on the fallible independence  as  lower  labor  turnover  and  ability  to  take
of  trustees.  It  also  ensures smoother funding  contribution holidays) offered by deflned benefit
patterns for  the  sponsor  as  the  fund matures.  plans.
Insurance against fraud would seem to  increase
security without the effects of moral hazard (or  Meanwhile regulatory structures and procedures
need for  tough  restrictions) implicit in  overall  appear to have developed piecemeal in a number
guarantees.  Such  overall  guarantees may  be  of countries. It could be suggested  that the Dutch
inferior to  discretionary bailouts of failed plans,  have a reasonable model (one supervisor, annual
reserved for extreme cases.  When insurance of  checks on the adequacy of funding, overview of
benefits is chosen, a  mixture of controls on risk  plan rules, on-site inspections, etc.) for others to
taking,  as  recommended by  Bodie and  Merton  follow.  Finally, given the long term nature of
(1992)  would seem to be justified.  pension schemes, there  is mucl. to  be  said  for
continuity  of  the  regulatory  framework'
It  is also worth noting that many of  the issues  Retrospective  changes  in  regulation  affecting
(vesting,  transfers,  funding,  ownership  of  liabilities are particularly undesirable, given their
surpluses, guarantees  of benefits)  are absent or  likely impact  on corporate finances.25
4.  PERFORMANCE
This section reviews the relative levels of benefits  mid career.
provided  by  the  funds,  followed  by  an
examination of  their  portfolio behavior and  its  In  the  United  States,  where  defined  benefit
underlying determinants.  Effects of the latter on  schemes are again final salary, there  are often
overall  risks and  returns,  and  the  influence of  discretionary pension increases to compensate  for
fund management  on fund behavior and costs, are  inflation  after  retirement,  although  explicit
also assessed.  indexation for inflation is less common.  Indeed,
as pointed out by Bodie and Merton (1992), even
(a)  Beneflts and Contributions  the indexing of pensions pi2r  to retirement only
holds to the extent that the employee continues  to
Comprehensive data  on  benefits  paid  are  not  work for  the same employer;  his wage keeps
available, and would in any case be distorted by  pace  with  general  wage  inflation;  and  the
factors such as the inclusiveness  of the statistics  employer continues with the same plan.  Early
and the degree to which pension funds cover the  leavers' accrued benefits are not indexed.  Unlike
different sectors of the income distribution.  For  the other countries, preretirement cashouts from a
example, Dailey  and  Turner  (1990) show  that  pension plan must not necessarily be invested in
average retirement benefits in  the  US  in  1989  a-zother  pension scheme, which raises the issue of
were $6359, but as noted by Munnell (1992) they  potential misuse of  the tax  advantages for  non
only beneflt a  'relatively privileged subset of the  retirement  expenditures.
population".  In Switzerland average benefits are
$6236 and Canada $5100, but the latter may be  In Canada even discretionary increases  of benefits
boosted by  inclusion of  public sector schemes.  to allow for inflation are relatively rare (93% of
France ($3203) and Japan ($2304) appear low, the  private sector participants are  in plans  with no
former due to coverage of low paid workers and  formal  inflation protection);  a  fixed  income
the  latter because only  annuities and  not  lump  related to  final salary is promised in retirement.
sums were captured.  We suggest it may be better  In  Germany most  pension  funds  promise  an
to gauge the nature of benefits offered to the plan  amount  dependent  largely  on  duration  of
participant more directly.  employment;  final  salary  schemes  are  less
common than in the other countries.  However,
For example, in the UJnited  Kingdom the nature  indexation is mandatory.  In Japan benefits tend
of benefits has changed since the  1960s.  Final  to relate to years of service and final basic salary,
salary based defined benefit plans, 75% of whose  but the ratio to the latter tends to be less than in
members  benefit  from  guaranteed  indexation,  the Anglo-American  countries;  (such benefits are
cover all public sector and the majority of private  often taken as a  lump sum).  Only the part of
sector  beneficiaries.  Indeed,  indexation  of  pensions replacing social security is indexed.  In
b- nefits up to an inflation rate of 5% may soon  Denmark, where funds are in  any case defined
become mandatory.4 3 The  typical replacement  contribution,  there is little explicit indexation.
ratio  after  40  years  is  50-66%.  Lump  sum
withdrawals at  retirement are  permitted, up  to  Inflation indexation  of pensions is of course a key
150%  of  final  salary.  Meanwhile  in  the  policy topic in  its own right.  The move from
Netherlands 90%  of  pension plans  are  defined  career  average to  final  salary pension plans in
benefit (usually paying 70% of final salary), and  some countries can  be  seen  as  an  attempt to
90%  of  members  receive inflation protection.  correct for effects of inflation  prior to retirement
Pensions  in  Sweden  and  (in  practice)  in  (leaving open difficulties for early  leavers, and
Switzerland  are again indexed.  Swedish  pensions  the issue of indexing after retirement).  However,
are  based  on  best  years  of  income  (suitably  in  Japan  the dependence of  pensions on  basic
indexed) and not final salaries, which may offer  salary and not full remuneration may mean that
superior  equity  between managers and  manual  pre-retirement indexation is  imperfect.  And as
workers, since the latters'  earnings may peak in  noted above, post retirement benefits are rarely26
fully  indexed in  the  US,  Canada, Japan,  and  condition of the fund.  EPFs are more flexible -
Denmark.  Of course, social security pensions  are  contributions are  set  to  obtain  the  promised
invariably  inflation  indexed.  benefit given an assumed  nominal return of 5.5%.
Bodie (1991) suggests that  automatic indexation  The  distribution  of  contributions  between
may be avoided by employers  and not pressed for  employer and  employee varies widely, although
by employees in countries such as the US because  its economic implications need not be significant
of lack of an asset providing an  inflation hedge  (employers can  reduce  salaries  to  offset  their
(unlike index linked gilts in the UK);  because via  contributions).  The  proportion  paid  by  the
social  security,  real  estate  investment,  etc,  employer is  100% in Japan,  89% in  Germany,
individuals  already  have  enough  inflation  87% in the US, 70-75% in the UK, Canada, and
protection, and providing it would increase costs  the Netherlands,  and 58% in Switzerland.
unacceptable  for young workers; or due to money
illusion.  Bodie finds the third explanation most  Administrative costs of  pension funds are  only
plausible.  However, Blake (1992) argues that if  available for a selection of countries, ai;.  are not
real wages and hence contributions rise at 2-3%  directly  internationally comparable.  However,
per  year,  and  fund  managers can  obtain real  some patterns do emerge from US data (Turner
returns  of  2%,  indexation to  prices should be  and Beller (1989)), namely that costs are higher
easily  attainable.  Vittas  (1992)  disputes  this  for  small funds than large,  and  defined benefit
calculation  and suggests that real returns need to  over defined contribution.  For funds with assets
ed  real  earnings  growth  by  2-3%  for  of Sl  million  in 1985, costs were 2% of assets for
indexation to  be  possible  at  reasonable cost.  defined  benefit,  and  1.4%  for  defined
Section 4(c) suggests that real returns of  2% in  contribution.  For  plans  with  assets  of  $150
excess of real wage growth are attainable in most  million,  tha  costs  were  0.7%  and  0.2%.
countries.  Anecdotal evidence for the largest funds in the
UK suggests figures as low as 0.1 %.  Evidence
Given  the  burden  on  employers as  outlined,  from several countries suggest that the costs of
policymakers in  most  countries  have  tended  personal  pensions  are  much  higher  than  for
historically to  avoid legal  provisions enforcing  company  plans,  given  economies  of  scale,
indexation,  even where, as in Switzerland  and the  advertising, commission  costs, etc.
Netherlands, de facto indexation tends to  apply.
However, there are signs that this is changing, as  The features of pension funds outlined in Sections
in the UK laws will shortly enforce indexation  for  2-4(a) are summarized  in Table 6.
p  to  5%  inflation (they already insist on pre-
retirement indexation  of accrued benefits), and as  (b)  Portfolio Distributions
noted, indexation is mandatory in  Germany and
weden.  The portfolio distribution and the corresponding
return on the assets held are the key determinant
Contribution  rates are generally limited  by tax law  of the cost to the company of providing a given
to  around  15% of  salary, except in  Denmark,  pension  benefit'  (although  obviously  the
where they are unlimited,'  balanced by the real  prevailing nature of benefits in a given country,
interest  rate  tax  on  the  funds'  yields.  For  as outlined above, also influence  the overall cost).
example,  in  the  UK,  total  contributions are  This section discusses portfolio distributions per
limited to  17.5% of the employee's salary, and  se;  the  next  assesses  their  implications for
e  maximum employee contribution is  15%  of  performance.
salary.  In Sweden, contributions are  13%.  In
countries such as Germany, where private pension  Changes  in  portfolio  distributions of  pension
schemes have limited "supplementary"  objectives,  funds over the period 1970-90  are shown in detail
ontributions are  typically much lower,  around  in Tables 8 to 20 and summarized  in Table 21.  It
1.5%  of salary.  In Japan, contributions  to TQPPs  should be  noted that the data generall) exclude
are limited to  3.2%  of  salary regardless of the  pension  funds  administered by  life  insutance27
companies.  The data for the Netherlands  exclude  significantly  higher than  in  other  countries.
the public  pension  scheme  (ABP), which invests  Germany  also has the lowest and least volatile
virtually  all its funds in loans  to the government  inflation  rate.  Meanwhile,  international
and local authorities,  or government  guaranteed  diversification' in  equities also offers sizeable
loans  to private  firms. The data are from national  real returns, at generally  lower risk than sole
flow-of-funds  tables and are not always  at market  focus on domestic  shares, despite exchange  rate
value (e.g., United States bonds and Canadian  risk.
equities are  at  book value) and may exclude
certain  assets (e.g., United  States  property). To  In principle,  the portfolio  share of ligiud asets
maintain  comparability,  asset holdings combine  can U. small because  withdrawals  are predictable
domestic  and foreign assets.  Hence equities  in  (the "contractual  annuity' aspect  noted in Section
Table 14, for example, are both domestic  and  1).  German, Japanese, Dutch, Swedish, and
foreign.  (In most cases, foreign  asset data was  Danish  funds have accordingly  always held less
obtained from separate sources.)  Finally, in  than  4% of assets  in this form. The higher  levels
recent years the data may be partly misleading,  that  have ofien been  observed  at various  times in
given increased  use of derivatives.  A suitably  other countries  (Table 8) are therefore  likely to
hedged  equity  may have the characteristics  of a  reflect high  market returns on  liquid assets
bond (see  the  discussion in  Section 5(a)) - relative  to other assets. This was  particularly  true
although ownership of  the  company clearly  for the United  Kingdom  and the United  States  in
remains  with  the equity  holder.  1974 when the equity market  fell sharply. The
United  Kingdom  has returned  to roughly  its pre-
As background,  estimates  of real  total returns  and  1974  level  of short-term  assets, while  Canada  and
their standard  deviations  for 1967-90  are shown  in  the United  States  have  built  them  up considerably.
Table  7.  The table was constructed  using annual  This  has largely  resulted  from  the accumulation  of
average  data on summary  or  market indices of  market paper,  though  deposits have  grown
interest rates,  yields and  asset prices drawn  somewhat  (Table9).
largely from the BIS macroeconomic  database.
No allowance  is made for taxation  or transaction  These increases  coincided  with deregulation  and
costs,  which would affect actual  returns to  expansion  of short-term  markets  (Stigum  (1990)).
investors. Owing  to lack of data, a number  of  Swiss  funds  have  always  held  a high proportion  of
bond price indices were estimated from changes  liquid assets, which has latterly expanded  to 12%,
in yields.  This is of course only a sample over a  largely in the form of short term money market
relatively short period and does  not necessarily  instruments  (Table 104'), due to the shape of the
ndicate long run expected  returns.  For example  term structure.
the United States real equity yield is thought to be
over  8%  higher  than  the  risk  free  rate.  Bonds (Table 11) constitute over two  thirds of
(Reference:  Ibbotson  and Sinquefield  (1990)).  pension fund  assets  in  Sweden and  Denmark,
largely due to pcitfolio regulations and the nature
Among  the  notable  features  of  the  data  for  of the domestic financial markets.  As shown in
domestic assets are that the highest return - and  Table 6, 60% of Danish assets must be  invested
the  highest  risks  - are  generally offered  by  in domestic debt instruments, while the majority
equities, followed  by property. Both are generally  of Swedish assets are to  be  in listed bonds and
in excess not only of inflation, but also - crucially  debentures (and retroverse loans).  In the United
for final salary plans - the growth rate of average  States, where regulations make it optimal to hold
earnings.  Bonds in most countries offer a much  a large proportion  of bonds despite their weakness
lower real return, and generally a highly volatile  as an inflation hedge',  bonds still form around
return (note that  the  calculations are  based on  40% of pension funds' portfolios.  Levels similar
annual  holding  period returns,  ie including  capital  to the US are maintained  in Canada  and Japan,
gains and losses arising  from changes  in interest  while  being  only  30%e in  Germany and
rates).  The main exceptions  are Germany  and  Switzerland.  In contrast, the bond share has
enmark,  where  real returns  on bonds  have been  fallen  sharply  in the United  Kingdom,  from 50%15bk 7:  Chwaaedes  of rea  NM reOwas, 1  -9
Men  (_adad  devun*  of read  bIaIIhogdpeg  od rem  (danel  cawncy)
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Laons  3.5  (2.9)  1.4  (5.0)  5.3  (1.9)  0.9  (4.3)  4.0  (3.7)  3.8  (3.6)  3A  (3.1)  6.1  (3.6)  2.5  (2.0)  2.6  (3.2)
Morwaaes  2.0  (13.4)  2.0  (5.2)  4.7  (1.4)  3.0  (4.9)  2.4  (12.3)  4.3  (2.6)  2.6  (3A)  S.J  (3.7)  1.3  (.3)  3.7  (2A)
Eluides  4.7  (14.4)  3.1  (13.9)  9.5  (20.3)  10.9  (19.4)  4.5  (16.5)  7.9  (23.2)  3.4  (3.3)  7.  (27.5)  6.2  a2.3  )  9.4  (26.9)
Bouds  -0.6  (14.4)  0.8  (11.1)  2.7  (14.9)  0.2  (12.3)  0.0  (12.1)  1.0  (13.1)  -0.9  (3.S)  3.4  (16.1)  -2.2  (17.6)  1.0  (13.1)
Shmt4erm a*m  2.0  (.5)  1.7  (4.9)  3.1  (2.1)  -0.5  (4.6)  2.5  (3.3)  1.6  (4.0)  1.3  n3.)  1.6  (1.3)  1.2  (2.2)  24  (3.4)
Propeny  3.4  (6.4)  6.7  (11.4)  4.5  (2.9)  7.2  (6.3)  4.6  (6.2)  4.6  (15.0)  -
Foreign  bods  1.5  (15.2)  -0.3  (16.0)  3.2  (12.3)  1.5  (14.9)  -1.1  (125)  .0.S  (11.7)  0.0  (13.3)  -1.7  (12.4 )  -1.6  (14.0)  O.  (13.2)
Foreip  eqiices  9.1  (17.1)  6.5  (16.4)  10.4  (143)  7.8  (19.6)  6.6  (14.9)  6.4  (14.4)  7.3  (14.5)  6.1  (14.5)  6.1  (16.3)  7.2 - (13.5)
Memoanhm  kemn:
Inflatio  (CPIu  6.0  (3.0)  8.9  (5.3)  3.5  (Z.1)  5.5  (5.3)  6.4  (3.0)  4.9  (3.1)  7.7  (3.0)  7.7  (3.2)  4.0  (2.5)  7.1  (4.1)
Redempion yield  an
gaomerm  bonds  2.6  (3.1)  1.9  (4.3)  3.9  (1.1)  1.0  (4.4)  2.9  (3.0)  3.2  (2.7)  2.3  (2.3)  5.3  (2.4)  0.9  (1.3)  3.3  (2.3)
Real eaning  growth  0.2  (2.1)  2.6  (2.5)  4.0  (3.1)  4.2  (4.2)  1.7  (2.8)  2.4  (3.2)  1.5  (35)  2.3  (3.6)  1.9  (2.1)
27aTable So Short  term  assets (as  a percentage  of  assets)
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990*
UK  4  8  5  4  7
Us  1  7  8  10  9
Germany  3  3  2  1  2
Japan  2  1  2  4  3
Canada  5  6  9  10  11
Netherlands  3  3  2  2  3
Sweden  0  0  0  1  3
Switxerland  7  6  6  7  12
Denmark  3  3  2  1  1
*  1989 for  Canada
1987  for Denmark
fable  9:  Market  paper  (am  a  percentage  of assets)
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990*
UK  2  5  3  1  1
uS  0  3  3  2  3
Germany  - - - - -
Japan  - - - _  _
Canada  2  2  5  6  10
Netherlands  2  1  1  1  1
Sweden  0  0  0  1  3
Switzerland  3  2  4  6  10
Denmark  - - - -
*  1989  for  Canada
1987  for  Denmark
2 pbTable  10:  Deposits  (as  a  percsitage  of assets)
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990*
UK  2  3  2  3  6
us  1  4  5  a  6
Germany  3  3  2  1  2
Japan  - - - - -
Canada  3  4  4  4  1
Netherlands  1  2  1  1  3
Sweden  0  0  0  0  0
Switzerland  4  4  3  1  1
Denmark  - - - - -
*  1989 for Canada
1987 for Denmark
Table  11t  Bonds  (as  a percentage  of assets)
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990*
UK  32  24  24  20  14
uS  45  42  41  40  36
Germany  19  18  24  32  25
Japan  12  34  51  49  47
Canada  53  50  50  49  47
Netherlands  15  13  10  19  23
Sweden  76  76  74  77  84
Switzerland  25  24  28  31  29
Denmark  72  72  63  67  67
*  1989 for Canada
1987 for Denmark
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of gross assets in 1966 to 14% in 1990.  bonds casts  some doubt on their  efficacy as a
means to  protect  against future risks  to  social
This may reflect different liabilities;  in countries  security, given the bonds are to be repaid by the
such  as  Canada,  only  nominal  returns  are  taxpayer in the same way as they would have to
promised after  retirement, while in  the  United  finance future social security burdens.
Kingdom a  degree  of  inflation protection both
before and after retirement is expected.  Similar  Except in Germany, where the bank bond market
prornises are made by the Swedish supplementary  remains  buoyant,  as  well  as  Sweden  and
national scheme, despite which the bond share is  Denmark, where a large proportion of bonds are
extremely  high, suggesting an inefficient  portfolio  issued by credit institutions for housing finance,
allocation.  The fall in the UK bond share also  private  bond  holdings of  pension  funds  have
reflects alternative means of diversification; after  tended to decline (Table 13).  Nevertheless,  in the
abolition of  exchange controls UK  funds  sold  United States the share remains over 20%.  The
bonds to buy foreign assets.  A decline has also  share  of  US  funds  in  total  corporate  bonds
been observed in the Netherlands, from 20% in  outstanding  has also fallen.  The general decline
1966 to  10% in  1980, although it has recovered  partly reflects availability, but also  a  shift  into
since, with the increase in public debt issue.  Van  public bonds (which are more liquid) and equities
Loo  (1988) relates  this  to  higher returns  and  (which offer higher returns).  Notably in the UK
longer  maturity  (and  thus  better  matching to  and US, pension funds have taken advantage of
liabilities) by private placement loans, while the  regulations permitting equity holding and  have
recent recovery in bond holding corresponds  to a  thus been able to profit fromi  patterns of relative
narrowing of the yield differential.  Patterns of  returns which have favored equities over bonds
bond holding may also relate to asset returns (see  (Table 7).
Table 7);  where (Dartly  owing to low and stable
inflation), real returns on bonds and other flxed  Since in many countries pension funas may offer
interest assets are  relatively high  in  Germany,  real returns (either in the sense of indexation to
Denmark, and  the  Netherlands while  in  other  wages  before  retirement,  or  in  some  cases
countries boads have performed poorly.  Swiss  indexation after retirement), they consider it  is
bonds have done particularly badly, as have those  sensible to invest in 'real"  assets such as equity
in  Sweden, where bonds have a  high portfolio  and real estate.'9
share.  Much of  the  past  growth of  Japanese
funds' bond holdings may reflect the high share  As shown in Table  14, the share of eguities in
of  public  bonds  purchased, under  government  most countries has grown significantly over  the
pressure, a practice that has now been abandoned.  period shown, albeit at levels in  1990 varying
from  19%  in  Sweden to  63%  in the  UK.  As
The share of goverment  bonds in pension funds'  noted, German  funds are limited to a maximum  of
portfolios has grown significantly since the mid-  20% by regulation, Swiss and Japanese to 30% -
1970s in  all of the countries studied except the  hence at 18% and 27% respectively in 1990, the
United Kingdom where there was a contraction  in  German and Japanese ceilings are almost binding.
the supply of public debt in the late 1980s  (Table  An exception  to the patterns of growth has been
12).  The decline in the UK occurred despite the  the  United States, where levels in  1990 were
introduction  of index linked bonds, which should  only  slightly  above  those  in  1970.  In  the
in  principle be  an  attractive means of  pension  Netherlands shareholding remains low - 20% -
fund  financing  (depending on  the  real  yield  despite absence of  portfolio restrictions.  This
relative to  growth  of  average earnings).  The  may  relate to  the  narrowness of  the  domestic
increases in  other countries parallel the size of  equity n.trket and risk aversion of pension fund
government deficits and  corresponding ex  ante  trustees.  Proportions in the United Kingdom, the
real returns on such bonds (although, as shown in  United States, and Canada were strongly affected
Table  7,  such  returns  have  not  always  been  by price instability in the mid-1970s whereas the
realized er  oost).  Investment of a  fifth of  the  1987 crash had little effect on equity proportions.
Swedish  quasi-public funds' assets in government  Reflecting portfolio regulations, the equity shareTable 12t  Governoent  bonds (as  a percentage  of  assets)
1970  1975  1960  1985  1990*
UK  16  18  22  18  11
Us  7  9  14  22  20
Germany  9  6  13  20  17
Japan.  11  16  15  13  5
Canada  38  34  40  42  39
Netherlands  10  7  5  13  14
Sweden  12  17  24  30  22
Switzerland  - - - - -
Denmark  11  6  4  14  11
1989  for  Canada  0  Government-guaranteed  bonds  only.
1987 for  Denmark
Table  133  Private  bonds (as  a percentage  of  assets)
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990*
UK  14  6  2  2  3
Us  38  33  26  19  16
Germany  10  13  11  12  8
Japan  - - - - _
Canada  1S  17  12  8  8
Netherlands  3  4  3  3  4
8weden  64  59  50  47  63
Switzerland  - - - - -
Denmark  61  ,  66  59  52  56
*  1989 for Canada
1987 for Denmark
28a¢  abl  14:  BqpaitL*s  (as  a percentage  of assets)
1970  1975  1960  1985  1990*
UK  49  30  52  62  63
us  45  42  41  43  46
Germany  4  5  9  12  is
Japan  6  10  9  16  27
Canada  22  25  21  28  29
Netherlands  11  11  5  11  20
Sweden  0  0  0  0  1
Iwltzorland  3  5  9  12  16
Denmark  0  0  3  6  7
*  1989  for Canada
1987  for  Denmark
!able  15:  Mortgages  (as  a  perceutage  of assets)
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990*
UK  - - - -
US  6  3  2  2  2
oermany  19  22  15  12  9
Japan  0  4  11  2  1
Canada  11  12  11  6  4
Notherlands  8  6  6  4  4
Sweden  - - - -
Swltzerland  15  13  10  9  8
Denmark  6  2  3  8  6
*  1989  for  Canada
1987  for  Denmark
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in  countries such  as  Sweden and  Denmark is  is  maturity of  the  fund,  as  the  need to  pa
exceptionally  low, despite the Danish tax on real  pensions  puts  a  greater  focus  on  incom
returns  (Section  3(a)),  which  encourages  generation, i.e.,  bonds,  as  opposed to  capit
substitution  of equities  for bonds.  growth, i.e., equities.  This may be an importan
factor in the future in the UK and US.
Fu.nding regulations  can  influence the  equity
s!iare, for example in the. United States where a  Pension funds in  all countries show a  declining
drop  in  market values can cause underfunding  share of mortgages in recent years (Table 15);  in
which has to be reflected in the employer's profit  Canada  and  the  Netherlands weakness in  the
and  loss  account.  As  dis, issed  below,  this  housing  market  has  stimulated  this  trend.
encourages holding of  bonds  and/or  forms of  However, note that  Swedish and  Danish funds
hedging.  have considerable exposure to  housing markets
via mortgage related bonds, and loans to housing
Accounting  conventions  can also have an effect on  credit  institutions.  Together  with  mortgages,
equity holdings.  In Japan, equities are held at  these amounted to no less than 57% of Swedish
book value, and a fixed return on the fund (based  funds' assets in 1990, while Danish funds in 1987
on interest and capital gains) is targeted for every  had  63%  of  assets  in  mortgages or  mortgage
year  This gives adverse incentives to  sell well  association bonds.  These  imply  an  enormous
performing equities as general share prices fall  exposure to  potential effects of  recession and
and retain those showing price declines (Tamura  falling house prices.  They may  also  imply a
(1992)).  In  Germany and  Switzerland, Hepp  draining of  resources from  private industry (as
(1992)  suggests  that  application  of  strict  contributors) as  well as a  diversion of  personal
accounting  principles, which are more appropriate  sector saving, depending on the post tax interest
to  banks  than  pension  funds,  restrains  equity  rates payable by mortgage borrowers.
holdings by funded schemes independently  of the
portfolio regulations (evidenced, particularly  in  Lans  face greater liquidity  risk than bonds, while
Switzerland,  by  the  fact  that  funds'  equity  having the advantage  of being tailored  preJisely to
holdings are  far  below the ceilings permitted).  the  needs  of  borrower  and  investor  (longer
These conventions,  for example, insist on positive  maturities,  etc.).  They  constitute  a  large
net worth of the fund at all times, carry equities  proportion of Dutch and German pension funds'
on  the  book at  the lower  of  book value  and  assets  (Table 16),  reflecting  the  structure  of
market  value  and  calculate  returns  net  of  financial markets as well as  returns.  Loans by
unrealized  capital gains.  However, Lusser (1989)  German funds are largely to banks and companies
suggests that Swiss funds are also inhibited  from  (including  the sponsoring  company); Dutch fuznds
equity investment by  lack of  expertise, lack of  lend predominantly  to the public sector.  Swedish
market transparency and limits on transferability  and Swiss funds, that  used to  relv heavily on
of shares.  loans, now only do  so to  a  limited extent.  In
Sweden the decline (both in "retroverse" loans to
In contrast, the UK accounting standard permits  participating companies  and  promissory  note
long-run smoothing and  focusses on  dividends  loans) is related to the increased efficiency of the
rather  than  market values,  and  hence  enables  domestic capital market in intermediating funds.
funds to  accept the volatility of  equity returns.  In  Japan,  the  share  of  loans has  again fallen
The concern of some commentators  in the UK is  sharply, although these medium-term  floating-rate
rather whether equity holdings are too high given  yen  loans to  firms were  consistently the  most
the risks;  however, note that 18% of the 63%  profitable investment in Japan in the  1970s.  It
equity share  in  1990w was actually in  foreign  can be argued that this highlights  a general point,
equities, thus reducing risk somewhat.  No other  that protection of  fund managers from  external
country has anything comparable  to this portfolio  competition  (as was the case in Japan till recently)
share of equities.  may  lead to  a  sub-optimal investment strategy
from the point of view of plan beneficiaries. (see
A further factor that may influence  equity holding  also Section  (d)).Table  16:  Loans  (as a percentag-  of assets)
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990*
UK  0  0  0  1  0
us  - - - -
Germany  31  33  37  36  36
Japan  52  30  22  15  13
Canada  0  0  1  0  0
Netherlands  46  52  63  52  39
Sweden  22  24  26  22  10
Switzerland  33  31  27  21  14
Denmark  1  1  4  1  1
*  1989  for Canada
1987  for Denmark
Table  17:  Property  (as a percentage  of assets)
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990*
UK  10  15  18  10  9
Us  - - - - -
Germany  12  12  9  7  6
Japan  27  21  6  3  2
Canada  1  1  2  3  3
Netherland3  16  15  14  11  11
Sweden  0  0  0  0  1
Switzerland  16  20  18  18  17
Denmark  - - _  _
*  1989  for Canada
1987 for Denmark
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The same comment  appeared for a long time also.  investing in  LDCs,  and  the  risk of  heightened
to  apply  to  declining  investment by  Japanese  volatility arising from short term herd-like shifts
pension funds in  propey  (including equipment  of funds between markets, see Section 5(d).  For
and real estate trusts) (Table 17), which has fallen  further discussion, see Davis (1991).
from almost 30% of the portfolio in  1970 to 2%
now,  although the  current property crash  now  Of  course,  international  investment  poses
casts doubt on this judgement.  Property holdings  additional  risks  compared  with  domestic
in  Germany, the  Netherlands, and  the  United  investment.  Exchange rate risk means that the
Kingdom,  (where  much  of  the  accumulation  returns from foreign assets may be more variable
followed weakness of  the equity markets in the  than for domestic instruments, especially in  the
mid-1970s) have also  declined recently.  Once  short term.  Transfer risk may affect the ability to
UK  equity  returns  recovered  and  exchange  repatriate  returns.  Settlement risk  in  some
controls  were  abolished,  property  investment  securities markets may  be  large,  with  a  high
declined owing to its lack of liquidity and lower  proportion of  delayed  and  failing transactions.
returns  than the alternative of  foreign equities.  Liquidity risk  that  transactions may  move the
As in Japan, in the light of the property crash in  market against the  fund may  be  significant In
the  UK  in  the  late  80s,  this  strategy proved  narrow markets.  There may also be restrictions
sensible.  Dutch  holdings  were  made  less  on investment  given concerns over foreign control
attractive by  a  tightening of  rent  and  tenure  and disruptive  capital inflows."
controls.  Canadian  holdings  are  small,  and
restricted to 7%.  The principal exception to the  Table 18 shows that foreign asset holdings have
picture are the Swiss funds, which retain around a  grown  sharply  over  the  1980s in  the  United
fifth of  their assets in  property.  As noted by  Kingdom and  Japan.  In  both  countries, this
Schmahl (1992b), this  focus may drive  up  the  pattern followed  abolition of exchange controls, at
price of lauid and does. not contribute to  capital  a  time  when  the  econoii,'s  were  generating
formation.  Lusser  (1989)  also  criticizes this  current account surpluses  and  verseas investment
approach, and suggests funds will face decreasing  returns looked attractive.  In Japan,  restrictions
returns on  (domestic) property in  the future, as  on  overseas investment were  also  progressively
the population  declines.  eased  over  the  1980s.  There  is  a  contrast,
however, in that UK foreign assets are virtually
n principle, international  diversification  can offer  all equities, whereas Japanese funds invest  heavily
a better risk/return tradeoff to fund managers, by  in  foreign  bonds,  see  Table  19.  Meanwhile
reducing  the  systematic risk  of  investing  in  Dutch  funds  have  long  held  a  significant
domestic markets arising from the cycle or  long  proportion of  assets  abroad, partly due  to  the
term  shifts in  the profit share.  It  will be  of  large v)lume  of  pension fund  assets compared
particular importance  in small markets with a low  with domestic security and  real  estate markets.
umber  of  liquid  stocks  - where  domestic  Growth  was  much  less  marked  in  the  other
nvestment would hence imply a  high degree of  countries (Table  18);  in  Germany and Canada
ndustry risk.  Alternatively it can be seen as a  this is partly for regulatory reasons. 52 Data for
means  of  hedging  against  risks  of  imported  Sweden and Denmark are not available, but their
inflation (which vary  with the openness of  the  foreign  asset  holdings  are  believed  to  be
economy).  It  will  also  allow  investment in  extremely  small.
industries not present in the domestic economy.
In a longer-term  context, intemational  investment  The characteristics of pension funds'  portfolios,
in  countries with a  relat'  'ely  young population  which result from the  asset selection discussed
ay be essential to prevent battles over resources  above, are shown in Table 21.  The exceptionally
between workers and pensioners in countries with  high level of real assets for  UK pension funds,
an  aging  population.  As  a  by-product,  and the low levels in Scandinavia,  are particularly
international diversification should also  improve  notable.  Reflecting their  heavy  investment in
efficiency  of global capital markets, subject to  loans, German and Dutch funds have relatively
,itations  funds  impose  on  themselves  on  low  levels  of  marketable  securities.  TheseTable 18:  Foreign assets (as  a  percentage  of assets)
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990*
UK  2  5  9  15  18
Us  0  0  1  2  4
Germany  0  0  0  1  1
Japan  0  0  1  5  7
Canada  - 3  4  5  6
Netherlands  7  8  4  9  15
Sweden  - - - _  _
Switzerland  - - - 3  5
Denmark  - - - - -
*  1989  for Canada
1987 for Denmark
Table  19:  Foreign assets  of pension funds  *nd-1988
Foreign  assets  Percent  of  Foreign  bonds  Foreign  equities  as
(Sbn)  total assets  as  percent of  percent of
foreign  assets  foreign ass-ts
UK  53.8  13.9%  6%  94%
Us  62.8  4.0%  14%  86%
Germany  0.2  0.4%  93%  7%
Japan  65.2  7.1%  (50%)  (50%),
Canada  6.9  5.3%  7%  93%
Netherlands  15.0  14.4%  41%  59%
Switzerland  9.0  4%  70%+  30%+
Memo:  France  1.2  4.0%  15%  85%
*.  Percent  of securities  holdings  only
+  Estimated
Data for  Sweden  and  Denmark  not  available.
30aTabl-  20:  Other  assets  (as a percentage  of agsets)
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990*
UK  0  0  2  4  6
Us  3  5  8  6  2
Germany  11  6  3  1  1
Japan  - - - -
Canada  8  1  2  2  2
Netherlands  - - - - _
Sweden  3  0  0  0  0
Switzerland  I  1  1  1  1
Denmark  23  25  28  24  25
*  1989  for Canada
1987  for Denmark
30bTable 21:  Characteriutics  of  pension  funds'  portfolios
United  United  Canada  Japan  Germany  lItherlands  Sweden  Denmark  Switzerland
Kingdom  States
an  a  proportion  of  total  ausetu"'
Marketable  1970  0.85  0.90  0.77  0.21  0.23  0.28  0.76  0.72  0.31
securities  b)  1980  0.79  0.86  0.73  0.64  0.34  0.15  0.74  0.66  0.41
1990  0.78  0.85  0.86  0.74  0.43  0.44  0.B8  0.74  0.55
Real  assetsc  1970  0.61  0.45  0.23  0.37  0.17  0.28  0.00  0.00  0.19
1980  0.70  0.41  0.20  0.16  0.18  0.19  0.00  0.03  0.27
1990  0.72  0.46  0.32  0.29  0.24  0.31  0.02  0.07  0.33
Capital-uncertain  1970  0.93  0.90  0.76  0.51  0.36  0.42  0.76  0.72  0.44
assets(d  1980  0.94  0.82  0.70  0.7  0.42  0.29  0.74  0.66  0.55
1990  0.96  0.82  0.79  0.76  0.49  0.54  0.86  0.74  0.62
Long-  term
Fixed-interest-  1970  0.32  0.51  0.65  0.14  0.69  0.61  0.98  0.76  0.58
bearing  assets"'  1980  0.24  0.43  0.64  0.54  0.76  0.72  1.00  0.70  0.55
1990  0.14  0.38  0.51  0.47  0.70  0.66  0.94  0.74  0.43
(a)  Categories  overlap,  so  they  do  not
add  up  to  unity.
(b)  Equities,  bonds  and  market  paper.
(c)  Equities  and  property.
(d)  Equities,  property  and  bonds.
(e)  Bonds,  mortgages  (for  Canada,  the
United  States,  the  Netherlands,
Denmark,  Sweden  and  Germany),  other
loans  (for  Germany,  Denmark,  Sweden,
Switzerland  and  the  Netherlands).
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observations apart, for the United Kingdom, the  measure for an ongoing portfolio, since they take
United States and  Canada, the  table  reveals a  full account of losses or gains due to interest rate
comparative lack of change in the characteristics  changes (aithough other  assumptions regarding
of pension funds' assets, which may in turn  be  holding  periods  could  also  be  made).  The
related to unchanging aims and regulation.  The  estimates  suggest that pension funds in the United
main shifts have been a move from fixed interest  Kingdom obtained  the highest real return over the
to  real assets by United Kingdom pension funds  period  1967-90, Sweden,  Switzerland, Canada,
and  into marketable and capital uncertain assets  and the United States the lowest.  These results
by  Canadian funds.  This  observation suggests  must  be  reflected either  in  funding costs  fo,
that many of the portfolio shifts discussed above  sponsoring firms or the level of benefits offered
did not imply changes in objectives,  but rather an  and  it  is  notable that  UK  funds tend  to  offer
adjustment  to  market  conditions  within  an  superior benefits to North American funds (Tab'
unchanged set  of goals in terms of  real return,  6).  The result of course partly reflects risk an
marketability, etc.  Portfolios  in  Sweden and  the  share  of  equity  and  property,  the  Unit^
Denmark are also stable - but in this case perhaps  Kingdom having the highest standard deviation  -
due to the tightness  of portfolio regulation  and the  returns (together with Denmark), and by far the
conservatism of fund management.  Portfolios in  highest share of real assets (Table 21).  But as
Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan have been  noted in Section 1, compared with other financial
somewhat  more fluid;  one cause of this, notably  institutions, pension  funds  are  well  placed  to
in Japan, was the increased issue of government  accept a degree of volatility.  This is particularly
bonds, with a  concomitant shift out of  property  the case for defined benefit funds where there can
and loans.  be  risk  sharing  between  younger  and  older
members" 3 Meanwhile, Swedish, Swiss, United
(c)  Returns on the Portfolio  States, and Canadian funds held high proportions
of  bonds,  which  performed  poorly  over  this
The patterns of portfolio distributions (Tables 8-  period.
20) and risks and returns on assets (Table 7) can
be  used to  derive estimates of  the  returns and  Interestingly,  portfolios  in  Germany  and  the
risks on portfolios, and hence the cost to the firm  Netherlands had  a  high  real  return  and  low
of  providing a  given level of pensi6n benefits.  volatility, despite their focus on bonds and loans.
The method is simply to  weight the annual real  This relates to relatively high returns on fixed rate
rate  of  return  on  each  asset  by  the  relevant  instruments in  those countries (Table 7).  The
portfolio share,  thus  giving  on  aggregation a  high  returns  may  appear  to  justify  the
series  of  annual  portfolio  rates  of  return.  conservative asset  distribution of  German and
Transactions and management costs are ignored;  Dutch  funds.  Growing  integration of  capital
actual  returns  would  be  lower  if  these  were  markets, however, should mean this asymmetric
significant (see  Section (d)).  The  average  and  performance  is unlikely to be repeated, and hence
standard deviation of  these series are given in  portfolio regulations locking German funds into
Table 22.  (The data in Table 22 cover the period  this type of distribution  remain difficult to justify.
1967-90 and average returns,  especially for  the  Moreover, Table 25 (see below) shows that real
US and Canada, are affected by the high level of  returns for German and Dutch funds could have
stockmarket prices in  1966.  Appendix II shows  been boosted significantly by an increased share
real rates of return over the period 1970-90.  It  of  equities.  Investment in  international equities
can be seen that for the US average real returns  would ensure that the associated increase in risk
amounted to 4% over this period, twice the level  was mitigated,
reported for the longer period 1967-99.)
Several observations  can be made regarding these
Annual  holding  period  returns  on  marketable  results.  The publically sponsored Swedish fund
fixed - rate instruments are used, as in Table 7,  does poorly, despite the structure of independent
instead of redemption yields.  In our view, the  fund boards.  A further test of ownership effects.
holding period  returns  are  the  more  relevant  splitting local government  and private funds in theTable 22:  Pension fund returns (1967-90)
Mean  (Standard  deviation) of annual real
total returns (domestic  currrency)
Percent
us  UK  Germany  Japan  Canada  Netherlands  Sweden  Demnark  Switzerland
Using holding  period retunms
on bonds (all countries)  and
fixed rate mongages
(US & Canada)
2.2  (11.9)  5.8  (12.5)  5.1  (4.4)  4.0  (9.4)  1.6  (9.8)  4.0  (6.0)  0.2  (7.6)  3.6  (12.7)  1.5  (6.4)
Average  earmings  0.2  (2.1)  2.6  (2.5)  4.0  (3.1)  4.2  (4.2)  1.7  (2.8)  2.4  (3.2)  1.5  (3.5)  2.8  (3.6)  1.9  (2.!
Pordolio return less
average earnings  2.0  3.2  1.1  -0.2  -0.1  1.6  -1.3  0.8  -0.4
Govemunentbonds  0.6  (14.4)  0.8  (I1.))  2.7  (14.9)  0.2  (12.8)  0.0  (12.1)  1.0  (13.1)  -0.9  (8.5)  3.4  (16.1)  -2.2  (17.6)
Market paper  2.0  (2.5)  1.7  (4.9)  3.1  (2.1)  -0.5  (4.6)  2.5  (3.3)  1.6  (4.0)  1.3  (3.5)  1.6  (1.8)  1.2  (2.2)
Equities  4.7  (14.4)  8.1  (18.9)  9.5  (20.3)  10.9  (19.4)  4.5  (16.5)  7.9  (28.2)  8.4  (23.3)  7.0  (27.5)  6.2  (22.3)
Memo: using redemption
yields on fixed rate
instrunents  3.9  (7.6)  6.3  (10.7)  5.5  (3.0)  2.9  (5.7)  4.1  (5.0)  4.3  (5.5)  2.8  (2.9)  5.8  (3.0)  2.2  (2.a)
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UK and US, is shown in Appendix. Public funds  Canada,  Japan  and  Switzerland  and  more
again achieve lower returns.  The Swedish and  significantly  so  in  Sweden.  A  negative
Swiss are also both compulsory, thus in principle  differential implies a need for higher contributions
reducing competitive pressures.  The  Japanese,  or for regular top ups in order to meet specified
Swiss,  and  Germans have  generally had  little  targets. 5'  It was noted above that this may relate
competition in fund management  (see Section 4(d)  to inefficient  asset alloc,ations.
below).  But as  shown by  the Germans, good
economic  performance  - or  international  Table  23  shows  the  results  of  illustrati
diversification - can  overcome  a  number  of  calculations on  the  relation  between costs
handicaps.  providing pensions,  average  earnings and  real
returns (based on Vittas (1992)), as applied to the
Comparison of  the risks and returns on pension  results of the sample shown in Table 22.  The
fund portfolios with Table 6 shows the benefits of  Table shows the  implied replacement rate  th
diversification  in  terms  of  lower  standard  would be  attainable given the real  returns and
deviations on the portfolio than individual  assets.  growth  rates  of  wages  shown  in  Table  22,
However,  the  returns  cannot  be  directly  assuming indexed pensions, a  10% contribution
compared, as pension fund returns are free of tax,  rate, 40 years in service and 20 years retirement.
while assets held directly would not be.  It should  The  table  illustrates clearly the  benefits of
also  be  noted  that  Table  22  only  shows  an  higher return relative to real earnings;  assumin
estimate  of  returns  to  funds  from  "passive"  pensions are indexed to prices, the UK funds can
holdings of  the  relevant index for  each asset,  obtain a  replacement ratio of 66%,  the Swedes
weighted by portfolio share.  Appropriate stock  only  16%.  Clearly, given their lower  returns,
selection could in principle give a higher return - pension funds in Sweden as well as Switzerland,
although as  discussed below,  in  practice active  Canada  and  Japan  would  require  highe
asset  management often  lowers  retums,  given  contribution rates  in  order  to  achieve simila
transactions  costs.  replacement rates  to  those  of  the  UK  funds
(Table 2  in  Appendix II  shows a  much more
Comparison, in Table 22, of the results with risk  favorable  combination  of real returns and earnings
free  yields  suggests  that  the  funds  generally  growth for the period 1971-90 in most countries.
outperformed  government  bonds,  albeit  only  This  reflects  the  better  performance of  stock
narrowly in Denmark.  However, in Canada and  market  in  the  1980s and  the  deceleration in
Sweden the  portfolio return  is  below  that  on  earnings growth.  It should, however, be stressed
market paper (it  is  open to  doubt whether the  that what really matters is  average returns and
markets were big enough to absorb pension funds'  earnings  growth over 40 or even 60 years.)
size,  of  course).  Returns are  generally below
those on equities, but at a benefit of much lower  Table 24 shows the real returns on pension fund
risk.  portfolios  over five-year subperiods, thus offering
an  additional indccation of  the risk  of  pension
The  most  crucial test  is  ability of  a  fund to  funds.  As above, the patterns are influenced  both
outperform  real  average  earnings,  given  that  by portfolio distributions  and the differing returns
defined benefit schemes are basically indexed to  on domestic financial  markets.  And as noted, the
them.  This is hence the key indicator  of the costs  degree  to  which  the  latter  differentials  may
of  the scheme to  the sponsor.  For the period  continue  with  open  and  globalized  financial
1967-90, the headroom is sizeable (over 2% pa)  markets is  open  to  doubt.  Subject to  these
in  only  two  countries,  the  US  and  the  UK,  caveats, the table shows that German funds have
although the US result relies on the estimate of  earned a positive real return throughout, whereas
almost  zero  real  wage  growth  (net  of  fringe  in other countries returns were negative in 1971-
benefits) over  the  past  25  years.  It  remains  5.  In  Denmark, Canada, and the  US,  returns
positive  in  the  Netherlands,  Germany  and  were also negative before 1970, and in Sweden,
Denmark.  The differential between returns and  Japan, Canada, and the US in  1976-80.  In the
earnings growth is negative, though barely so in  1980s a  catchup occurred,  although returns onTable 23,  Implied replacement ratem with indexed  pensions
Percent  Indexation  of  Indexation  of
penslions  to  prices  p-nmions  to  wagem
United States  37.6  36.9
United Kingdom  66.4  52.6
Germany  40.0  27.6
Japan  28.4  18.9
Canada  23.1  19.4
Netherlands  40.5  32.2
Sweden  16.1  13.7
Switzerland  21.6  17.8
Denmark  33.2  25.3
Note: This table uses the simple model developed by Vittas  (1992)  to calculate
the implied replacement rates if the pension schemes were run as defined
contribution plans and the real rates of return and real rates of earnings
growth were those of the period 1967-90.  The model is based on a 10I
contribution rate, 40 years of active service and 20 years of retirement life.
32aTable 24a  Real  pension fund returns  in sub  periods (usiLj  holding
period returns on bonds)
1966-70  1971-75  1976-80  1981-5  1986-90  Urnol
average
UK  4.2  -2.8  4.9  12.4  10.1  5.8
(11.5)  (19.4)  (5.2)  (7.3)  (12.7)  (12.5)
US  -S.4  -0.8  -1.9  8.1  11.2  2.2
(6.5)  (13.8)  (6.9)  (13.0)  (12.2)  (11.9)
Gormany  5.0  3.3  3.3  7.7  6.3  5.1
(3.3)  (2.7)  (4.4)  (4.9)  (5.9)  (4.4)
Japan  0.1  -0.5  -1.2  10.9  13.8  4.0
(5.3)  (10.9)  (5.3)  (2.1)  (7.8)  (9.4)
Canada  -3.3  -1.2  -1.0  6.1  7.9  1.6
(1.4)  (11.7)  (4.0)  (15.1)  (6.7)  (9.8)
Netherlands  1.7.  -1.4  2.02  10.5  6.3  4.0
(3.3)  (5.5)  (3.3)  (4.0)  (5.4)  (6.0)
Denmark  -1.9  -1.3  0.8  17.7  -1.8  3.6
(8.7)  (12.7)  (4.4)  (14.6)  (10.3)  (12.7)
Sweden  1.2  -3.5  -5.3  3.9  4.7  0.2
(8.2)  (6.7)  (5.6)  (4.9)  (9,3)  (7.6)
Switzerland  0.8  -0.5  4.0  3.0  -0.2  1.5
(0.0)  (6.3)  (8.0)  (5.4)  (7.2)  (6.4)
32bTable 25:  Mean  (standard  deviation) of real  total returns on diversified portfolios
Domestic'  Domestic &  MeNo: Col 2
Per cent  international 2 less Average
Earnings
United States  1.4  (12.1)  1.9  (11.4)  1.7
United Kingdom  4.9  (16.4)  4.5  (14.9)  1.9
Germany  6.3  (11.2)  5.8  (10.5)  1.8
Japan  5.7  (14.2)  4.7  (12.5)  0.7
Canada  2.4  (11.9)  3.0  (11.1)  1.3
France  3.7  (16.3)  3.8  (14.6)  n/a
Netherlands  4.5  (17.4)  4.1  (15.5)  1.1
Sweden  3.8  (13.5)  3.7  (12.1)  2.2
Switzerland  2.0  (16.5)  2.0  (14.5)  0.1
Denmark  5.2  (18.9)  4.5  (16.4)  1.7
1  S0o domestic equity, 50% domestic bonds.
2  40* domestic equity, 40% domestic bonds,
lo% foreign equity, 10% foreign bonds.
Note: International diversification should cause a convergence in ret -ns  by
increasing below average returns and lowering those above average.  This would occur
if purchasing power parity held all the time.  In fact, large deviations between
exchange rates and purchasing power parities may prevent this convergence from
materializing, at least in the short to medium run until corrections in exchange
rates take place.
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Swedish and Swiss funds are consistently below  year of the sample. In most cases this may not be
the  Germahs-, despite similar portfolios, largely  so, as some form of active portfolio management
because Ger.man  bonds have returned a  positive  is widely adopted.  This warrants a discussion of
real yield.  Of course, it can be argued that a five  the economic issues in fund management, costs,
year  horizon is  irrelevant to  the time  scale of  and the implied  effects on pension fund returns.
pension funds (given a  working career that lasts
3040  years).  However, it may be of relevance  Fund  management  is  a  service  entailing
when  strict  funding  and  accounting rules  are  management  of an investment  portfolio on behalf
applied.  of  a  client  - in  this  case  a  pension  fund.
Management may be carried out  internally, that
Finally, Table 25 shows the returns on artificial  is, by employees of the fund, or externally" by
portfolios of holding 50% equity and 50% bonds,  a financial institution  such as a bank or insurance
-and of international diveasification.  This shows  company.  Such delegation raises principal-agent
what could occur if portfdlio.  restrictions did not  problems, as  unless  the  manager  is  perfectly
exist.  As  noted,' equity hdlding$ are generally  monitored and/or a foolproof contract drawn up,
below this (Table 14).  Compared with Table 22,  he  may  act  in  his  own  interests  (e.g.,  in
the results confirm that returns may be boosted by  generating excessive  conmmission  income)  and
raising the share of equity, at some cost in terms  contrary to those of the fund.  One can suggest a
of risk.  'Meanwhile foreign investmnent  always  priori that such monitoring will be costlier when
reduces risk, though in some cases there is a trade  managers lack reputation or relationships, which
off  with  returris -(this generally relates  to  the  otherwise  constitute  assets  that  would  be
changes in the exthange rate over time.  With a  depreciated by adverse behavior.  Also internal
structurMl  depreciation, for  example, as  in  the  managers  should be less susceptible  than external,
UK,  returns . on  foreign  assets- are  boosted,  given a  greater degree of  control  that  can be
comnpare  Tabie 7.). Several of the countries  which  imposed  via employment  contracts, etc.
fell below a satisfactory return on assets relative
to  average earnings (such as Canada, Denmark,  Various  features of fund management  in countries
and Sweden) would have found pension provision  such as the UK can be seen as ways to reduce
less  costly if  they had  followed such  a  rule.  principal-agent  problems. For example, managers
German  funds  would  also  have  boosted  their  are offered short (3-year) mandates, with frequent
headroom considerably.  performance evaluation; fees related to the value
of funds at year-end and/or performance related
'Sunrnarizing  Sections (b)  and  (c),  support  is  fees.
given to a prudent man rule, backed by flexible
accounting  and  funding  standards  (perhaps  The  level  of  management  fees  (excluding
focussing on income rather than market value) to  transactions costs)  chargeo  by  fund  managers
back holding of  high-return but  volatile assets.  depends  on  the  competitive structure  of  the
Except for a fund with mostly retired members, a  market;  for  example  in  the  competitive UK
shift into deficit in one year should not interrupt  market a fund would pay no more than 22 basis
payment  of  pensions.  These policies in  turn  points on  £100 million.  In  the  US,  fees  are
should help minimize the cost to  the sponsor of  higher at around 40 basis points.  This difference
providing a given level of benefits.  Since foreign  may relate to  greater ability to  cross subsidize
investment is  shown invariably to  reduce risk,  from retail business  in the UK and /or higher risk
albeit often  with  a  slight  reduction in  return,  of loss of mandate in the US, which necessitates
limits  on  such  holding  are  suggested to  be  higher fees to break even.  Fees in countries such
particularly counter productive.  as  Switzerland and  Germany,  with  relatively
uncompetitive  fund management sectors, are  far
(d) Fund Management  higher - 100 basis points or  more.  In  Japan,
several structural features ensure low  levels of
The returns calculated  above all assume that funds  competition in fund management.  Until recently,
hold the market index of the relevant  asset in each  only trust banks and life insurers could manage34
funds.  In  house  rnanagement is  restricted to  asset categories. This is in-ine  with the efficient
bonds.  New entrants, only  recently permnitted,  markets hypothesis, which  suggests that,  given
can only invest new inflows.  Accordingly, trust  prices  already  incorporate  all  available
banks  charge  60-180  basis  points,  while life  information,  there is no net benefit from spending
insurers charge 2-5% of the inflow. 56 extra cash to try to beat the index.  Nevertheless,
as  noted by  Grossman and  Stiglitz (1980) and
However, even more than administrative costs,  Cornell and  Roll (1981),  the  efficient markets
the crucial influence on pension funds' costs is of  hypothesis does  not  rule  out  small  abnormal
course the efficacy of asset management.  Here  returns as an incentive  to acquire informaticn, but
again,  the  countries  with  uncompetitive fund  those acquiring costly information should have
management  sectors may lose out;  for example in  only  average  net  returns  after  the  costs  of
Japan the asset return target is  fixed (8%) and  acquiring information  are taken into account.  In
there is little incentive to exceed it.  Similarly in  practice,  as  shown  below,  active  managers
Switzerland  there are few rewards for exceeding  a  underperforn.
low  return  (and  considerable costs,  given the
accounting system, in holding volatile assets that  Data for the UJK  are shown in Table 26.  These
could  put the fund below actuarial balance).  show that even in the home market, funds tend to
underperform the index, but underperformance  is
Where fund management  is a competitive  sector,  particularly severe in foreign markets.  This in
as  in  !he  Anglo-American countries, portfolio  turn  justifies  an  indexed approach to  national
managetnent  is typically a two stage process, with  stocks,  where  the  fund  manager's  skill  is
traditionally  a  strategic  decision  regarding  employed in picking undervalued markets rather
allocation to different assets and national markets  than stocks, and employing  stock index futures to
being followed by a lower level decision over the  gain  rapid  exposure  to  such  markets.  As
precise assets to be held within these categories.  discussed  below  and  in  Howell  and  Cozzini
The latter may include passive indexation of the  (1991), this is increasingly  the approach adopted
market.  (However,  more  recently,  there  is  by large international  investors in countries such
evidence that  fund  mangers are  picking  core  as the UK.  Table 27 shows that average returns
holdings of stocks at a strategic level, and picking  are lowest for external managers, which is in turn
national markets at a tactical level, with the use of  inversely correlated with  turnover.  These are
tock index futures (see below, also Davis (1991)  consistent with the principal-agent problems set
nd Howell and Cozzini (1991).)  out  above;  managers least under control have
higher turnover and lower returns.
The traditional strategic choice,  typically taken
jointly by managers and trustees, is illustrated  by  Similarly, Lakonishok  et al (1992) show that most
the  data  in  Sections (b) and  (c).  The results  US investment  management is again active, and
suggest that  there  is  a  tradeoff, as  would be  that fund managers consistently  und  ¢rperform the
expected,  between  return  and  risk  and  market, for example the equity proportion of US
considerable benefits from diversification.  This  funds  (excluding  the  management  fee)
in  turn  points  to  the  need  for  appropriate  underperforms  the S&P 500 index by an average
measures  of  risk-adjusted  returns  and  of 1.3% pa over 1983-9, or 2.6% if returns are
identification  of sources of portfolio performance  value  weighted.  If  managers overperform in
in order to evaluate fund managers' performance  some periods this  is  virtually never sustained.
(Blake (1990), Tamura (1992)).  The authors suggest that the  persistant use  of
active  management despite  such  evidence  is
As  regards  the  traditional  short  term  asset  related to  agency problems.  In particular, they
allocation decision, which tests ability of  active  suggest  that  these  may  arise  within  the
management  ("stock  picking")  to  outperform  management  structure of the sponsor;  corporate
indices inclusive of  fees and  transactions costs,  treasurers  seek to bolster their own positions visa
the evidence is almost uniformly contrary to the  vis their managers, and hence seek fund managers
efficacy of  active management of  funds within  that can offer good excuses for poor performance,Table 26:  UK Pension fundst  Long term returns  on equity relative  to benchark  indices
1981/89
1981 1982  1983 1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  198sverage
USA  -3.5 -4.2  -4.1 -8.3  -2.7  -3.0  -3.7  -3.4  -0.5  -3.7
Japan  8.5  6.9  9.3  -15.4  -8.7  -1.1 -13.6  -8.9  5.3  -2.0
Cont
Europe  -6.8  5.7  0.8 -5.3  -4.6  -4.0  -3.0  -0.4  1.7  -1.8
World  -3.8  -3.6  1.9 -8.5  -1.9  -2.6 -10.1  -5.8  6.7  -3.1
UK  0.5  1.2  -0.5  -1.6  -0.5  -1.2  -0.8  -1.0  -0.1  -0.4
(1)  Prior to 1987, local indices for US and  Japan, MSCI for Europe.  After 1987,  FT
indices.
Source:  WM
Table 27:  UK Pension funds:  Performance  and Turnover  by Management Method, 1986-90
Nominal Annual  Activity Cl)
returns (')
Internal  11.1  64%
Part internal/external  10.9  118%
2 or more manager.  10.6  119%
Financial  conglomerates  10.8  106%
Life company  managed  11.2  96%
Life company  segregated  10.4  117%
Independent  managers  10.6  118%
(1)  Activity is the element of  turnover in excess of net investment of new money, as
percent  of assets.
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clw  stories about  portfolio  strategies  and other  generally.  As  discussed below,  widespread
servies unrelated  to performance. They avoid  indexation  may also weaken  incentives  to monitor
Ixiexat{on,  as this would  reduce  their own day to  corporate  management.  Meanwhile,  to the extent
day responsibilities,  as  well as  internal asset  indexation  is not used, a reliable  measure  of fund
management,  as this would  give them too great a  managers'  performance  as a means of control  is
reonsibility  for errors.  The authors suggest  seen as  essential.  Performance  measurement
these  aency costs  are additional  to the difficulties  services - whose data  generated the  results
(u noted above)  which  arise between  a (rational  reported  above  - are well  developed  in the Anglo-
profit-m&ximzig)  sponsor  and the fund  manager,  American  countries  but vestigial in  Continental
W  that a  sift  to  defined contribution  plans  Europe and Japan.  Indexation  does not,  of
would  help  overcome  the difficulties.  course, remove the need for selection  of aset
categories  in the light of liabilities  and expected
The main implication  of  these analyses is that  returns,  as well  as choice  of national  markets. To
IdenIo,  as dicussed below, will be optimal  the extent  these activities  remain  profitable,  they
for mot pension  fund assets,  with the caveat  that  suggest  that there is greater  efficiency  within  thn
te  beefits  arising from active management  are  between  markets.
likely to  incrase  with the  number of  funds
adopting  such predictable  passive strategies,  and
witb  the inefficiency  of the market  more36
5.  EFFECTS ON CAPITAL MARKETS
This section  discusses the impact  of pension funds  Bodie  (1989)  suggests  that  fixed  duration
on  innovation,  market  structure,  demand  for  securities (and  associated strategies) have little
capital  market  instruments,  volatility  and  the  role in terms of household utility maximization,
overall development  of capital markets.  as they are unable to hedge against the inflation
risk to future consumption. Hence an individual  -
(a)  Innovation  or  equivalently a  defined contribution pension
plan given the distribution  of risk to the employee
The impact of pension funds on the development  - would not  seek such  instruments but  instead
of capital markets varies from country  to country.  would just diversify, seeking to  maximize return
For example, as regards innoyation, in the United  for a given risk.  The only difference would be
States ERISA codified the legal status of defined  that  in  a  tax  free  pension plan,  there  is  an
benefit  corporate  pension  funds  and  imposed  incentive to  focus on  the  least  tax-advantaged
minimum  funding  requirements,  sharply  securities such  as  corporate bonds  (subject to
increasing  demand  for  hedging  by  pension  inflation risk).  Consistent with  this  analysis,
funds."  This has stimulated the development  of  Berkowitz, Logue (1986) found that  returns on
immunization strategies  (to  match  assets  to  defined  benefit  plan  were  below  other  US
liabilities) based  on  long-term  bonds.  The  diversified portfolios over  1968-83, where  the
incentive to immunize in defined benefit schemes  shortfall  in  returns  was  identified  as  the
arises from the asymmetry of treatment  of pension  'insurance  premium".  (Although as  noted by
deficits  and  surpluses (Section  3  (d)),  which  Lakonishok et  al  (1992)  in  Section 4(d),  the
implies  that  the  corporate  guarantee  of  the  shortfall could also be due to agency problems.)
accumulated benefit obligation (ABO) is  a  put
option on  the  investments of  the  pension fund  Meanwhile United States funds have been in the
with an exercise price equal to the present value  vanguard  of  developing  passive  indexation
of the ABO.  To minimize the cost of the option,  strategies (which appear justified in  the light of
there is an incentive  to immunize the liability via  persistent  underperformance  by  active  fund
an investment  strategy  of duration matching.  managers, as discussed above).  In  1990 41  % of
US funds employed such strategies, with  index
The  requirement  of  a  fixed  duration  for  funds  accounting  for a quarter of total US funds'
investment  instruments has stimulated  innovations  assets.
tailored to  funds'  needs  such  as  zero  coupon
bonds,  collateralized mortgage obligations and  In  the  United  Kingdom,  the  contribution of
guaranteed income  contracts  (offered  by  life  pension funds to  innovation is  less  clear  cut.
insurers);  immunization strategies also  spurred  Many trust  deeds  used  to  prevent  funds from
development of  markets for  index options and  using derivatives, though these restrictions have
futures.  For example, pension funds wri:ing call  been relaxed more recently.  Taxation was also a
options on  equities can be  seen  as  converting  discentive until the late 1980s (use of derivatives
them into short-term fixed-income securities for  was counted as "trading" and taxed).  There also
matching purposes.  Another strategy is holding  appears  to  be  a  more  general  difference  in
assets in excess of the legal minimum in equities,  attitudes between United Kingdom and  United
as long as their proportion is reduced when the  States  managers  to  innovation.  (See  Davis
market value of  pension assets approaches the  (1988).)  This may be related mainly to the less
ABO.  This  strategy  is  known  as  portfolio  asymmetric  and  more  flexible  accounting
insurance or  contingent immunization, and  has  treatment of funds in the UK, where there is no
stimulated development of  index  options  and  sudden cutoff point where liabilities must enter
futures markets (as  well  as  being blamed for  the  balance  sheet.  Also  minimum  funding
market volatility, for example at the time of the  standards only apply to a subset of pensions (the
1987  crash).  GMP).  Thus  the  option/guarantee  effect
described  above  for  the  US  does  not  apply37
particularly strongly, and funds have so far been  position-taking  market makers ready and able to
happy to  hold  an  overwhelming proportion of  facilitate  large  trades,  will  hence  tend  to  be
unhedged  equities.  However,  Blake  (1992)  attractive  to pension funds.  Because liquidity  is a
suggests that  as  funds  mature  and  raise  their  form of  economy of  scale, it tends to  make it
holdings of bonds in order to  reduce the risk of  difficult for other markets or financial centres to
not  meeting  liabilities  when  they  fall  due,  compete with  such  markets, even with  similar
mmunization  strategies will come to the fore.  technology.  London's SEAQ International is  a
classic example; it currently carries out 50% of
However, one  area  in  which  UK  funds have  French and  Italian equity trading and  30% of
already  been  particularly  active  is  use  of  German, for  example.  Its  relative liquidity is
derivatives  in  international  investment.  As  reflected in transaction  sizes - $275,000 compared
iscussed  in Davis (1991), stock index futures are  with $25,000 in Paris and $50,000 in Frankfurt.
seen  as  particularly  useful  in  tactical  asset  Similarly, growth of pension funds in the US has
allocation,  facilitating  rapid  shifts  between  led  to  development  of  off-exchange  'block
different national markets, which would later be  trading".  The  growth of  such exchanges may
translated into stocks.  Derivatives might also be  entail a tiering of markets, with order-driven and
used  for  long  term  strategic movements into  heavily regulated domestic markets retained for
markets or stocks, if they enable such shifts could  retail investors and  for  small  company stocks.
occur  without moving the  market  against the  Liquidity  may  be  aided  by  reduction  in
fund.  This  will be  the case if  the derivatives  conunissions, that institutions are well-placed to
arkets are more liquid than the underlying (as,  press for.  Increases in liquidity should in turn be
for  example,  in  Japan,  where  in  mid-1991,  beneficial more  generally to  the  efficiency of
outstanding futures  contracts  represented  three  capital markets, and  lead to  a  reduction in  the
times the daily number of shares traded on  the  cost of capital.
stock- market).  Also temporary adjustments in
posure could be obtained by purchase and sale  (c)  Demand for Capital Market Instruments
index futures without any transaction in  the
derlying  (overlay  strategies),  thus  avoiding  Institutional investors can influence the demand
disturbance of long-term portfolios, see Cheetham  for capital market  instruments in several ways;
1990).  Such  strategies  also  facilitate  by  influencing the rest  of the personal sector's
;unbundling"  of fund management into currency,  portfolio distribution between bank deposits and
market and industry exposure.  Finally, pension  securities,  by  the  institutions'  own  portfolio
funds might invest cashflow awaiting long term  choices, and  by  increasing the total  supply of
nvestment,  in  derivatives,  as  it  ensures  the  saving.
manager is always invested and will not miss an
urn.  In  the  Anglo-American countries,  econometric
results (Davis (1988)) suggest that the growth of
Market Structure  institutions has been accompanied by a  shift by
persons from securities to deposits, not matched
-roader effect of the development of pension  in  Germany and Japan.'  Hence securities are
unds  and  other  institutional investors is  on  increasingly  held in the Anglo-American  countries
-1  market structure.  Their key demand is  by  large,  informed, risk-averse investors facing
dity, that is, ability to transact in large size  low  transactions costs.  Such a  capital market
out moving  the price against them, and at low  should sensitively reflect information on  firms'
ransactions costs.  They are unconcerned by the  performance.
irmness of investor protection regulation, as they
iave  sufficient countervailing power  to  protect  This is confirmed by econometric  analysis (Davis
their  own  interests against market  makers and  (op cit)) of the portfolio distributions of pension
other financial institutions.  Specialized  wholesale  funds, which show they are strongly influenced
markets which  focus  transactions and  increase  by relative asset returns, particularly where there
dity,  usually  centered  on  well-capitalised  are  few  regulations  governing  portfolio38
distributions and low transactions costs, as in the  the UK in the 1980s.
United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States.
Adjustment to  a  change  in  such  returns  is  (d)  Volatility and Short Termism
generally  rapid.  This  implies  an  efficient
allocation of funds.  These results do not all hold  A  further  qualitative  question  is  whether
where transactions costs are high and regulations  institutionalization  increases  capital  mut
are strict - e.g.,  in Germany, Japan, and Canada.  volatiljty.  Some commentators in  the  Unit
In  these  countries adjustment to  a  change  in  States blamed fund managers' portfolio insuran
returns  is  somewhat slower  and  allocation of  strategies for causing volatility at the time of the
funds less efficient. The results also contrast with  1987 Crash, although this is disputed.  Regul
those  for  households  and  companies  (Davis  performance  checks  against  the  market  (as
(1986)) where adjustment to  changes in  returns  frequently as monthly in  the United States, b
tends to be slow, due to higher transactions  costs  less  in  the  United  Kingdom)  may  induce
and poorer information.  "herding"  among  funds  to  avoid  performing
significantly worse than the median fund.  The
Most  of  the  literature  suggests  that  Japanese also appear to suffer from such herding,
institutionalization  has a signiflcant  but not major  despite  a  less  competitive  environment  for
effect on total personal saving, increased saving  managers.
via  institutions being partly offset by declining
discretionary  saving,  (see  Feldstein  (1978),  Interviews with fund managers suggests this ma
Munnell (1986) and the review in Smith (1990).)  be  an  important cause of  volatility not only  i
although some recent studies, such as  Hubbard  domestic but also in international markets.  S-
(1986) suggest a much larger effect.  In theory,  Davis (1988) (1991).  As noted in Howell an
while the scale of benefits of a  pension system  Cozzini (1991), the rise of global asset allocatio
may have an effect on personal saving, funding as  as  a  tool  of  fund  management,  and  the
such should not.  (As noted, funding is rather a  development of markets such as those for stock
transfer of securities from the sponsoring  firm to  index  futures  have  stimulated  and  facilitated
the  market,  which  collateralises the  liabilities,  massive increases  in  short  term  cross  borde
reduces  risk  of  non-payment  (because  of  equity flows.  One equity transaction in three in
diversification) and  gives  scope  for  voluntary  Europe now  involves a  foreign transactor; and
increase in pensions when returns are high.)  The  trading in  stock index futures often far  exceeds
effect that does occur may result from liquidity  that in  the underlying.  Although the  investors
constraints on  some  individuals (especially the  desire to reduce risk by adopting such strategies,
young), who are unable to  borrow in  order  to  the focus of funds on a small number of leveraged
offset obligatory saving via pension funds early in  instruments  often  leads  to  destabilization of
the  life  cycle.  Pension saving may be  partly  markets and sharp swings in asset prices.  Nor
offset  at  a  national level  by  tax  subsidies to  need the behavior be confined to equity markets.
private saving, especially if they are financed by  Besides the fact that equity flows themselves  have
public dissaving.  However, a switch from social  a direct effect on the exchange rate, evidence in
security to funding would probably have a major  mid-1992  suggests  that fund managers  switched  to
effect  on  saving,  given the  former  has  been  cash in the light of relative returns, and were at
shown significantly  to depress saving in a number  least  partly  responsible  for  the  prevailing
of countries.'  exchange  rate tensions (a forex manager in a bank
has around $20 million at his  disposal; a  fund
Bernheim and Shoven (1988) show that pension  manager can have billions).  Indeed Howell and
funds  may  change  the  volatility  and  relation  Cozzini  (op  cit)  suggest  that  international
between saving and real interest rates.  Data from  regulatory bodies need to  tighten supervision of
the US show that a rise in real rates may reduce  international  securities  flows,  to  prevent
saving  if  it  makes more schemes fully funded  deleterious  effects  on real economies.
(target  saving)  and  reduces  the  need  for
contributions.  There is also evidence for this in  Regular performance evaluation is  also  said  to39
underpin  the  short-termist  hypothesis,  that  others  (Germany, Italy)  do  not.  There  is  a
willingness of  funds to  sell shares  in  takeover  question  of which Comes  firt?
battles (to maintain  performance)  discourages  long
erm investment or r&d.  Conclusive evidence is  Although pension  funds could develop  on  the
scant,  but  there  is  widespread agreement that  basis  of  loans  or  property  investment, their
other  ways  besides  takeovers  of  exerting  greatest comparative advantage is  in  the capital
corporate control should be more widely used by  market.  Loans  require  monitoring  so  the
institutions, such as appointment  of non-executive  customer  relationship  may  give  banks  a
directors to  represent shareholders' interests, or  comparative advantage here.  Trading and  risk
irect  involvement  of  pension  funds  in  pooling are  more  efficiently undertaken in  the
management.1 0 The  development of  portfolio  capital  markets  where  transactions  costs  are
indexation has  important  implications in  this  lower,  although  these  need  not  be  domestic
context, since the longer term relationships, close  markets if  there  are  no  exchange controls and
monitoring of  company performance and  large  funds  can  invest in  developed capital  markets
shareholdings needed  for  these  alternatives to  elsewhere.  Moreover,  if  one  of  the spurs  to
takeover to operate will not be present.  development  of protection in retirement is income
equalization 6"  (as  well  as  rising  averagc
related point is that pension funds and other  incomes), this may with a well-developed  capital
stitutional  investors may  not  invest  in  small  market  simultanecusly provide  the  means  for
rms, given illiquidity of their shares, difficulty  development of  funded  schemes (reduction of
and  costs  of  researching  firms  without track  personal equity holdings by the wealthy) which is
records and limits on the proportion of a firm's  absent in  a system dominated by banks.  States
equity that may be held.  They may also lack the  might be more likely to opt for a generous social
business expertise to  supply risk taking venture  security  scheme in the latter case.
capital, given the need for close monitoring  of the
lients of such finance.  It  can be  argued that  Unlike pay-as-you-go social  security  schemes,
e  problems would be  overcome if,  given a  where  there  can  be  an  immediate transfer  of
greater degree of tax neutrality between types of  income to  those who have not contributed (who
saving, more funds were directed through banks  are old at the outset), in finded private schemes
rather than institutional investors.  On the other  the assets are built up while they are maturing,
hand,  it  may  be  best  to  avoid the  associated  and  this  stimulates  investment  and  *he
tendency of  banks to  monopolize the financial  development  of securities markets.  This effect is
markets.  of course offset if others reduce securities holders
or saving differentially  in the case of funded and
ese potential drawbacks, it should be  noted,  social security pensions.  The discussion above is
ult from the nature of capital markets and from  also relevant here, for example in that it suggests
institutionalization  generally,  rather  than  from  funds may increase market efficiency.
,ension funds per  se (th6ough  they are clearly a
component  of  institutionalization).  Any  Given their focus on real returns, pension funds
iedies should therefore be a feature of general  should be particularly beneficial to  development
nomic and  financial policy  and  not pension  of  equity  markets.  Development of  equity
,olicy - policies bearing solely on pension funds  markets in turn is seen as beneficial in providing
taxing  short  term  capital  gains) -would  risk capital for growing enterprises,'  as well as
dvantage them  without solving the  problem  offsetting  the potential fragility and/or dependence
life insurers, mutual funds etc would be  on  bank  finance  which,  stems  from  high
unaffected).  debt/equity  ratios (see Davis (1992)).
Development of Securities Markets  The analysis of this paper suggests that focus on
equities by  funds can be stimulated by  flexible
ountries with large pension fund sectors tend to  accounting  rules,  encouragement  of  indexed
iave  well-developed securities  markets,  while  benefits and  institution of  a  prudent man  rule40
instead of  portfblio  regulations.  Absence of  the  causality  may  be  reversed;  a  dominant
insurance of benefits .n  help to avoid the need  pension  fund  sector  will  ensure  satisfactory
for strict rules on portfolios  and on provisioning.  treatment for shareholders is  maintained.  And
Some would suggest that there is also a need for  indeed,  even  Swiss  funds have  become  more
guarantees  of  shareholder  rights  (e.g.,  equal  active shareholders in  recent years.  However,
treatment in takeovers, rights of pre emption over  experience in countries such as the  Netherlands
new share Issues, equal voting rights) In order for  (Van Loo (1988)) suggests there is no one to one
pension funds to hold equities willingly.  Lusser  relation between pension funds and equities, even
(1989) suggests  that such problems help to inhibit  with appropriate regulation as outlined, if funds
Swiss funds from equity investment. In practice  adopt a very risk averse strategy.41
6.  CONCLUSIONS
In  this  final  section we  offer,  first,  a  broad  attractiveness of pension fund saving relative to
summary  of the content of the paper;  second, we  other forms of private provision for  retirement.
focus on  prospects for  pension fund growth in  Taxation is an obvious example  of regulation that
industrial countries and, third, we assess issues of  can stimulate pension fund growth, but  it is also
potential  relevance  for  countries  setting  up  shown  how  provisions  such  as  portfolio
pension funds de novo.  The author's views on  regulations,  funding  rules,  ownership  of
the various policy choices are noted in this last  surpluses, portability,  insurance and  protection
section;  the  reader  should, however,  bear  in  against fraud can influence the attractiveness of
mind that in  most cases such judgements are a  pension funds either to the sponsoring  firm or the
question of choosing an  appropriate point on  a  members.  There is little international  consensus
tradeoff between  alternative  benefits  or costs.  on the appropriate  scope or even role of many of
these  regulations.  There  are  tendencies for
(a)  Summary  countries to group together on regulatory issues,
as they do on the structural features noted above.
Section  I  discussed the  economics of  pension  For  example, the Dutch/Anglo-American  group
funds, distinguishing  defined benefit and defined  tends to  have "prudent man"  asset management
contribution plans and  outlining the features of  regulations and  short  vesting.  In  contrast the
pension funds largely by contrast to other types of  Germans,  Swiss,  and  Japanese  have  portfolio
financial  institutions.  It  was  suggested  that  regulations and  longer vesting  periods.  (See
regarding pension  funds  as  offering  employee  Table 6.)  Features such as  the structure and
retirement insurance was a fruitful way to assess  mechanics  of supervision are also shown to vary
them  economically, although other  approaches  widely  between  countries.  Some  a  priori
such  as  the  tax  shelter,  labor  economics and  suggestions  regarding best practice were made.
corporate  finance  approaches could  also  offer
insights.  Section 4  reviewed the  performance of  funds.
The relative level of benefits offered, and their
In Section 2 the features of pension funds in the  indexation against inflation, vary widely and not
main  industrial countries were  outlined  in  the  only  in  response to  the  relative generosity of
light of Section 1, and their place in the patterii of  social  security.  The  resultant  levels  of
retirement provision clarified.  It is noted that the  contributions also vary.  The bulk of the section
argumeats for funding are not unidirectional,  and  is devoted to analysis  of portfolio distributions,  as
case can in some circumstances be made for  comparative  data for 10 asset types is considered.
pay-as-you-go.  International  comparison  (as  The influences on  distributions, as  well as  risk
detailed in  Tables  I  and 6)  shows four  broad  and return, are shown to  include the nature of
groups of  countries, one  with  long-established  liabilities, regulation, accounting standards and
funded defined benefit schemes  (Netherlands,  UK,  the  supply  of  certain  financial  instruments.
US,  Canada),  one  with  nationally-directed or  Estimates  are made of returns on the portfolio;  it
provided compulsory funded schemes (Sweden,  is  shown that  a  focus on  real  assets such  as
Switzerland), a third with relatively small funded  equities  end  property  has  generally  boosted
sectors,  but  significant  levels  of  unfunded  returns, but that variations between countries in
corporate  pension liabilities (Germany, Japan),  real returns on debt instruments have sometimes
and  an  exception,  Denmark,  with  significant  more than offset this.  Hence the German funds
nded defined contribution schemes.  The  key  come second only to the UK, because real returns
determinant of  the growth of  private retiremeni  on  bonds and loans were never negative in the
saving via institutions  such as pension funds is the  70s.  Such  an  analysis  ignores  the  role  of
scope of social security.  transactions costs and the portfolio management
process, which it is suggested may pose problems
Section 3 outl.ned the regulation  of pension funds,  to  pension  funds due  to  high  annual  charges
and  suggests it is  a  crucial determinant of  the  and/or poor  investment performance for  active42
managers.  stimulus to  capital markets - would probably b
significantly greater.  It  is  notable that in  th
The  influence of  pension funds on  the  capital  Anglo-American  countries, where social security
markets was assessed in Section 5.  To a degree  is  less  comprehensive, the  ratio  of  personal
that varies between countries, they are shown to  financial wealth to GDP is around 2,  whereas in
have  stimulated  innovation,  promoted  liquid  France and Germany it is below 1.5.  If French
market structures, boosted the demand for capital  financial  wealth reached the same level as the UK
market instruments  (by increasing saving) as well  in  relation to  GDP,  as  well as  pension funds
as making demand more sensitive to  return and  attaining the same share of personal wealth, the
risk, and aided the broader development  of capital  stock  of  pension  assets  would  be  over  $40
markets.  However,  they  have  also  prompted  billion.  To  a  degree depending on  portfolio
some concern over  their contribution to  capital  regulations  and the investment  climate, this should
market  volatility  at  both  a  domestic  and  in turn  boost demand for  equities (as discussed
international  level,  and  to  short-termism  of  above).
nonfinancial  companies.
Current  proposals for  EC  reform  are  also  of
(b) Prospects for Advanced  Countries  relevance  (see  Commission of  the  European
Communities (1991), Kollias (1992)).  The EC
Growth  prospects for pension funds differ sharply  proposes  legislation  to liberalize funded retirement
between the countries studied.  In  Sweden and  provision,  although  the  process  is  still  at  a
Switzerland, there is  little prospect for  growth,  consultative stage.  A draft Directive has been
with 90% coverage and schemer largely mature.  drawn  up  on  funded  pension  schemes  which
In  the  Anglo-American  countries  and  the  addresses the following issues:  first, the freedom
Netherlands'  most  company funds  are  mature  to offer services across borders (in other words,
and therefore any significant growth is likely to  administration and  fund  management can  be
stem from broadening of the coverage of private  conducted in another member state);  and second,
pensions across the labor force.  The success of  the  liberalization of  investment throughout the
personal pensions in countries such as the United  Community  (altnough  this freedoin should already
Kingdom indicate considerable  scope for this.  In  exist, especially perhaps for  personal retirement
Denmark, Japan,  and  Germany, immaturity of  provisions,  under  the  Capital  Liberalization
company schemes  indicates further  growth  is  Directive).  Meanwhile,  discussions  continue  on a
likely.  third proposal contained in a  recent consultative
paper, namely the freedom for pension schemes  to
But more generally, in many countries (notably in  operate across national boundaries  on the basis of
continental Europe) future demographic  pressures  home state authorization and for  individuals to
on pay-as-you  go social security are likely to lead  join schemes in other member states.  This is seen
governments to  seek  to  stimulate  growth  of  as  the .nost  difficult issue,  particularly due to
private pensions  as a substitute for social security.  need for countries to agree on funding standards,
If  such  countries  were  to  develop  schemes  as well as fiscal differences;  but  it is also the
equivalent to  those in  the United Kingdom, the  most  important  for  labor  mobility  and  the
sums involved would be sizable.  For example, if  completion  of the single market.  A first step may
French pension funds were to  reach the size of  be to cover only migrant and "frontier" workers,
their  UK  counterparts in  terms  of  shares  of  that is, those living in one state and working in
personal sector  assets,  they  would  total  $235  another.  Agreement on these three issues could
billion.  Similar calculations for  Germany give  clearly facilitate development  of pension funds in
$400 billion in assets, which compares with the  continental  European  countries  currently
$355 billion market capitalization  of the German  dependent  on pay-as-you-go  schemes.
stock  market.  In  practice,  personal  sector
financial wealth would probably be boosted by a  A subsidiary objective in a number of European
switch  from  pay-as-you-go to  funding, so  the  countries, which growth of  pension funds may
increase  in  value  of  funds  - and  consequent  assist,  is  development  of  equity  markets.43
Following  the  calculations  above,  if  funded  structure  - subject  to  certain  side  effects
sectors developed in  France and Germany on  a  (volatility, short-termism) (Section 5 (a), (b) and
par with those in the UK, and equity proportions  (d)).  These effects may be stimulated by certain
were similar to US funds, the increase in demand  regulations such as those for funding (Section 3
for  equities  would  be  $106  billion  and  $184  (d)) but also blunted by factors such as portfolio
billion,  respectively.  (Note,  however,  that  in  regulations and the structure and behavior of the
global terms these might be partly offset by the  fund  management sector (Sections 3  (c)  and  4
maturity  of UK and US funds, which may induce  (d)).  These are strong  arguments in  favor  of
a relative switch into bonds from equities by such  developing  private  funded  schemes.  The
funds.)  benefits to the capital market would  be absent
in the case of book reserves, and hence external
(c)  Issues  and Recommendations  funding is seen as  more desirable.  The side
effects,  ir considered suMciently undesirable,
As outlined by Vittas and Skully (1991), there are  should be dealt with In the context of economic
a number of questions to be  faced by countries  policy more  generally.  They  are  general
seeking to  set  up  or  develop pension  funds.  features of equity markets  and/or  institutional
These  include  the  role  of  contractual savings  investors  rather than pension  funds per se.
institutions in retirement income provision;  their
impact on  saving  and  capital  markets;  their  The implications  of development  of pension funds
effects on economic efficiency and social equity;  for  economic efficiency include their  effect on
the role of government in promoting them;  the  labor niobility (Section 3  (f)) and  distortionary
case for preferential  fiscal treatment; the need for  effects of their taxation (Section  3 (a)), as well as
compulsion;  and  the  appropriate  regulatory  the above-mentioned  consequences  for the capital
framework.  This paper has sought to  address  market.  Social equity is affected by the rules on
these  questions  by  reference  to  the  adopted  internal transfers and equity of treatment (Section
solutions in the major industrial countries.  We  3 (g)), coverage (Section 2 (c)), rules in relation
conclude by highlighting  some of the main issues  to tax privileges (Section  3 (a)) and the safety net
brought out under each of these headings, and  of social security 'Section 2 (b)), as well as the
seek to come to a judgement on some of the  degree of choice and disclosure (Section  30)) and
key questions.  the  scale  and  indexation of  benefits  offered
(Section 4 (a)).  Appropriate  regulatory  design,
The  primary  role  of  pension  funds  is  a  as  outlined  in  Section  3(l)  is  needed  to
supplementary one  in  each  of  the  countries  minimize these difriculties.  We consider that
studied;  there are no cases where they provide  indexation,  at  least  up  to  a  certain  level
the only form of  old age support, although the  (subject to a  "prudent  man" asset management
height of  the  social security safety net  varies  rule  being in operation) and rules facilitating a
widely, and this in turn has a crucial effect on the  degree  of  portability  are  particularly
development  of funded schemes (Section 2).  We  desirable.  Arguments  against  perfect
onsider such  a  mixture sensible,  given  the  portability  (e.g.,  reduced  Incentives  of
connlicting  arguments for  funding as  opposed  employers to  train  workers) should  not  be
to pay-as-you-go  disregarded,  however.
The  impact on  saving and  long term  financial  The  role  of  government in  promoting pension
resources is to  boost the former, albeit not in a  funds has been shown to  be  a  crucial one.  In
one-to-one manner,  while  pension  funds  also  particular, the  level of  state  benefits'  and  the
stimulate the development  of securities and equity  ability of employees  to opt out of the state scheme
markets under certain conditions (Sections 4 (b),  and  personal pensions (Section 2);  changes in
(c) and 5 (e)).  As regards the development  and  taxation  of pensions and alternative  assets (Section
functioning  of capital markets, pension funds may  3(a)),  legislation on  the  nature  of  benefits
be beneficial by promoting inn' vation, liquidity  (Section 4  (a))  and  legislation on  provisioning
and efficiency, while also influencing  the market  (Section 3 (d)) all have a crucial role to  play in44
making the setting up of funds attractive  to firms  that individuals  are myopic is taken seriously; and
(assuming their establishment  remains voluntary).  the  evidence seems quite strong.  It  could be
More indirectly, the provision of a stable macro  argued that if fund are compulsory, then relative
environment  and steady economic growth, via its  tax advantages are not needed, and all forms of
influence  on  the  returns  on  capital  market  saving  should  ideally  receive  expenditure tax
instruments  (Section 4 (c)) will also influence  the  treatment.  Compulsion will also have an effe
cost  of  providing  funded  pensions.  The  on the corporate sector, since it will impose an
government also  faces  certain  key  choices  in  unavoidable  burden on companies, which in turn
influencing  the development of pension funds, of  could affect international competitiveness of the
which the  most  crucial is  perhaps the deflned  economy.  These effects would make measures  to
benefit/defined  contribution choice.  The choice  minimize costs,  such  as  a  prudent  man  rule
of  comes  down  to  the  balance between  the  (Section 3 (c)) and competitive  fund management
economic advantages of defined benefit noted in  (Section  4 (d)), all the more urgent.  We feel that
Section I  (superior insurance) and the practical  compulsion In social security is sufficient;  an
difficulties  with  defined  benefit  that  were  efcient  company  pension  sector,  with
discussed in  Section 3  (ownership of  surpluses,  appropriate  tax incentives, should be  sufficient
transfers,  etc).  A  choice must  also  be  made  to attract employers and employees.
between book reserves and separate funding.  In
our  view,  defined  benefit  plans  retain  an  Some  of  the  regilatory  preconditions  for
advantage over  defined contribution,  given  development  of pension funds, which are covered
their  superior  "employee  retirement  in  Section 3,  have  already been  noted in  this
insurance",  especially if  regulations  are set to  summary. They require a balance  between cost to
overcome the key problems.  Only companies  the  sponsor,  economic efficiency,  equity  and
have  proved  able  to  offer  defined  benefit  benefit  security.  Funding  rules,  adequate
plans.  And more generally, for both  types,  institutional  stnictures (independent  trustees etc.),
company  based  schemes  are  superior  to  effective regulatory structures, rules on treatment
personal  pensions  given lower transactions  costs  of surpluses, portability, vesting, indexation and
and  avoidance of  market failures.  Finally,  protection against  fraud  are  clearly  essential.
separate  funding  is  felt  superior  to  book  More  contestable are  the  need for  quantitative
reserves. not only because  of the effects on  the  portfolio restrictions (Section 3(c))  and  benefit
capital market but due to the concentration of  insurance  (Section  3(h)).  Apart  from  self
risk in book reserves.  investment  limits, the former may reduce returns
and  increase risk,  thus  increasing costs unduly
The  case  for  preferential  fiscal  treatment  is  relative to  a prudent man rule,  while the latter
outlined in Section 3 (a), and as shown, most of  may  entail  either  incentives to  boost  risk  or
the  countries studied have found it  persuasive.  require stringent and costly portfolio restriction.
The myopia argument was suggested as the most  to  protect the  insurer.  We suggest that the
crucial, although reducing the burden of  social  following rules provide an appropriate  balance;
security and  increasing saving may also play a  a degree of mandatory  indexation  of pensions;
role.  Whether  there  is  a  case  for  special  prudent  man rules  on asset allocation,  with a
treatment of pensions relative to  other forms of  ban  on  self  investment (except for  p0'  'folio
saving  may  depend  on  the  view  taken  that  indexation  purposes);  minimum  and
contractual  annuities  have  unique  features  in  maximum funding rules tailored to the nature
retirement income provision, absent from other  of the obligations  (given indexation, the IBOj,
forms of saving.  We consider  these arguments  but which do not discourage  equity holding by
persuasive, and  hence  suggest  that  pension  penalizing  temporary shortfalls;  independence
funds should be tax advantaged even if other  of  the fund from the employer;  insurance
forms of saving are not.  against  fraud;  disclosure  to  members;
indexation  of  accrued  benefits  for  early
These  link  in  turn  to  the  arguments  for  leavers;  and  vesting periods  of  around  five
compulsion.  Compulsion is needed if the view  years.  A  Dutch-styie supervisory  structure45
(one  regulator,  annua'  checks  on  funding,  whether the difficulties  of an aging population are
oversight  of  rules,  occasional  on-site  really avoided by funding, if funds are invested  in
inspections)  appears  a good model to  follow.  domestic assets.  The last point can be answered
in two ways; first, property rights may be a more
Finally, the advantages of pension funds relative  secure basis for  retirement than taxation, and,
to  other  forms  of  saving  include the  superior  second, the difficulties  can in principle  be avoided
retirement insurance they offer,  as  outlined in  by  investing  in  countries  with  younger
Section  1,  as  well  as  reduction  of  the  populations.'  On balance, it is suggested that
demographic difficulties associated with pay-as-  pension funds are a suitable means of old age
you-go social security, as discussed in Section 2.  support for countries at an appropriate  state of
Of  course,  the  choice of  funding  itself raises  development - where  traditional means  of
numerous policy issues, referred to  in  Section  family support for the old are breaking down,
2(a), such as inter- and intra- generational  equity,  and  there  is a  reasonable degree of capitalist
pressure on domestic rates of return, the costs of  industrial development  in which to invest - to
tax exemption for funded pensions, and the costs  supplement  basic social security.  A degree of
to existhig workers in the transition (when they  freedom  to invest internationally  is an essential
have to  pay both for their own funded schemes  counterpart,  to  avoid demographic difriculties
and  the  previous  generation's  pay-as-you-go  and pressure on rates of return.
pensions). Also there are important  questions46
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NOTES
l.The estimates are based on macro data for portfolios of the entire pension
fund sector and the returns on the capital market as a whole, and hence do not
provide a precise indication of performance of individual funds.
2.In principle, such risks can be reduced by gradually switching to less risky
assets such as bonds or deposits prior to retirement.
3.It  is  suggested by  Vittas  and  Skully  (1991) that  the  "premia"  for this
insurance include restrictive vesting and transfer conditions.
4.These  may  be  particularly  severe  for personal  pensions, where  asymmetric
information is likely to be severe, and hence inappropriate products may be
mold and/or investment performance may be poor.  The main countervailing force
is likely to be the institutions's desire to maintain reputation.
5.Indeed, Friedman and Warschawsky (1987) show that annuity markets in the US
are far from actuarially fair, due to adverse selection, although they suggest
a bequest motive is also needed to explain observed patterns of (low) purchase
of annuities.
6.Defined  benefit  funds  nonetheless  impose some  types  of  risk  on  workers,
notably sensitivity of pensions to earnings late in the career, in the case of
final-salary  plans  (Section  3(g).  In  some  countries,  they  may  also  be
vulnerable to inflation (see Section 4(a)).
7.'n  practice  there  are  some  insurer-provided  defined  benefit  plans  in
councries such as Switzerland, but they benefit from being compulsory, and are
also  provided  through  non-financial  companies  only,  which  reduces  adverse
selection.
8.Justifications  for  provision  of  social  security  benefits  include
paternalism, overcoming the problem that individuals may not cater for their
own retirement due to myopia;  information inefficiencies, whereby government
helps each  individual to  save for retirement  by providing  a base  level of
benefits, without needing to gather information on the precise nature of each
individual's preferences;  overcoming  adverse  selection  problems,  th3t  may
plague private  annuity markets - the main private sector protection against
the risk that individuals will run out of retirement savings before they die;
and  overcoming  free  rider  problems,  that  individuals  will  not  save  for
retirement if they know there is a safety net, and thus they should be forced
to contribute to it. (See Bodie and Merton (1992).)  Several of these parallel
the case for compulsory or tax-advantaged private pension funds (Section 3).
Also governments, via the power to tax, have ability to pay pensions that are
inflation  indexed,  and  may  find  social  security  a  convenient  means  to
redistribute income
9.Such  redistribution may be  justified, for example,  if the growth rate  is
rapid and the young are n,uch  more productive than the elderly.
lO.Because  of their  redistributive element,  pay-as-you-go  schemes  generally
have to be compulsory.
11.Swedish pension fund assets shown in the table, which are also very large,
relate to the national  supplementary (ATP) pension  scheme, and are included
for comparative purposes.
12.The paper does not discuss long-term saving in detail, although it clearly
determines the size of total wealth of which pension wealth forms a part.  It
is likely to depend on factors such as income growth (old age security appears
to  have  a  large  income  elasticity  of  demand),  demographic  factors  (the
proportion of the population in the high-saving groups aged 35-65) inflation52
and social  uecurity  provision.
13.Note that in practice the effective retirement age has tended to fall in
most  industrial  countries,  as  employers  seek  cheaper  and  supposedly  more
flexible  younger  workers.  Final  salary  schemes  may  have  accelerated  this
tendency, as assuming wages of the employee would otherwise have risen, early
retirement saves on pension payment rates.
14.Many workers also take further employment at a lower wage and status, after
"retirement".
15.There is no obligation for such provisions to cover all pension promises.
16.Sometimes called "support funds".
17.It is, of course, compulsory once it forms part of a contractual collective
agreement.
18.However, in the United Kingdom the  'personal equity plan' scheme makes  a
move towards reducing the tax disadvantages of direct equity holdings. Growth
of  funds  has  not  accompanied  a  reduction  of  equity  holdings  in  Japan  or
Germany;  there is no capital gains tax  in Japan, while  in Germany  it only
applies to short-term gains.
19.Private pensions in France are also compulsory but operate on a pay-as-you-
go  basis.
20.Blake (1992)  quotes an equivalent figure of £15 billion for the UK.
21.Similar  patterns  are  apparent  in  Germany,  where  in  a  1982  survey  of
pensioners, three quarters of former senior managers but only half of former
wage earners received private pensions.
22.Note,  however,  that  some of  the  assets  backing  unfunded  commitments  in
Germany  and Japan are  in the  form of  cross-shareholdings with other  firms,
i.e., there may be some degree of diversification.  Conversely, any rundown of
such holdings when pensions are paid may contribute to the unwinding of many
of the associated relationships.
23.For example,  in France, pension funds must  invest at least  34% of  their
assets in state bonds.
24.Estimates of  returns are presented in Section 4(c).
25.In practice, life insurers are more strictly regulated, see Davis (1991).
26.Paradoxically, and despite their indexed obligations (Section 2), they tend
to invest conservatively in fixed interest assets (Section 4).
27.The  Germans  have  sought to  exempt Pensionskassen  from the  Pension  Funds
Directive  on  the  grounds  they  are  insurance  companies,  but  this  may  be
inconsistent with their existing derogation from the Insurance Directives.
28.As discussed below, German schemes are forced to index but unable to fund
the IBO tax free.
29.Such rules makes it optimal to hold "real assets" to avoid underfunding.
30.The part of pensions which replaces the state pension is fully indexed in
line with average earnings up to retirement.
31.Another company  scheme, a personal pension,  an annuity or  rights  in the
state earnings related pension scheme.53
32.Given the speed with which pension funds can change their risk exposure, it
could be argued  that anything  short of continuous monitoring  could  lead to
this hazard.
33.Clearly,  if  underfunding  exceeds  30%  of  net  worth,  the  operation  is
profitable for the firm.
34.To the extenit  that PBGC insurance leads to  imposition of high charges on
well funded plans to subsidize underfunded ones, it could be directly counter
productive to this goal, as financially sound sponsors wind up their defined
befit plans.
35.Bodie and Merton  (1992) suggest this is an underestimate, as it is based
only on plans that have defaulted to date, rather than estimates of losses on
currently insured plans that will default in the future.
36.Custody services include safekeeping, settlement, tax, dividend receipts,
dealing with rights issues and stock lending.
37.Note, however, that published accounts did not hide the high level of self
investment by the Maxwell funds.  The problem for members was of understanding
the associated risk - and the difficulty of redress.
38.In addition, the investment management regulatory bodies regulate insurance
companies and other financial institutions offering pensions, asset managers
and those offering advice to individuals regarding pensions.
39.It also assesses whether  funds meet the standards to contract out of the
state earnings related pension, checks revaluation and preservation of rights
for early leavers, etc.
40.Their  fiduciary duties are  to hold the assets  in trust  for members,  act
impartially, keep accounts, check funding is in place, and seek expert advice
when necessary.
41. Since they get the surplus assets in the case of winding up.
42.For example, when a mature scheme is underfunded, and pensioners may prefer
it  to  be  wound  up  (since  the  ABO  gives  them  all  they  wish),  while  the
employees  may  prefer  to  take  the  risk  that  the  employer  will  fund  the
shortfall later on.
43.In practice,  it has been announced that except for plan terminations, the
requirement  for  indexation  will  not  be  brought  into  effect  until  the
implications of the European Court judgment on equal pension ages (the "Barber
Judgment") have been clarified.
44.In practice, Danish contributions tend to be around 10-15%.
45.For example, Vittas (1992) shows that in a defined contribution plan with a
contribution  rate of  10%, 40 years' contributions, 20 years'  retirement and
real wage growth of 2%, real returns of 3% will only obtain a replacement rate
for  an  indexed  pension  of  33%, while  a  5%  real return  obtains  an  indexed
pension of 60% of final salary.
46.Foreign yields were constructed using the country's effective exchange rate
and the average of yields in the UK, US, Germany, Japan, and Canada (excluding
the country in question for its own foreign return).
47.The data in Tables 9 and 10 add up to those in Table 8.54
48.See  Section  5(a).  Bodie suggests  thiat  given such rules,  it is a paradox
that US defined  benefit  funds  invest  in equities. He suggests  it is perhaps
because  management  sees  a  plan as a trust  for  employees,  and  manages  assets  as
if it were a defined  contribution  plan (i.e.,  for  employee  welfare),  with a
guaranteed  floor  given  by the  benefit  formula.
49.However,  Bodie (1990)  disputes  the  utility  of equity  as an inflation  hedge
and suggests  investment  in equities  can be seen merely  as boosting  expected
returns  for  the  benefit  of members.
50.It  reached  84%  at end-Ql  1992.
51.Merton  (1992)  has suggested  that using  stock index  swaps  may be a  way for
LDCs to  achieve the  benefits of  inward international  diversification  by
pension  funds  from  major  countries  without  transfer  of capital  resources. By
separating  capital  flows from risk sharing,  it avoids  capital imbalances  or
foreign  intervention  in domestic  capital  markets.
52.For  a discussion  of life insurance  companies'  and pension  funds' foreign
investment  see  Davis  (1991).
53.Hence high volatility for Danish (defined  contribution)  funds is more
serious  than  in  the  UK,  where  funds  are  largely  defined  benefit.
54.If  reform  of  the  portfolio  rules  is  not  possible,  and  subject  to
administrative  costs,  one  might  question  whether  pay-as-you-go  might  not  be  a
better  solution  in  those  countries.
55.In  Germany,  pension  funds  may not  delegate  fund  management.
56.Fund managers  in  Japan  are  themselves subject  to  restrictions  on
diversification,  and may  not have more than 50% of their managed  assets
overseas.
57.See  Bodie  (1991a).
58.However,  King  and  Dicks-Mireaux  (1987)  found  little  effect  in  Canada.
59.See  Feldstein  (1977).  However, analysts in countries such as Germany
dispute  this  effect  (Pfaff  et  al  (1979))  and  suggest  social  security  had  no
effect  on  saving.
60.Charkham  (1990).
61.Others  may be lower  population  growth,  increased  life  expectancy  and  social
change  which  reduces  the  role  of the  extended  family.
62.Large  firms  already  able  to access  the international  capital  markets  would
be less  affected.
63.However,  Huiser (1990)  asserts  that there will be further  growth in the
Netherlands,  despite  the large  size  of existing  Dutch  funds.
64.Note  many  ldcs  also  have  pay-as-you-go  social  security.
65.In  practice,  pension  funds  are  unwilling  to  invest  in  LDCs  given
illiquidity,  transfer  risk,  settlement  risk,  etc (see  Davis  (1991).APPENDIX  I
RETURNS  ON LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  AND PRIVATE  FUNDS
The data for the UK and US allows a futher comparison  of effects of ownership and
management  methods to be made, this time in the sarne markets, in that local governmnent
funds data can be identified  separately  from private-sector  funds.
Mean (standard  deviaton) of annual real total returns (domestic  currency)
UK:  Local authority funds  4.9  (13.4)
Private funds  5.6  (13.0)
US:  State and local funds  1.2  (12.6)
Private funds  2.7  (11.7)
*  1967-1988  for the UK
In each case, local goverm-nent  funds obtain lower returns than private funds.  This can be
related to more conservative  portfolio  distributions. UK local authority funds held an
average of 52% equity over the sample, while private funds held 56%.  For US funds the
difference is more dramatic; 25% and 53%.  Interestingly,  the risks in real tenn3 were
higher for the local government  funds, given the volatility of real returns on bonds (see Table
7).
55APPENDIX  II
This appendix  provides average real returns calculated  over the period 1971 90 as well as the
changes that would be implied  by standardized  portfolio structures.
56TAk  1:  C0uacsrle  of red  bla  riinml  1971-W
Mm  (_adard  deviaon)  of real WuVwhl  pnod  mum (domesi  crency)
hr  am  UIdW  UJbd  G_may  J_p"  Cama  Nedmrda  swum  Ihcnk  Swbmd  Mie:
S_w  de  Fern
LoA  3.9  (2.6)  1.2  (5.4)  5.2  (2.3)  0.9  (4.7)  4.2  (3.3)  3.9  (3.9)  3.0  (3.3)  6.5  (3.5)  2.4  (2.1)  2A  (33)
Monw  es  3.1  (14.2)  1.3  (5.7)  4.5  (1.5)  2.7  (5.2)  3.4  (13.2)  4.3  (28)  2.4  (3.1)  6.3  (3.7)  12  (2.5)  3.3  (2.7)
80ties  5.9  (14.9)  10.8  (31.3)  9.3  (20.4)  11.2  (21.0)  5.0  (17.8)  8.6  (30.1)  9.3  (23.7)  9.4  (29.4)  4.7  (22.2)  9.6  (23.3)
Bons  1.2  (15.0)  1.6  (11.5)  2.6  (15.1)  0.0  (20.3)  1.1  (12.8)  1.3  (11.5)  0.6  p.6)  4.5  (17.0)  -1.7  (13.7)  1.3  (13.9)
Showm  asset  2.1  (2.7)  1.5  (5.3)  2.9  (2.3)  40.7  (5.0)  2.6  (3.6)  1.7  (4.3)  0.9  (3.7)  1.7  (1.6)  1.1  (2.3)  1.9  (3.4)
propel  3.9  (5.5)  5.7  (13.0)  4.5  (2.8)  6.6  (7.2)  5.2  (5.8)  4.6  (15.0)  -
Foreign bonds  2.2  (16.0)  .0.4  (16.8)  3.8  (12.2)  2.9  (15.8)  -1.2  (13.9)  *0.1  (12.2)  0.6  (13.9)  -1.0  (12.9)  -1.6  (14.9j  0.4  (14.3)
Foreign equhies  9.6  (18.2)  6.2  (17.1)  10.6  (16.0)  8.6  (20.5)  6.4  (15.9)  6.7  (14.9)  7.4  (14.5)  5.9  (14.7)  5.2  (17.1)  7.2  (14.2)
Maewomma. inem:
laltma  (CPI)  6.3  (3.2)  9.8  (5.4)  3.3  (2.2)  5.5  (5.8)  6.9  (3.0)  4.9  (3.3)  3.4  (2.6)  7.9  (3.4)  4.2  (2.6)  8.0  (4.0)
Redemption  yield o
govermesv bonds  2.8  (3.4)  1.9  (4.3)  4.0  (1.4)  1.5  (4.7)  3.3  (3.1)  3.3  (2.9)  2.2  (3.0)  5.7  (2.2)  0.7  (1.9)  3.0  (3.0)
Real eaings  growth  0.5  (2.2)  2.4  (2.5)  3.6  (2.5)  3.0  (3.5)  1.1  (2.7)  1.4  (2.6)  1.1  (3.4)  25  (3.7)  1.6  (2.0)
56aTable 2:  Pension fund returns  (1971-90)
Mean  (Standard deviation)  of annual real total returns  (domestic currrency)
Percent
US  UK  Gennany  Japan  Canada  Netherlands  Sweden  Denmark  Switzerland
Using holding period returns
on bonds (all countries) and
fixed rate mortgages
(US & Canada)
4.0  (12.2)  7.4  (15.9)  5.2  (4.7)  4.9  (10.0)  2.7  (10.5)  4.3  (6.3)  0.0  (7.7)  4.9  (13.4)  1.5  (7.7)
Average earnings  0.5  (2.2)  2.4  (2.5)  3.6  (2.5)  3.0  (3.5)  1.1  (2.7)  1.4  (2.6)  1.1  (3.4)  2.5  (3.7)  1.6  (2.0)
Portfolio return less
average eamings  3.5  5.0  1.6  1.9  1.6  2.9  -1.1  2.4  -0.1
Governmentbonds  1.2  (15.0)  1.6  (11.5)  2.6  (IS.1)  0.0  (20.3)  I  (12.8)  1.8  (l1.5)  -0.6  (8.6)  4.5  (17.0)  -1.7  (18.7)
Market paper  2.6  (2.7)  1.5  (5.3)  2.9  (2.3)  -0.7  (5.0)  2.6  (3.6)  1.7  (4.3)  0.9  (3.7)  1.7  (1.6)  1.1  (2.3)
Equities  5.9  (14.9)  10.8  (31.8)  9.3  (20.4)  11.2  (21.0)  5.0  (17.8)  8.6  (30.1)  9.3  (23.7)  9.4  (29.4)  4.7  (222)
Memo: using rcdemption
yioIds on fixed rate
instentents  4.8  (7.9)  7.5  (13.8)  5.4  (3.3)  3.5  (2.7)  4.1  (5.5)  4.5  (5.8)  2.6  (3.1)  6.5  (2.5)  2.1  (4.1)
56bTable 3:  Ma  (stadard devidon)  of rea! total returns  on divenrifd porfolos 1971-1990
Dometic'  Domestic  &  Memo:
Per cant  InternatonaP  Column 2 less  Average
Earnings
United States  3.5  (13.4)  4.0  (13.2)  3.5
United Kingdom  6.2  (19.6)  5.5  (17.1)  3.1
Germany  5.9  (14.9)  6.2  (13.3)  2.6
Japan  5.6  (16.9)  5.6  (15.6)  2.6
Cauda  3.1  (12.1)  3.0  (11.7)  1.9
France  5.4  (19.7)  5.1  (17.3)  n/a
Netherlands  5.2  (18.4)  4.8  (16.4)  3.4
Sweden  4.3  (13.5)  4.2  (12.1)  3.1
Switzerlad  1.5  (16.9)  1.5  (14.9)  0.  1
Denmark  6.9  (20.0)  6.0  (17.4)  3.5
1  50% domestic equity, 50% domestic bonds.
2  40% domestic  equity,  40% domestic bonds,
10%  foreign equity, 10% foreign  bons.
Note: International diversificadon  should cause a convergence  in return. by increasing  below  average  returns and lowermg those
sbove average.  This would  occur if purchasing  power  parity held all the time.  In fact, large deviations  between  exchange  rates  an
purchasing power parities may prevent this convergence from materializing, at least in the short to medium run until corrections  in
exchange rates take  place.
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